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SHOUT A11ST I ¡ACT -  SIIMMAHY
This thesis presents an investigation of cognitive aspects of 
a perceptual motor skill. In particular the relationship between covert 
rehearsal (mental practice), imagery and memory is considered. An analy­
sis of past studies of mental practice suggested that some form of imagery 
is used by subjects to mentally rehearse certain aspects of various tasks.
It appears that mental practice produces relatively consistent performance 
improvements in tasks which are predominantly perceptual or motor in nature, 
rather than symbolic. Two different typos of imagery have been suggested} 
one based on the visual/porceptual system, the other based on the motor 
system. A review of the mental imagery literature considered the various 
methods of investigating imagery and outlined several hypothetical models 
of mental imagery. It was concluded that selective interference techniques 
offered the greatest potential for investigating mental imagery, as might 
bo employed in mental practice procedures.
A technique for investigating mental imagery was derived from a 
recent study by Finko (1979) in which the functional equivalence between 
images and actions was inferred from the presence or absence of imagery 
induced biasing or after-effects. The present research used a linofir 
positioning task, with novel movements interpolated between the learning 
and recall of a standard movement as the basic perceptual-motor task to bo 
investigated. In past research such tasks have boon shown to bo biased by 
characteristics of the interpolated movement. It was hypothesised that if 
imagery of movements and movements wore functionally equivalent, then 
biasing errors produced by making a novel interpolated movement should also 
bo present with instructions to imagine but not execute such a movement.
The results showed that instructions to execute or imagine linear movements 
produced similar effects on subjects* memory for other linear movements.
A series of five further experiments then investigated the nature of imagory 
used in this task, by means of a selective interference paradigm, used to 
suppress any imagory offocts. The results of those experiments suggested 
that this typo of imagory primarily involved a spatial information processing 
system. The seventh experiment investigated the relationship between imagos 
of linear movements and subjects' memory for such movements. It was found 
that tasks which suppressed imagos also intorfored with subjects' memory 
for linear movomonts. It was concluded from this that subjects' images of 
linear movements and their memory for that class of movement primarily 
involved tho representation of spatial information. Tho final experiment 
investigated tho offocts of instructions to form imagos of a non-spa+ial 
task on subjocts' memory for a similar non-spatial task. Instructions to 
imagino a novel pressure, interpolated botwoon tho learning and recall of 
a standard pressure, failed to prodtico a predicted biasing offeet. However, 
it appeared, from subjective reports, that subjocts woro generating spatial 
images which hod littlo or no significant offoct on how tho task had boon 
remembered.
This research shows that imagery of linear movements involves 
n spatial information processing system and that even in a task with 
little spatial informational content it is the spatial aspects of tho tasks 
which are reported in subjects' imagory. It is suggested that this may 
reflect tho importance of spatial information in action control. Mental 
practice appears to he a procedure in which subjects use images consisting 
largely of spatial information to represent tho environmental conditions 
for and consequences of action.
' v i i
LONG ABSTRACT
Briefly this research has focused on the cognitive processes 
involved in learning a simple perceptual motor skill. These cognitive 
processes arc highlighted in the relationship between memory and 
rehearsal. Rehearsal can be thought of as a continuum of procedures 
with overt rehearsal, in the form of actual practice at one end and 
covert rehearsal, in the form of mental practice at the other. Actual 
practice procedures are well covered in the psychological literature 
on training, while mental practice (MP) has not attracted much interest 
from psychologists. If one can assume that the effects of rehearsal 
occur within memory, then it is impossible to distinguish the effects 
of rehearsal procedures without identifying memory representations.
A full explanation of the rehearsal of motor acts must include an 
understanding of how those acts are represented in memory.
A review of the mental practice literature revealed improve­
ments in performance, in terms of reduced errors and increased speed 
which occur in a variety of tasks following MI5 instructions. When 
comparisons aro made botwoon MP, actual practice and no practice 
groups, it seems that MP consistently produces more improvements than 
no practice groups, but only occasionally aro those improvements 
grontor than actual practice groups. Further analysis of this litera­
ture revoalod that MP has boon applied to a varioty of tasks under a 
variety of conditions.
An early hypothesis of MP, Morrisott (lOlft), suggested that 
MP would tie host suited to "symbolic" tasks, or thoso which wore 
sequential and highly vorbalisod. The curront roviow includod a
•»i.
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classification of tasks based on Morrisott's definitions, in terms 
of their "symbolic", "perceptual" and motor components. It appears 
that, contrary to earlier claims, MP produces improvements in per­
formance most consistently with motor and perceptual tasks rather 
than symbolic tasks.
Another dimension of this review considered the amount and 
type of prior training which subjects had prior to the MP condition, 
compared with no practice and actual practice conditions. The set of 
types and amounts of practice included no prior training, li^  trials 
or less on the task itself, 15 or more trials on the task itself or 
prior training on some other task. Of these, 1/f. trials or less on 
the task itself resulted in the most consistent improvements in per­
formance with MP. While MP still produced a high proportion of 
improvements following moro than 15 trials of prior training, the 
increased amounts of prior training had no additional benefits for MP.
Possibly the most important finding to omergo from this 
roviow was the inclusion of "cues" to aid MP. It seems that when 
subjects are told to "think about" or "imagine" performing tho task 
they are rarely loft with no "cues" to aid this procoduro. In fact 
tho Ml’ sossions woro most ofton structured in specific ways, with 
particular cues being provided by tho oxporimontor. Thoso cues woro 
either visual, such ns tho apparatus) verbal instructions presented 
either as written or spoken lists of procedures) action cues, in which 
tho subject is roquirod to produco cortnin movements which aro schematic 
of thoso roquired in tho actual task) or no cuos at all. Mental practice 
consistently produces a higher proportion of improvements when visual 
cuos are providod during the practice sossion.
Tho existing hypotheses of MP are vague and in some cases 
untestable but there is some consensus within the literature that a 
form of "imagery" is used by subjects to aid their MP. It seems that 
mental imagery is a fundamental process in mental practice and that 
this imagery process has important consequences for skill acquisition. 
Wli.it is not clear Prom tho existing literature is the nature of mental 
imagery in perceptual motor skills.
A review of tho mental imagery literature showed that very 
little attention had been given to imagery ns an aspect of MP. The 
main focus of this literature is towards "visual" imagery. However, 
there has boon a sufficient variety of investigations to allow some 
evaluation of tho various experimental techniques to be made. Those 
techniques include, introspective analysis, questionnaires, reaction 
times or chronometric analysis and selective interference. It was 
felt that selective interference techniques offered the most "power" 
in terms of identifying psychological processes. Tho main assumption 
of interference techniques being that tasks which interfere with per­
formance compete for some common resource. Of course it could be 
argued that interference is caused by a general capacity loading. 
Therefore one of the aims of this research was to show that selective 
interference techniques can ho successfully employed to identify 
underlying cognitive processes.
With tho benefits of those reviews of MP and mental imagery, 
a series of experiments was designed to explore the nature of imagery 
in MP on n perceptual motor task. Tho foremost problem for this 
research was to find a suitable task which would give evidence of a 
subject's use of mental imagery. A series of experiments by Finko (1979)
hail previously shown that instructions to imagine pointing and the 
effects of pointing at a target while wearing goggles fitted with 
displacing prisms and pointing at a target produced systematic 
biasing of subsequent pointing.
Biasing effects have also been found with linear positioning 
tasks in which subjects are required to learn a movement along a track 
by sliding a cursor to a predetermined stop. If the subject is required 
to first learn one movement, and then, during a retention interval, to 
produce a movement of a different extent to a different location along 
the track, their recall of the learned movement is biased towards the 
interpolated movement; this is known as the "interpolation effect". 
Assuming that images of movements can produce performance effects then 
one might expect similar biasing or interpolation effects when the 
interpolated movement is imagined. This research made use of this 
technique to investigate mental imagery and what follows is a brief 
summary of the eight experiments carried out.
Experiment I was designed to investigate the equivalence of 
linear positioning movements and instructions to imagine linoar posi­
tioning movements. By comparing the biasing effects produced by 
imagining novel interpolated movements and the actual production of 
interpolated movements it was possible to investigate thoir equivalence. 
Controls in which subjects oithor counted backwards in throes, or 
imagined the same movement they had previously learned were also 
included during the retention interval. It was found that imagory of 
linoar positioning movements is functionally oquivalont, in torms of 
its biasing effect to producing linear positioning movomonts. Imagory 
is difforont from producing linear movements thougti, in that tho sub-
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sequent recall contained less variability. Furthermore imagining the 
same movement further reduces the variability in motor memory. Thus 
imagery operates on the memory trace of a linear positioning movement.
In the case of imagining a novel movement this can have a biasing 
effect on motor performance. When subjects are instructed to imagine 
the same movement then a consolidation of the memory trace occurs.
This suggests that the imagery process involves manipulation of per­
ceptual representations in memory rather than activation of the motor 
production systems.
Experiment II was aimed at investigating the nature of mental 
imagery by using a selective interference paradigm to suppress the 
previously observed imagery produced biasing effect. This experiment 
used the previously established interpolation effect for imagery in­
structions, with the addition of various interference stimuli which 
occurred while subjects were attempting to carry out imagery instructions. 
The interference stimuli wore either visual or motor; visual interference 
consisted of inspecting an XY display monitor and motor interference 
required subjocts to squeeze a hand hold dynamomotor. The results were 
that the visual/spatial interference stimulus suppresses tho imagery 
produced bins while tho motor stimulus did not affect imagery. This 
suggests that imagery of linear positioning movements involves some 
cognitive rosource which is taxed by a concurrent visual/spatial task. 
Therefore it seems that this typo of imagery involves visual/spatial 
processes.
Experiment III sought to roplicato Experiment II but with a 
loss complex visual intorforonco stimulus and a more complex motor 
task, in term of its involvement of tho motor system. Tho visual
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interference stimulus was now two flashing lights positioned above 
the track in non-rolevant locations. Tho subject's task was to report 
which of tho two lights appeared brighter (in fact they wore of equal 
brightness) and how many times a particular light flashed on. The 
motor task now required tho subject to push, with their outstretched 
arm, against a pressure plate, mounted at shoulder height. Tho results 
of this experiment confirmed those of Experiment II in that a visual/ 
spatial task suppressed any imagery produced bias while the motor task 
appeared not to affect imagery. Manipulating the level of visual and 
motor interference stimuli did not appear to alter their effect on 
mental imagery. It seems that imagery of linear positioning movements 
utilises a visual/spatial processing resource rather than a motor 
resource.
Tho fourth experiment investigated tho assumption that inter­
ference tasks compete for a specific resource. It was intended to see 
if separate effects could bo found for tho specific resource taxed by 
the interference stimulus and its response demands on a general response 
capacity. A further manipulation of this experiment was tho inclusion 
of a verbal interference task, to tost an hypothesis that subjects 
might rehearse or "imagine" movements by counting^perhaps subvocally.
The results showed that a concurrent verbal task had no effects on 
imagory. It was also found that increasing tho rosponso demand of the 
interference stimulus had no effect on tho bias produced by imagery, but 
it decreased the variability in tho subject's recall. This suggests 
that tho rosponso demand of a particular interference stimulus affocts 
tho output or response production component of variablo error (VE) 
while tho specific naturo of tho stimulus affects the tnomory rosourco 
usod by imagory.
The fifth experiment sought to distinguish between the 
visual and spatial components of an interference stimulus. The 
previous experiments have shown that imagery of a linear positioning 
movement is suppressed by a visual/spatial task. In the present 
experiment visual, kinaosthetic and auditory tasks wore either of a 
spatial or non-spatial nature. The results showed that non-spatial 
tasks, including a visual non-spatial task, did not suppress imagery 
of a linear positioning task. All spatial interference tasks regardless 
of their source, suppressed imagery. Therefore it is the spatial rather 
than visual nature of the interference tasks which suppresses imagery 
of linear positioning movements. This suggests that the processes 
involved in mental imagery involve spatial processing, and that this 
processing is independent of the modality of sensory input.
The sixth experiment employed a different spatial task as an 
interference stimulus. It had previously been reported that simple Y 
mazes wore capable of being loomed from throe different methods of 
instructions; visual, verbal or motoric. In this experiment subjects 
wore instructed to imagine a novel interpolated linoar movement whilo 
attempting to learn tho corroct path through a Y maze, from eithor a 
visual, vorbal or motoric source of information. Other subjects wore 
roquirod to imagine tho same novel interpolated movement whilo res­
ponding to one of tho visual, vorbal or motor, non-spatial interference 
tasks. Tho results showod that only spatial tasks suppressed imagory 
of linear positioning movements. This confirms tho previous experi­
mental finding that imagery involvos tho processing of spatial information, 
or at loast involvos some or all of those parts of tho cognitive system 
which nro normally usod to process spatial information. It seems then 
that images of linear positioning movements nro primarily manipulations
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of spatial representations.
The seventh experiment was designed to test a hypothesis 
that images and movements, in the case of a linear positioning task, 
are equivalent at a level of memory representation. If images are 
primarily spatial and the memory representation for the linear posi­
tioning task is of spatial information then those tasks which suppress 
imagery should also interfere with the memory representations for a 
linear positioning task. Therefore in this experiment the same mani­
pulations of spatial and non-spatial stimuli were used, but without 
instructions to imagine a novel movement. It was found that, as 
predicted spatial tasks interfered with subsequent recall of a linear 
positioning movement, while non-spatial tasks had no effects on subjects' 
memory. This suggests that linear positioning movements are represented 
by their spatial component. Furthermore images of linear positioning 
movements manipulate the representation for the movement itself. Thus 
images and movements, with respect to a linear positioning task, are 
functionally equivalent in their effects on memory for movements.
The eighth and final experiment investigated the generality 
of previous findings to non-spatial motor tasks. Provious results have 
consistently shown that imagery of a linear positioning task involvos 
spatial information. This is hardly surprising since linoar positioning 
tasks aro primarily spatial in nature. It is not clear whothor othor 
forms of imagery operate when the task itself is of a non spatial nature. 
Ono such task involvos learning a forco, in which subjects aro roquirod 
to push n lover which has very little linoar movement with it. Past 
research has shown that similar biasing offoots occur with interpolated 
pressures ns occurs with interpolated linear positioning movoinents.
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Thoroforo if subjects are able to imagino applying a pressure or 
force, then instructions to imagino applying a novel pressure inter­
polated between the learning and recall of criterion pressure should 
produce biasing effects which are similar to those produced by applying 
such a pressure. The results showed that subjects instructed to imagino 
applying a pressure did not produce any more bias at recall than counting 
backwards in threes did, while applying a novel pressure produced a 
significant bias at recall.
It seems that images do not share an equivalence with the 
memory representation for applied pressures. In a debriefing session 
all subjects reported that they had fonnod an image of pressing but the 
imago featured their own hand on the lover, being moved in a downward 
direction but by a "magnified" amount. Thus it appears that in this 
experiment the main feature of the subjects' images was still spatial.
The findings from this series of experiments arc summarised
below.
(1) Instructions to imagino linoar movements have an offeet on 
subsequont linear movements. This offoct can either have positive or 
negative transfer effects to the subsequent recall of a loarnod linear 
mwvomont depending on the typo of movemont imagined. If subjocts are 
instructed to imagino a novel linear movomont thon their recall of a 
learned criterion linear movement is biased towards the imagined 
movement. Alternatively if tlio imagined movement and tho criterion 
movement are tho same then rocall performance improves compnrod to a 
control group who simply count backwards during tho retention interval.
(2) Imagery of linear movements does not appear to involvo the motor
production system, since the variability in a subject's recall per­
formance score is much lower in conditions involvino imagery instructions, 
compared with equivalent motor production conditions.
(3) Interference tasks which occur at the same time as an imagery 
instruction only suppress imagery effects when they have a spatial 
component to them.
(^ i) This spatial component is independent of the sensory modality in 
which it is presented. Indeed, spatial information presented either 
visually, motorically, auditorally or verbally suppress imagery effects, 
whilo non spatial tasks in any of these presentation modes has no effects 
on imagery.
(5) Separate interference effects wore found for attentional load, as 
reflected by response demand of the task, and resource demand.
(6) Similar interference offects of spatial tasks wore found for 
imagory and movements. Those tasks which had suppressed imagery effects 
also interfered with subjects' memory for linear movements when no 
imagory instructions were given.
(7) No evidence for imagory offects was found with a non-spatial motor 
task. It seems that imngory of motor acts only exerts a memory offoct 
on the spatial properties of a perceptual motor task.
Those are the main findings from the oxporimonts carried out 
during this research project. It seems that mental practice of linoar 
movement involvos the generation of an imago which is not simply visual
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nor motoric in nature but which is in some sense spatial, or at least 
contains spatial information within it. The process by which this 
imago generation improves performance seems to involve the reduction 
of output noise from the motor production system and the enhancement 
of the spatial characteristics of the memory for the movement. It 
remains to be soon by further research if other non-spatial tasks can 
be enhanced by imagery instructions.
This research has made some contribution to our understanding 
of the cognitive processes involved in skill acquisition and retention 
in that it has highlighted the coding of a perceptual motor skill and 
ways in which different cognitive processes might function.
While this particular rosearcli was based on a simple laboratory 
task, there are some practical implications which might bo of use. In 
particular the benefit to training gained from a breakdown of the effects 
of mental practice is worthwhile. It should be possible to identify 
which situations will bo best suited to MP procedures. Perceptual motor 
tasks which havo a spatial component (and most real world tasks do) can 
be rehearsed by means of imagining those spatial aspects. This can bo 
aided by a visual cue, such ns a video tape of the environment in which 
the action is to be performed. Ono possibility is that imagory of move­
ments might be used in conjunction with othor motor nets. If, as it 
seems, motor acts of a non spatial nature are not affected by images, 
then subjects might actually practice the lion-spatial parts while 
imagining tho spatial parts of the skill.
While tho present research project lias roachod a convenient 
and logical end-point it 1ms only begun to oxploro tho cognitive elements
of skill. In many ways the present research has raised more questions 
than it has answered, but those questions are now more clearly defined 
and address specific applications of the present research findings. 
Perhaps the foremost question to bo asked is whether motor acts are 
primarily represented in terms of their spatial characteristics or if 
different tasks have say a force or temporal representation. Furthermore 
what kind of cognitive processes are capable of operating on these rep­
resentations if imagery is confined to a spatial representation?
On a more practical note, the implementation of now training 
procedures encompassing covert and overt rehearsal needs to bo carefully 
considered with respect to the cost/bonofit analysis of various training 
methods. While training is very much event driven, that is to say, in 
practice one trains people to do particular known tasks, the future 
training needs are very much unknown. Consequently rosoarcli on training 
should now bo aimed at evaluating all possible typos of training and 
rehearsal procedures with a view to their optimisation. Perhaps, if 
one might attempt to predict the future training needs, there will bo 
a shift from manual skills to cognitive skills in which covert rehearsal 
procedures will bo oven more usoful.
CHAPTER ONE
MEMORY REHEARSAL AND PERCEPTIJAL-MOTOR-SKILL; AN INTRODUCTION
1.1 A Cognitive Approach
In his monograph supplement Woodworth (1899) complains that 
psychology has neglected motor skill. Motor acts wore not included 
within the psychological study of consciousness. In defence of the 
role of consciousness in motor acts Woodworth makes the following claim:
"Movement enters consciousness not only ns perceived 
but as intended. And the relation of the movement executed 
to the movement intended is just as important to the study of 
conscious life as is the relation of the perception to the 
stimulus perceived."
Woodworth (1899) p.2.
There has boon little change in tho attitude of psychologists 
towards motor acts since this time. With a few exceptions, psychological 
researchers have not investigated motor acts within cognitive psychology. 
Recent years have soon an upsurge of interest, particularly from physical 
education, in motor control. Tho majority of current research on tho 
psychological aspects of motor control is being carried out by mombors 
of physical education departments. It seems that cither cognitive 
psychologists do not considor motor acts to have a cognitive component, 
or else they find tho investigation of motor acts more complox than other 
more heavily populated areas of interest. Tho first of tlioso reasons is 
ill-founded, many cognitive psychology texts aro now including chapters 
on skills and motor skills in particular (Harvey and Greer in Claxton 
(1980), and Andorson (1980) aro but two examplos). Fitts (1964) rocog- 
nisod that motor skills passed through a cognitive phase in which tho 
symbolic components of tho motor act wore perceived and roprosontod in 
momory. Moro rocently Gontillo (1972) suggests that motor skills havo
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a cognitive element which is present at all times not simply during 
their acquisition. An example of tho cognitive aspect of motor acts 
is tho planning and covert rehearsal of tho movement. In a recent 
review of memory for motor acts Laabs and Simmons (1981) claim that 
such things as location and distance information are rohearsable while 
force information is not.
If it is tho case that motor acts are difficult to investi­
gate then they deserve greater attention since it is the purpose of 
science to explain not to ignore. Tho investigation of cognitive 
aspects of motor skills ought to be the concern of cognitive psycho- 
logy, or cognitive science as it now wishes to bo called.
The cognitive basis of motor skills is highlighted in tho 
relationship between memory and rehearsal of movements. Rehearsal 
can bo thought of as a continuum of procedures with overt rehearsal 
at one end and covert rehearsal at tho other. Overt rehearsal of 
motor skills has boon widely studiod by psychologists in tho past.
This rosoarch, roviowed by Holding (1965) and Annott (1969)* has 
been concerned with tho frequency of rehearsal and amount of actual 
practico. Considering tho quantity of rosoarcli carriod out on the 
various forms of overt rohoarsal there lias boon littlo advancement 
in our understanding of how motor skills are controlled.
At tho other end of this continuum is covert rehearsal. Most 
of tho research on covert rehearsal has boon in tho area of verbal 
looming. Tulving nnd Donaldson (1975) suggost two forms of rohcarsalj 
ninintonnneo nnd olnborntivo. Maintenance rohonrsal enables items to bo
kopt in memory, its only function being to delay any decaying process. 
Elaborativo rehearsal extends a memory traco by activating an asso­
ciated network which integrates a piece of knowledge with existing 
stored memory items and so embellishes the memory traco. The covert 
rehearsal of motor acts has boon studied, mainly by physical education 
researchers, under the guise of mental practice. Reviews of mental 
practico have boon provided by Richardson (1967a, b) and Corbin 
(1972). Unfortunately the accounts of mental practico presented aro 
vague. There appears to have boon no theoretical guidance to any of 
the experimental studios. Covert rehearsal or mental practico of a 
motor act may simply prevent any memory decay through constantly re­
activating the memory traco, as in maintenance rehearsal. Alternatively 
mental practico may facilitate the development of a new, more elaborated 
memory trace.
It lias boon suggested that some form of olaborativo rohcarsal 
may account for the improvements in performance following "rest-periods" 
(reminiscence effects). I11 a rccont study Frith and Lang (1979) suggest 
that improvements in performance of a tracking task, following rest 
periods woro duo to subjects actively formulating now motor programmes 
and re-organising the momory representation for the skill during the 
rest period. Ono function of this olaborativo rohcarsal and re-pro­
gramming is to automatiso now components of the skill.
Ilocauso the main offocts of rehearsal occur within momory it 
is impossible to distinguish the offocts of rohoarsal procossos without 
identifying momory representations. A full explanation of covort 
rehearsal of motor acts must include on understanding of how thoso acts
are represented in memory,
Ih
/, _
It is tho aim of this thesis to investigate and explain how 
a perceptual motor-task is represented in memory and how that represen­
tation is involved in tho covert rehearsal of tho task. This problem 
is indeed a cognitive one. Motor acts cannot bo fully explained without 
an understanding of tho cognitive processes involved. Furthermore cog­
nitive psychology cannot ignore tho production of motor acts. Noissor 
(1976) states that actions are clearly within tho framework of cognition. 
Noisscr's perceptual cycle captures tho dynamic nature of cognition and 
actions. Motor acts are, at one and the same time, the consequences of 
previous perceptual activity and the initiation for now perceptual 
processing.
A prominent, but controversial, topic within cognitive psycho­
logy is imagery. According to Neisser images occur when tho cognitive 
system is prepared to receive a particular input but tho external 
stimulus does not occur. This is very similar to tho notion of percep­
tual sot described by Woodworth (1930). Tho relationship between 
rohcarsal and imagory is quite strong. Tho use of imagery as a mnemonic 
technique has boon recognised by psychologists (c.g. Bugolski (1971)* 
Morris and Roid (1970), Morris and Stevens (l97/')t Richardson (19OO)) 
at least within verbal learning. The role of imagory within motor 
learning is less clear. Mental practice has frequently been doscribod 
ns a process of imago generation, but definitions of imagory within 
motor learning are vague and scarce. Kelso and Wnllnco (1978) suggost 
that movement production is based upon an image. They rolnto "plans" 
and "pro-soloction" effects showing improvod retention characteristics 
for subject defined movements as opposed to oxperimontor dofined 
movements, to tho subject's activation of an imago. Thoy dofino an imago 
ns "tho environmental consoquoncos of a movcmorit". Tho rolo of this imago
boing "to generate anticipatory signals that proparo tho actor to 
accept certain kinds of information" p.103. This is very much in 
tho vein of Ncissor's (1976) definition of imagery and adds little 
to his original ideas.
Imagery lias boon mentioned in connection with motor acts 
in the past. William James (1890) identified
"an anticipatory imago of the sensorial consequences of 
movement which ..... is tho only psychic state which 
introspection lots us discern of tho forcrunnor of our 
voluntary acts" p.501
Unfortunately tho definition of an imago seems to have boon vague 
throughout psychology, consequently many of tho arguments about 
imagery have concentrated upon what wo moan by an image.
1.2 Linear Positioning Tasks
A control feature of tho rosoarch prosontod in this thesis 
is the linear positioning task. This simple perceptual motor task 
requires subjects to loam movements by sliding a cursor along a 
fixed linear track. This task had its beginnings in Woodworth's 
(l899) rosoarch on lino drawing. His monograph supplement is a report 
of his studios on tho control of voluntary movements and his basic 
task involved producing linear movomonts. To record thoso inovoinonts 
Woodworth used poncil and paper. With this basic oxporimontal proce­
dure Woodworth was able to1show that our memory for movomonts enablos 
us to reproduce tho samo movement with rolativo accuracy. A similar 
study was also carried out by Thorndike.
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In lator years Hilodoau and Uilodeau (1989) enhanced tho
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basic lino drawing task by introducing lover positioning. This 
enabled more rigid control to bo made over the typo of movements 
subjects wore able to make. Further work was carried out by Annctt. 
Annott (1969) began to draw people's attention to what we would now 
call the underlying cognitive processes involved in learning simple 
lover positioning movements. This was particularly true with respect 
to the role of knowledge of results (KR) and feedback in such tasks.
Shortly after Annott*s work on linear positioning Adams 
and Dijkstra (1 9 6 6) started what was to load Adams to a model of 
motor learning, based on the role of KR in linear positioning tasks.
From about 1966 onwards Adams with various associates began to syste­
matically investigate the role of KR and visual versus kinacsthctic 
feedback in motor learning on a linear positioning task. Ry controlling 
the conditions under which subjects learned and recalled linear movements 
Adams was able to show that subjects roly heavily on KR during learning 
which was normally provided by the experimenter. For Adams, skill 
acquisition, on this task, load to the establishment of a "perceptual 
trace" which allowed the subject to produce particular movements in 
the absence of external KR. It further appoarod that visual information 
picked up by the subject during learning was important for tho develop­
ment of tills perceptual trace. In recent years Adams has argued for 
the dominance of visual over other sensory inputs for tho control of 
movements.
In tho early 1970's researchers in physical education began 
to tako an interest in tho experimental investigation of motor control 
and in particular tho linear positioning task. Various forms of mani­
pulation wore derived focusing on the learning, retention or recall
phase of the linear positioning task. In its standard form the 
linear positioning task requires subjects to move a slide to a 
fixed stop for a number of learning trials. This may then be 
followed by a short unfilled retention interval and a number of 
recall trials in which the subject has to return the slide to the 
original position with the stop removed. This has been termed 
"constrained movements". Adams varied the form of learning 
so that instead of moving to a stop subjects were given verbal 
feedback of their error from an experimenter determined position, 
for example the experimenter might report -11 cm or +11 cm depending 
on whether the subject had undershot or overshot the criterion 
position. Adams, Gopher and Lintorn (1977) had subjects learn a 
movement in this way while blindfolded and then compared a "visual" 
recall group with a "kinaosthctic" recall group. It was found that 
the visual recall group had lower errors scores (i.o. closer to target 
position) at recall than the kinaosthctic recall group. This super­
iority of recall with visual monitoring of movements load Adams et al 
to propose a visual dominance of the "perceptual trace" for motor 
control. Further experiments by Chow (1976) in which throo different 
typos of KR wore compared, visual, verbal and motor showed no 
differences in subsequent recall performance, which suggests that the 
perceptual trace is in fact amodal. However, Johnson (i960) varied 
the form of feedback available to subjects both during learning and 
at recall. It was found that subjects who had loamod a linear posi­
tioning movement with visual feedback and were then requirod to recall 
the same movement without visual feodback had greater errors at recall 
than a group of subjects who learned the movement blindfolded and 
recalled it blindfolded. I'lirthormoro the blindfolded learning and 
recall group hnd loss error than a group which learned tho movomont
US'
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blind then recalled it with vision, but this group continued to 
show learning during recall. Therefore subjects prefer to recall 
movements in the conditions under which they were learned; however, 
there is ‘.uperiority for visual over non visual information.
This suggests that the linear positioning task is primarily a spatial 
ta k wnich involves learning a position nnd distance along i track 
and that the visual modality is most suited to processing information.
Arguments have been raised as to whether it is position or 
distance that is beamed during a linear positioning task. Recently 
Walsh, Russell and Crassini (l98l) have shown that subjects rely 
on both distance and location information. The two typos of informa­
tion interact such that the subjects who are told to ignore the distance 
and learn the location are affected by moving the starting point of the 
movement, while subjects who are instructed to ignore the location 
and learn the distance aro biased towards a particular end location 
which was pertinent during learning.
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A further development has been the use of the subject's own 
pre-seloctod movements rather than experimenter determined movements.
In standard linear positioning tasks in which subjects are allowed to 
pre-select where their movement will terminate it seems that their 
movement errors at recall are much lower than when preceded by moving 
to a stop, Kelso and Frokany (1978)«
In experiments of this type It is the cognitive processing 
prior to movement which is being Investigated. Therefore while the 
linear positioning task is a simple perceptual motor task it offers
')
a range of experimental manipulations which can bo used to investi­
gate the underlying processes of motor control.
Finally one part of the linear positioning task paradigm 
which can be experimentally manipulated is the retention interval.
It is possible to vary the length and/or the subject's activities 
during the retention interval. It appears that varying the length 
of the retention interval differentially affects recall of pre­
selected and constrained movements, in that preselected movements 
are retained better over longer intervals. There appears to be a 
distinction between the affects of filled and unfilled retention 
intervals on subsequent recall only when the activity during the 
retention interval involves movements of a similar kind to the to be 
recalled movement. No systematic investigation of the affects of 
various interpolated activities has been made, although Popper and 
Herman (1970) and others have shown that specific biasing affects 
can be caused by interpolating particular motor tasks between 
loarning and recall of standard movements.
1.3. An Outlino of the Present Hoscarch
The following chapters first prosont a roviow of tho literature 
of covert rohoarsal (or mental practico) in motor skills. This work has 
boon carried out mainly by rosoarchors in physical education, conse­
quently the psychological implications of thoir studies arc not nlways 
clear. First critoria of acceptability wore established for tho 
inclusion of reports within tho roviow. This was necessary sinco many 
of tho experiments wero without any controls and somo escape statistical 
analysis. An analysis of acceptable experiments was porformod to idontify
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tho underlying processes of mental practice. Finally suggested 
theories of mental practice wore evaluated against existing empirical 
evidence. The third chapter presents a review of montal imagery. 
Because much of this work lias been carried out within the main area 
of cognitive psychology it is mainly concerned witli visual and per­
ceptual processes in imagery. This roviow includes an examination 
of tho experimental techniques, sucli as introspection, questionnaires, 
chronomotric analysis and interference techniques. Theories of montal 
imagery are reviewed and some arguments about the existence of images 
as a cognitive process within a memory recall system are presented.
Tho next eight chapters present a series of experiments 
which investigate tho naturo of montal imagery in the covert rehearsal 
of movements. 1!y using a variety of interference stimuli presented 
concurrent with iinagory instructions tho underlying properties of 
movement images are investigated. Some arguments are presented which 
relate images and linear movements to an abstract form of memory 
representation.
A linoar positioning task, which consists of loaming to 
move a slide along a track to a roquirod stop and than being able to 
reproduce the same movement along tho track but with tho stop removed, 
was tho main experimental task. Past experiments on such a task havo 
shown that one of the things which can bo manipulated is the retention 
interval. If subjects arc required to produce a novel movement to a 
different point along tho track during tho retention intorval then 
their subsequent recall of tho original movement is biasod towards 
this now point. Such affects aro woll documented in tho motor 
looming litoraturo.
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The experiments which follow make use of this biasing 
effect with linear positioning movements in a rather subtle way.
Certain groups of subjects are instructed to imagine, rather than 
produce, a movement to a novel point along the track during the 
retention interval. By comparison with other groups of subjects 
who either produce novel movements or else perform some other 
activity such as counting backwards during the retention interval, 
it is possible to investigate the functional equivalence of images 
of movement and movement itself.
It was found that in many ways images of movements and 
movements themselves are functionally equivalent and evidence is 
presented in Chapter I V  which shows that instructions to imagine 
movements has a profound effect on the memory for a linear positioning 
movement, which can either enhance or bias the subject’s memory for 
the correct position. Imagery is shown to produce both negative and 
positive interference effects on subjects' performance in a linear 
positioning task depending upon the typo of movement subjocts aro 
instructed to imagino.
Furthor investigations of montal imagery and movements woro 
mado possible by using an additional intorforonco task to supress the 
effects of montal imagory in a linear positioning task. This, of course, 
assumes that there is some relationship between tho cognitive processes 
required to produce images and tho spocific resources taxed by tho 
supressant. The strength of tliis assumption is justified In later 
experiments when separate affects aro found for task comploxity and 
rosourco demand. Tho gonoral capacity loading of the suprossant 
appears to produce a soparato offoct on motor performance than that of
The experiments which follow make use of this biasing 
effect with linear positioning movements in a rather subtle way.
Certain groups of subjects are instructed to imagine, rather than 
produce, a movement to a novel point along the track during the 
retention interval. By comparison with other groups of subjects 
who either produce novel movements or else perform some other 
activity such as counting backwards during the retention interval, 
it is possible to investigate the functional equivalence of images 
of movement and movement itself.
It was found that in many ways images of movements and 
movements themselves arc functionally equivalent and evidence is 
presented in Chapter iy which shows that instructions to imagine 
movements has a profound effect on the memory for a linear positioning 
movement, which can either enhance or bias the subject's memory for 
the correct position. Imagery is shown to produce both nogativo and 
positive interference effects on subjects' performance in a linear 
positioning task depending upon the typo of movement subjects nro 
instructed to imagine.
Furthor investigations of montal imagery and movements woro 
mado possible by using an additional intorforonco task to supress the 
effects of montal iinagory in a linear positioning task. This, of courso, 
assumes that thoro is soino relationship botwoon tho cognitive processes 
required to produce images and tho specific resources taxed by tho 
suprossant. Tho strength of this assumption is justified in later 
experiments when separate affocts nro found for task complexity and 
rosourco domnnd. Tho gonoral capacity loading of the suprossant 
appears to produco a sopnrnto effect on motor porformnneo than that of
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tho specific resource demands.
The final chapter draws together the intricate relationships 
between memory, imagery and motor acts. Suggestions are made for tho 
application of imagery in motor learning situations and about future 
research in applied and theoretical settings.
nCHAPTER TWO
MENTAL PRACTICE
The process by which performance improves following a period 
of imagining some aspects of the task has boon called mental practice 
(MP). There have boon a number of studies over the past fifty years 
which seem to show that performance does indeed improve following MP. 
Unfortunately little of this research has boon aimed at a theoretical 
explanation of the underlying processes. Instead the main concern has 
boon with the amount and situations under which MP is offoctivo. The 
state of this field of research is rather unsatisfactory for various 
reasons. First there is no way in which the exporimonter can indepen­
dently chock that the instruction to practico mentally has boon carriod 
out. Tills moans that tho oxporimontor does not know what tho subject 
is doing when improvements in performance do or do not occur as the 
case may bo. Second tho litorature contains a high proportion of 
studios in which essential controls are lacking such ns actual practico 
and no practico conditions ns well ns an MP condition. In his review 
Corbin (1972) described n "typical" oxporimont in which thoro is a no 
practice group, an MP group, a physical prnctico group and a combinod 
MP/physical practico group. This is far from boing a typical study,
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it is almost an ideal, although one would want a combined MP/no 
practice group as well.
There have been two reviews of MP, one by Richardson 
(1967a, 1>) and more recently Corbin (1972). Doth of those provide 
a reasonably coherent account of the findings from the various 
studies, but neither of them sufficiently analyse those studies in 
terms of underlying processes. Again their main force is to provide 
evidence for the existence of MP effects. Each of thoso reviews docs, 
however, provide some vague theoretical suggestions as to why MP 
should improve performance but this is devoid of any empirical evidence. 
The present review is fundamentally different from past work in that 
an analytical approach to the procedures involved in MP arc considered.
2.1. The Equivalence Of MP And Actual Practice
A roviow of tho litoraturo produced a corpus of over 70 
published reports on MP and ovon more if such vaguo notions as "Tho 
inner game" method of training are considered. Tho inner game technique 
attempts to uso such tilings as relaxation, imagory and consciousness 
to improve tho subject's performance. Its main aim appoars to bo to 
focus the subject's attention on somo oxtornal part of tho task, such 
as the flight of the ball in tennis, and to loavo tho control and 
organisation froo of intorfcronco from conscious monitoring. The 
psychological processes which this procedure makes use of nro varied 
but it has some relationship with Ornstcin's (1977) view of consciousness. 
In ossonco tho inner game technique is assumed to pormit tho "shift" 
of control from tho loft or vorbal hemisphere to tho right-spatial 
hemisphere, such broad generalisations about hemispheric functioning
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are, to say the least, tenous. Cnly a relatively small number 
of MP studies escape serious criticisms, such as inadenuate or 
non-existent control conditions against which the experimental 
condition(s) can be compared, e.g. Start (I960), (196^ ) and 
Powell fly/3). Other reports fail to give sufficient detail 
auout the procedures used in the experiment to be of use. The 
comparisons made between different types of practice methods do 
not always take into account the initial level of performance ach- 
-irveri in the learning phase of the experiment. In some cases, 
no statistical significance is attached to the difference between 
conditions.
These déficiences within the corpus of experimental evidence 
are more serious than deviations in the type or length of practice, 
instructions to subjects or type of task used which past reviewers 
have considered. The discrepancies brought about through lack of 
controls, poor statistical analysis or sloppy reporting make any such 
reports and any roviow of those reports, of little value in explaining 
the underlying processes which produce the improvements observed in 
performance following MP.
In order to be able to disclose some reliable and interprotable 
effects of MP which might then bo used to produce hypotheses capable 
of explaining the underlying psychological processes, certain criteria 
for including a report in this review have been established.
*
2.1.1. Criteria of Acceptability
As stated earlier, in order to moke comparisons of MP adequate 
control conditions should bo included with both a no practice and an 
actual practice condition with which to conpare MP. At the very least
w-r.i ->**: 'jf
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MP should be accompanied by one other control of either no practice 
or actual practice.
A full report of the procedures used mentioning tho type 
and amount of prior training is necessary. Tho situations under 
which MP is carried out with details of instructions to subjects and 
any additional cues such as visual displays or written procedures 
which are available to subjects should bo given. Finally tho typo 
of measures taken such as speed, accuracy, or number of trials, 
savings scores or percentage increase in performance should bo 
clearly stated. Where a pro-tost - post-tost design is used compari­
sons made botwcon the various conditions of the experiment must take 
into account tho level of performance reached in tho pro-tost. Finally only 
statistical differences at tho .05 probability level or below arc 
taken ns significant.
2.1.2. Comparisons not Studios
Rather than take individual reports as tho unit of analysis 
comparisons mado between MP and other methods of practice aro used.
The distinction botwoon imports and comparisons is mado clearer by an 
cxnmplo; Perry (1939) and Ulich (l9(>7) oacli published one report on 
MP. Within each report thoro aro many comparisons mado botwoon MP and 
other practice procedures and botwoon various tasks.
The benefits of selecting tho comparisons made rnthor than 
tho report ns tho unit of analysis are threefold. In tho first enso 
tho number of units in tho data base upon which tho analysis is per­
formed is increased. Second, the largo discrepancies hotwocn tho 
roports in tonns of the tasks usod, tho typo of practico and tho amount
of prior training makes it impossible to identify similarities or 
differences in the effects of MP. When a smaller unit of analysis 
is used specific similarities and differences arc more apparent. 
Third, it follows from the previous point that if the number of 
dimensions along which comparisons differ is rcducod or separated, 
then interpretation of the corpus of experimental evidence is easier.
The choice of comparisons rather than studies as the unit of 
analysis provides a larger, more homogenous data-base and enables 
any review to produce a clear analysis and synthesis of the research 
on MP to date. From such a review some theoretical basis for the 
effects of MP procedures can be suggested. A full table of the 
studies reviewed hero is shown in appendix A.
2.1,3« Typos of Comparisons
The effectiveness of MP can bo compared with a variety of 
other typos of training/practicc procedures. For cxamplo Ulich 
(1967) compared MP with actual practice, observational learning and 
no practice on a variety of tasks. The simplest comparisons are 
botwoon MP and no practice or MP and actual practice. Depending upon 
which comparison is chosen different assumptions about MP aro made. 
Contrasting MP with actual practice, a result which showod no signi­
ficant difference botwoon the two practico methods suggests that MP 
is ns good (effective) ns actual practice. Tho oxporimentor nood 
not show that MP is bettor than actual practico, but must show that 
actual practice is bottor than Ml’.
Ilowovor, when MP is contrasted with no practice a signifi­
cant difforonco in favour of MP is sought. A non-significant result
Iioro is treated as a refutation of a hypothesis supporting MP. In 
comparisons with actual practice non-significant results are taken 
as support for the effectiveness of MP. Tho two different typos of 
comparisons signify two different strengths of an MP hypothesis.
(1) A strong hypothesis
When MP is contrasted to actual practice a strong version 
of tho effectiveness of MP hypothesis is taken. Tho experimenter who 
adopts this hypothesis attempts to show that actual practice produces 
more improvements in performance than MP. Most often, a non-significant 
result is used as tho basis for an assumption that Ml1 and actual prac­
tice are equal. Thus a null hypothesis is taken as support for a 
strong version of tho Ml’ hypothesis.
(2) A weak hypothesis
Contrasting an MP group with a no practico group a weaker 
version of the MP hypothesis is taken. In studies which follow a weal« 
hypothesis tho experimenter is interested in whether Ml’ is bettor than 
no practico. Hero there is no temptation to take a non-significant 
result as support for MP effects.
Tho terms "bettor" and "offoctivo" whon usod in connection 
with MP have spocific meanings. Whon a group of subjocts improve thoir 
performance, in terms of roduced errors or time on task, following a 
particular practico period, tho improvement relative to thoir original 
performance level is noted. If tho improvement produced following MP 
is groator than that following a no practico poriod, thon MP is said 
to bo "hotter", alternatively if actual practico producos groator 
improvomonts than MP thon actual practico is "bottor". It should bo
pointed out that by taking relative improvement scores any differences 
between groups prior to the typo of practicc/rohearsal procedure is 
equated, although it could be that particular practice procedures 
interact with the initial performance level. In which case one might 
find that with high-base level performance scores MP produces greater 
improvements than actual practice.
However, there is little a priori evidence to suggest that 
this kind of interaction occurs. Moreover, in many studies comparisons 
are made of base-level performance scores between groups prior to 
practice which show that the performance lcvols of the various groups 
are equal prior to any experimental manipulation. Thus the relative 
and absolute improvement values are equal.
The "effectiveness" of MP refers to the consistency with which 
an MP procedure produces bettor improvements in performance than a 
non or actual practice group. If out of ton comparisons MP improves 
performance bettor than no practice sovon times, while actual practico 
improves performance hotter than no practico in eight out of ton com­
parisons thon MP is not ns offoctivo ns actual practice in improving 
performance. The dcpondnnt variable in all comparisons is tho perfor­
mance level, rather than tho number of trials or retention level of 
skill over time.
2.1 .^ i. Empirical Bvidonee Tor a Strong and a Weak llypothosis
(l) A strong hypothesis
From 112 comparisons of MP with any othor form of practico 
35 woro between MP and actual prnctico (31*25$)• From thoso 35 compari­
sons 22 (63%) showed MP to bo oithor hotter than or no difforont from
actual practice. The majority of these comparisons found no difference 
between MP and actual practice. Only six out of 35 comparisons (17%) 
found MP to be significantly bettor than actual practice. Perry (1939), 
Twining (1949), Clark (i960), Smith and Harrison (1962), Stobbins 
(1968), Rawlings and Rawlings (197^)* Minas (1978) and McHrido and 
Rothstcin (1979) all found MP to be cither bettor or no different 
from actual practice.
(2) A weak hypothesis
Comparisons between MP and no practice represent 37% or 4l 
out of the total 112 comparisons roviowod. Thirty of those forty-one 
comparisons found MP to bo significantly bettor than no practice (73%)« 
None of the comparisons that wore mado showed no practice to bo more 
effective than MP, although the remaining nine comparisons all show 
no significant differences between the effects of MP and no practico. 
Sackctt (1934), (1935), Perry (1939), Twining (1949), Smith and 
Harrison (1962), Corbin (1967a), Ulich (1967), Surburg (1968),
Rawlings et al (1972), Rawlings and Rawlings (1974), Smyth (1975) 
and Minas (1978) all found MP to be more effective than no practico.
From tho analysis of these comparisons the weaker MP hypor 
thesis, that MP is bettor than no practico, is well supported. Tho 
stronger vorsion, that MP is ns good ns actual prnctico, is relatively 
woll supported, lmt, much of this support is basod on "no significant 
differences".
(3) Other comparisons
llosido comparisons hotwoon Ml’, no prnctico and actual
prnctico, sovoral studios hnvo compnrod no practice, MI’ and actual
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practice with combined mental and actual practice. In those studios 
subjects alternate between periods of actual practice and MP in the 
combined condition, Ulich (1967), Corbin (1967b), Stebbins (1968) 
and Smyth (1975) have all included such comparisons. The majority 
of those comparisons show combinod MP to bo as good as actual 
practico. Smyth (1975), however, points out that in order to achiovo 
proper control combined MP and actual practico conditions should bo 
compared with combinod no practice and actual practice conditions.
It is not clear, therefore, whether spaced practice or MP improves 
performance. Finally, when MP is compared with observational learning, 
Ulich (1967), MP is superior in improving subject's performance on a 
varioty of tasks.
3.1.?). Summary Of The Comparisons Involving MP
Using the comparisons made in various studios ns the unit of 
analysis it has boon possible to separate the various results in terms 
of a strong or weak hypothesis of MP. Whilst some support for the 
strong hypothesis was found much of this is based on nonsignificant 
differences. The weaker hypothesis in which Ml' is compared with no 
prnctico has more convincing support. It seems that MP is hotter 
than no practico but not bottor than actual prnctico, although in soino 
casos MP may bo as good ns actual prnctico.
Finally tho offoctivonoss of MP is measured in torms of a 
reduction in errors or an increase in speed and overall performance. 
Appendix A contains n tnblo of tho comploto schodulo of studies and 
comparisons used in this analysis. In view of tho lack of control in 
oxporimonts using combinod MP and actual prnctico mentioned by Smyth
(1975) the remaining analyses exclude all such comparisons. Only 
comparisons between MP, actual practice and no practice are considered, 
this reduces the total number of comparisons to fifty-five. Comparisons 
between different kinds of MP and between MP and observational learning 
have also boon excluded.
MP then, is a procedure which has some benefits for skill 
acquisition. The common theme of past research of MP has boon to broaden 
the spectrum of situations in which MI’ has boon used. There has boon 
little analysis of what MP involves. Ulich (1967) is one exception, his 
study attempted to assess the involvement of muscular activity during MP. 
More attention is given later to Ulich's and other speculative hypotheses 
of MP. First an analysis of the typo of MP used in past research is 
presented. The following sections analyse the various procedures that 
have been adopted during an MP period. Their effectiveness in terms of 
the consistency of improvements in performance compared with actual or no 
practice periods are considered. Through this kind of analysis it is 
possible to discloso what MP involves and what cognitive processes are 
operating.
2.2. Procedures and Applications of MP
The first analysis is in terms of the typos of cuos providod 
during MP; visual, vorbal/writton or action cuos havo all boon used. Each 
typo of cue is analysed separately and the most effective cuos are intor- 
protod as having a close rolation to tho underlying processes of MP.
2.2.1. Typos of Cues used in HP
Tho typos of cuos available to tho subjoct following instructions
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to engage in MP are important in that inferences can be made about 
possible cognitive processes which are used from the specific cues 
present and the effectiveness of MP in improving performance» As 
mentioned above, the types of cues range from none, where a subject 
sits in a quiet room with his/her eyes closed and is instructed to 
"imagine" or "think about" a particular action, as in Smyth's (1975) 
experiments» At the other end of this continuum subjects are 
required to carry out some activity which resembles the task but with 
some elements missing; Summer (1977) uses this kind of cue in his 
experiments. Table 2.1 summarises the analysis of cues present 
during MP in terms of the various comparisons between MP, no practice 
and actual practice.
(l) No Cues
When subjects are deprived of all external sources of infor­
mation following an MP instruction sixteen out of the total of fifty- 
five comparisons fell into this category. Comparing MI’ with no practice, 
MP produces significantly greater Improvements in performance in eight 
out of the ton comparisons, Sackctt (1935), Smith and Harrison (1962), 
Ulich (1967), Rawlings et al (1972), Smyth (1975)• When MP is compared 
to actual practice only ono out of the six comparisons showed MP to 
improve performance as much as, or greater than actual practice, Smith 
and Harrison (1962).
Overall nino out of the sixteen comparisons in which no cues 
at all were present show MP to improve performance significantly more 
than no practice and occasionally equal to actual practice. Instructions 
to imagine performing a task, without cues to aid imagery, are 
relatively effoctivo in improving the subjects' subsequent performance 
on the task.
I
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\
v Compari­
sons
MP/no practice MP/actual
practice
Total 
No. of 
compari­
sons
Cues
\
No. of 
compari­
sons
MP
effec­
tive
No. of 
compari­
sons
MP
effec­
tive
None IO 8 6 1 l6
Verbal 4 2 4 2 8
Visual 10 6 10 7 20
Action 6 4 5 3 11
Total 30 20 25 13 55
Tablo 2.1 Analysis of cuos present durino MI’
(2) Vorlml Cues
Tlio classification of cues into "verbal cues" includes both 
spoken and written aids. In theso situations the subject is normally 
given an instruction to imagine or think about the task in hand whilst 
tho experimenter presents a spoken or written list of the procedures 
and goals of the task. The subjects have additional cues to a no-cuo 
group, which describe and outlino tho salient points of the task. It 
should ho noted that in those comparisons tho subjects in tho MP group 
arc tho only ones who receive verbal cues. This confounds any improve­
ments which may occur as tho subjects arc being given additional infor­
mation as well as engaging in MP.
Tho analysis presented in table 2.1 shows that there wore 
only eight out of tho fifty-five comparisons which used verbal cues.
Of theso eight comparisons four were between MP and no practice and 
four botween Ml’ and actual practice. In both cases, two out of tho 
four comparisons showed MP to significantly improve performance either 
above a no practice group, Corbin (1967b) and Surburg (i960), or equal 
to or groator than an actual practico group, Clark (i960) and Mcttrido 
and Rothstoin (1979)« Whilst tho analysis shows that verbal cuos 
with MP improve performance in 50% or four out of eight comparisons 
this only represents four out of fifty-five or 7% of the total number 
of comparisons.
Ilecause of tho low number of comparisons using verbal cuos 
it is difficult to form a clonr opinion of tho contribution to MP mndo 
by verbal cuos. It would appear that MP is not onhancod by tho addition
of verbal information
(5) Visual Cues
Twenty out of the total of fifty-fivo comparisons analysed 
used some form of visual cue to augment MP. The typo of visual cues 
varied from study to study. For instance Minas (1978) provided lights 
which flashed at bin locations in a prescribed sequence to indicate 
which bin subjects should bo aiming at. Rawlings and Rawlings (197^) 
had the apparatus present during MP so that subjects could look at it 
while imagining performing the task. Other studies, Twining (19^9) 
had the target used in the experiment present while subjects were 
instructed to imagine aiming and throwing rings at it. In all cases 
subjects wore instructed to make use of those visual cues while imagin­
ing performing the task. Finally, Surburg (1968) and Stebbins (1968) 
required their MP groups to watch other groups perform the task while 
imagining a performance of the task. All these examples embellish 
the practice environment with visual cues.
When comparing MP with a no practice group six out of the 
ton comparisons favoured Ml’, in so much that MI’ with visual cues improved 
performance significantly moro than that of a no practico group in 60% 
of the cases. Again it is unclear whether all comparisons diffored 
only in the MP instruction. Minas (1978) only provided visual cuos 
for the MP group but othors such as Rawlings and Rawlings (197(0 pro­
vided visual cues for both the no practice and tho MP groups. Generally 
when tho cuos consisted of tho apparatus boing present both MP and no 
practico groups had tho samo visual cuos. Of tho ten comparisons botwoon 
MP and no practico oiglit of thoso usod tho apparatus ns a visual cuo and 
all six of tho improvements In performance favxtring MP woro with tho 
apparatus prosont, Perry (1939)» Twining (19/*9), Smith and Harrison 
(1962), Rawlings and Rawlings (197^) and Minns (1978).
When MP is compared witli actual practice seven out of a 
further ton comparisons favoured MP in so much that performance 
improved following MP at least as much as and sometimes greater than 
the improvement following actual practice, Perry (1939), Twining (1949), 
Stobbins (1968), Rawlings and Rawlings (1974) and Minas (1978). Only 
one of the comparisons did not use visual cues that comprised the 
apparatus or target, thus both actual and MP groups had the same 
amount of information available in the environment. On the whole visual 
cues produced an increase in performance which was greater than no 
practice in thirteen out of twenty cases (65%).
(4) Action Cues
The final category of cues available following an MP inst­
ruction is when the subjoct has to physically do something at the 
same time as imagining performing the task in question. There are 
an assortment of examples of this class of MP, for instance Sackett 
(1934) had his subjects mentally practice a maze by drawing the mazo 
from memory. Smith and Harrison (l9f>2) had three groups of active 
MP, the first of which wero instructed to move their oyes around a 
peg board in the correct order for the task; the second group moved 
thoir oyes around the board in tho reverse order and the third group 
had thoir hand guidod around tho peg board by tho experimenter. The 
rosults sliowod that moving your oyos around tho board in tho correct 
order during MP produced a greater improvement in performance than 
actual practice. Tho reverso ordered eye movement group equally 
improved thoir performance as much ns the actual practice group.
Whilst tho hand guidod MP group showed no moro improvement than a no 
practico control group. Another study by Summer (1977) involvod tho 
MP group having to tap n key board in tho same order ns required in
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tho actual task, but at their own rate, and without any guiding lights 
(tho lights appeared if tho correct koy was pressed - giving feedback 
to the MP group). This is rather like tho maze practice experiments 
described by Sackctt (1934) in that the subject is given an oppor­
tunity to mentally rehearse elements of tho task with tho aid of 
overt actions but without actually performing tho task itself.
From table 2.1, there are cloven of the fifty-five cases 
which use some form of action cuo with MP. Tho analysis showod that 
four of the six comparisons between MP and no practice produced more 
improvement in performance with MP, Sackett (1934), Smith and Harrison 
(1962). Comparing MP with actual practice, throe out of the five 
comparisons show MP to improve performance at least as much as actual 
practice does.
On tho whole augmenting MP with actions produces improvements 
in performance which are greater than no practice controls, and some­
times equal to or greater than actual practice controls in seven out 
of cloven cases (64%).
(9) Summary of Cues usod in MP
The predominant trend in experiments using an MP condition 
is to provide some kind of cuo along with instructions for subjocts 
to imagine some performance of tho taskj thirty-nino out of tho fifty- 
five cases analysed (71%) used some form of cue. On the whole visual 
and action cues produced more consistent improvements following MP 
than no cuos at all. Visual cues improve the effectivonoss of MP 
such that whon this form of MP is comparod with no practico 65% of 
tho MP, with visual cues, comparisons produco significantly grontor
_____
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improvements in performance over no practice. Similarly, MP with 
action cues result in 64% of the comparisons with no practice 
favouring MP. Whilst MP with no cues improves performance in only 
56% of the comparisons witli no practice groups.
Vorbal cues scorn loss effective than visual or action cues 
in facilitating improvements following MP. The improvements in 
performance following MP with vorbal cues, compared with a no practice 
group,show that this form of MP improves performance above the no 
practice group in only 50% of the comparisons.
Of the visual and action cues, visual cues have the highest 
percentage of success in improving performance abovo the level of a 
no practico control group. Tho conclusion to bo drawn is that visual 
cues facilitate imagery and effective MP. This suggests that imagery 
may have a strong visual component. Tho next section considers tho 
amount and typo of training given prior to any instruction to imagino 
performing a task.
2.2.2. Amount and Typo of Training
As well ns varying tho typo of cues providod following an 
instruction to imagino a task, tho extent of training rocoivod prior 
to a practice period also varies in tho literaturo on MP. In order 
to bo able to practice a task tho subject must have somo knowledge of 
what tho tusk entails. When MP is used Corhtn (072) claims that its 
effects can only ho realised when tho subject lias already rocoivod 
somo basic training on tho task in quostion. One can nssumo that if 
MP involves making uso of whatever representations are encoded in 
memory, thon until some form of oxporionce lias boon gained no oncoding
\  Compari- 
sons
MP/no practico MP/actual
practico
Training s
. ... \
No. of 
compari­
sons
MP
effec­
tive
No. of 
compari­
sons
MP
effec­
tive
Total 
No. of 
compari­
sons
Less than 15 
trials on 
actual task
1/* 8 l4 8 28
Moro than 15 
trials on 
actual task
12 8 9 3 21
Trials on a 
difforent 
task
1 0 1 0 2
Prior instruc­
tion
Vritton/spokon
2 1 2 0 4
Total 29 17 26 11 53
Tallio 2.2 Analysis of typo and amount of prior training
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can liavo taken place. Within the sots of studies under roviow the 
amount of training lias varied from no actual training on tho task 
itself, Smyth (1975), to 150 trials on tho same task, (Corbin 1967a). 
Training has also varied in its type, ranging from actual trials on 
tho task itself, Corbin (1967a), to trials on a different task and 
written instructions Corbin (1967b). This analysis classifies training 
in terms of tho amount and typo of training (see table 2.2). All 
groups, Ml’, no practice and actual practice receive tho same amount 
and typo of prior training boforo tho experimental manipulation.
(1) Less than 15 trials prior training
In deciding upon 15 trials as tho boundary for this class 
some consideration was made as to tho typo of task in question. Fifteen 
trials at a basket ball net might not bo as beneficial as fifteen trials 
at a peg board task. Upon further analysis it seems that when tasks 
aro of tho more complex basket ball or tennis typo tho subjects wore 
far from beginners at that particular skill. In view of this it was 
felt that tho boundary of fifteen trials is adequato for all tasks.
Whon tho number of comparisons between MP and no practico 
aro considered eight out of fourteen (57%) of thoso comparisons with 
loss than fifteen trials prior experience showed MP to improve per­
formance moro than tho no practico control group, Sackott (l93/*), (1935)» 
Perry (1939), Smith and Harrison (1962) and Minas (1976)»
Whon MP is comparod with actual practico, following loss 
than fiftoon trials prior training, again eight out of fourteen such 
comparisons show MP to bo at loast as effective ns actual practico in 
improving performance, Perry (1939), Smith and Harrison (1962),
Minas (1978) and Mcliridc and Rothstcin (1979)• The overall effect 
of having loss than fifteen trials prior training is that in sixteen 
out of twenty-eight comparisons (57%) between MP and any other practice, 
MP improves performance above the lovol of a no practice group. This 
suggests that the ability to effectively imagine performing a task is 
quite good after a small amount of prior training.
(2) 15 or more trials prior training
When the amount of prior training comprises fifteen or more 
trials on the task itself there are twelve comparisons ( 75$ between 
no practice and MP. In eight of these twelve comparisons MP improves 
the subjects' performance significantly more than no practice, Twining 
(1949), Ulich (l9(>7)t Corbin (1967a), Surburg (1968), Rawlings et al 
(1972) and Rawlings and Rawlings (1974).
In this category there are nino cases comparing MP with 
actual practice. MP improvod performance at least as much as actual 
practice in only tlirco out of the nino comparisons (33»3%) following 
fiftoon or more trials of prior training on tho task itsolf, Twining 
(1949), Stobbins (1968) and Rawlings and Rawlings (1974).
Overall, more than fiftoon trials of prior training on tho 
actual task produces improvements in performance with MP that aro at 
least groator than no practice control groups in cloven out of twonty- 
ono comparisons (52%). This suggests that n relatively large amount 
of prior training produces moro improvement when it is followod by 
further montal practice trials. Although MP is still effectively 
facilitating and improving performance above no practico levels, tho 
benefits to bo gainod from longor prior training are not significant.
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(") Different task and writton/spokon prior training
The remaining two categories of training have been merged 
into one as there are only two comparisons that used a different 
task and four that used written or spoken training procedures prior 
to an experimental condition.
Comparing MP with no practice one out of the three comparisons 
made resulted in MP improving performance above the improvement attained 
by a no practice group. When MP is compared with actual practice none 
of the throe comparisons showed MP to produce as much improvement as 
actual practice, Smyth (1975).
Generally prior training on a different task or with written 
or spoken instructions is not effective in facilitating imagery in an 
MP procedure to the same extent as it facilitates improvement following 
actual practice. As there wore only six out ot a total of fifty-five 
comparisons which used this form of prior training, those conclusions 
are limited.
(4) Summary of prior training effects on MP
In summary, MP is most effective following a small amount of 
prior training on the task itself rather than a largo amount of prior 
training on tho samo task. MP is still capable of offectivoly improving 
performance after a largo number of prior training trials but thoro is 
no apparent bonofit. from having such large amounts of pre-training.
The offoots of presenting writton or spoken pro-training witli MP 
appears to bo limited; they may oven inhibit MP boing carriod out.
Tho next soction analyses tho effects of different tasks on MP.
2.2.3» Typos of Tasks in which MP has boon used
A classification of tasks in psychology has boon attempted 
by several authors, each with some degree of failure, Miller (1962), 
Knapp (1967) and Fleishmann (1967), (1978) provide good examples.
Tho aim of this section is not to provide a task taxonomy, which in 
view of tho infinite number of tasks that could exist is probably 
impossible, but to point out that different tasks may bo affected 
differently by MP procedures. Indeed, Perry (1939) suggested that 
tasks with a high amount of symbolic content best suited MP. Perry 
defined symbolic content as verbal, this implies that it is those 
elements of a task which are capable of being verbalised that are 
used in MP and that tasks which are capable of being highly verbalised 
should benefit most from MP.
Morrisott (1956) extended Perry's classification to include 
perceptual and motor, as well as symbolic task content. Morrisott 
tested the hypothesis that MP would facilitate improvements in per­
formance to tho extent that pcrcoptual and/or symbolic task components 
were involved. Tasks with a high motor component would show little or 
no improvement following MP. The implicit assumption behind this 
hypothesis is that MP involves tho manipulation of symbolic and/or 
perceptual information. Motor tasks were definod as those which 
required skeletal-muscular activity, perceptual tasks involvod dis­
crimination between stimuli, whilo symbolic tasks wore those that placed 
importance upon an "intervening associative process between reception 
of stimulation and tho making of overt responsos". While Moj-risott 
mokes threo distinctions ho only tests botwoon two of thorn, nnmoly 
motor and symbolic/porcoptual. Mis results supported his hypothosis 
using various card sorting tasks to difforontinto tho lovol of motor
Tho typos of tasks used in the various studies of MP con­
sidered hero are listed in table 2.3. There are eighteen different 
tasks which have boon categorised according to Morrisott's original 
three groups, symbolic, perceptual or motor.
(1) Definition of categories
Symbolic Tasks:- tasks which contain a high amount of 
procedural information about discrete sequences of operations.
Perceptual Tasks:- tasks which involve discriminations 
and judgements based on sensory inputs.
Motor Tasks:- tasks whore tho performer lias to make many 
movements and that it is tho movements themselves which constitute 
tho main part of tho task.
(2) Classification of tasks
To allocate tasks to categories 3 judges wore given the 
above definitions of tasks and askod to rato oach task on a scale 
from O to 5| with 5 being a high scoro, in torms of its symbolic, 
perceptual and motor coutont. For example, basket ball was given a 
total of 8 for symbolic, 13 for porcoptual and 10 for motor components 
out of a total of 13 in oach of tho classes. The relation botwoon tho 
3 judges' markings was tostod using Kondall's correlation. An nvorngo 
correlation of .717 was found which is significant at tho 0.01 level 
of probability (soo appendix n for ratings).
and symbolic/pcrcoptunl component of the task.
Tho classification shown in tablo 2.3 is tho result of
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Symbolic Perceptual Motor
Throe hoio tapping Baskot ball Ball throwing
Mazo learning Pursuit rotor Ring toss
Key tapping Table tennis Finger dexterity
Symbol/Digit- Tennis Typing
Substitution Mirror drawing 
Rivotting 
Card sorting
Peg-board
Sit-ups
Juggling
Table 2.3 Classi ficatIon of tasks according to tlioir major
coinpotiont
this rating procedure. Out of the initial l8 tasks all havo boon 
separated and classified into the category in which their highest 
marks fell. In the example above baskot ball has boon classed as 
a perceptual task. This classification was used to analyse the 
effects of MP according to class of task. While only throe judges 
have boon used to classify these tasks it is based on Perry and 
Morrisott's original classification. Therefore the present classi­
fication should bo scon as an extension of the earlier analysis 
rather than a now analysis. (See Table 2.4)
(3) Symbolic tasks
The analysis of MP in terms of tasks rated as having a high 
symbolic component shows that one out of the four comparisons between 
MP and no practice results in MP improving performance more than a 
no practice group, Sackott (1935)• Comparing MP with actual practice 
shows that two out of throe comparisons of this sort result in MP 
producing at least as much improvement in performance as an actual 
practice group, Porry (1939), Ulich (1967). On tho whole MP produces 
improvements in performance which aro at least groator than those 
produced by no practice and occasionally as good as those produced by 
actual practice in three out of seven comparisons (43%).
(4) Perceptual tasks
Considering tasks which are classified as boing primarily 
perceptual, eight out of eleven comparisons (73%) between MI’ and no 
practice show MP to improve performance above tho level of improvement 
attained by tho no practico group, Porry (1939)» Ulich (1967)1 Surburg 
(1968) and Smyth (1975). Whon MP is comparod with actual practico four 
out of tho eight comparisons made show Ml’ to improve porformnneo at
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\  Compari- 
\ sons
Tasks \
MP/no practico MP/actunl
practico
Total 
No. of 
compari­
sons
No. of 
compari­
sons
MP
offoc-
tivo
No. of 
compari­
sons
.
MP
offoc-
tivo
Symbolic 4 1 3 2 7
Perceptual 11 8
9 4
20
Motor 13 9 0
28
Total 28 t-k 05 27
IAr* 55
Table 2.4 Analysis of typo of tasks nml tlio affects of MP 
compared with actual and no practice
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least ns much ns actual practice, Clark (i960), Rawlings and Rawlings 
(1974), McBride and Rothstoin (1979). MP improves performance on 
perceptual tasks in twolvo out of the twenty comparisons made (60%)•
(l) Motor tasks
Tasks which have boon identified as being primarily motor 
in nature constitute almost 51% of tho comparisons made between MP, 
no practice and actual practice. Of these twenty-eight comparisons 
eighteen, or 64% found MP to improve performance at least above a 
no practice level.
Comparing MP with no practice, MI* produces greater improve­
ments than no practice in nine out of thirteen comparisons (69%),
Perry (1939), Twining (1949), Smith and Harrison (1962), Corbin 
(1967a), Ulich (1967), Minas (1978). The comparisons between MP and 
actual practice showed that in nine out of the fifteen comparisons 
(60%) MP was at least as good as actual practice in improving perfor­
mance, Porry (1939), Twining (1949), Smith and Harrison (1962),
Stobbins (1968), Minns (1978).
(6) Summary of effects of MP on various classes of tasks
According to tho classification of tasks presented in tnblo
2.3, oightoon tasks aro classified into throo entogorios, symbolic, 
perceptual, motor. MP producos improvements in performance most ofton 
in tasks which Itnvo a high motor component. The overall comparisons 
botwoon MP, no practice and actual practice show that MP improves 
performance in 64% of tho motor tasks, 60% of tho porceptunl tasks 
and 43% of the symbolic tasks. This contradicts Porry's initial 
hypothesis in so far ns symbolic tasks hnvo tho lowest improvomont
rate following MP. Morrisott's experiments failed to distinguish 
between symbolic and perceptual tasks; on tlio basis of this review 
it seems that the success of Morrisott's symbolic/pcrccptual group 
may be duo to the perceptual component rather than the symbolic 
component of the tasks.
2.2.h * Summary of Procedures and Applications
Having analysed the empirical evidence for and against MP 
in terms of the various agencies, cues, prior training and task type, 
which might affect its use and relate to underlying cognitive processes, 
a summary of these findings follows.
MP improves performance in the majority of cases above the 
level of a no practice control group who spend a similar amount of 
time without instructions to engage in MP. This form of practice is 
not as consistently efficient as actual practice.
Subjects who are instructed to engage in MP are often provided 
with additional cues to augment their practico period. Comparisons 
were made botwoon the effects of MP, no practico and actual practico 
in terms of the various cuos; no cues, verbal cues, visual cues and 
action cues. Visual cuos producod the highost ratio of comparisons 
in which MP improved porformanco above a no practico group. MP is 
host suited to visual information which suggests that MP is a form of 
visual imagery.
Tho amount of training prior to MP was usod to differentiate 
the amount of prior knowledge of tho task. Tho offocts of MP woro 
most efficient whon only a small amount (less than 15 trials) of prior
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training had occurred. MP was still as effective following longer 
training periods but there is no added benefit to bo gained from 
increasing the amount of prior training. It may well bo that MP 
servos to elaborate a particular memory encoding in much the same 
way that Craik and Watkins (1973) found olaborativo rehearsal of 
verbal material to improve recall performance.
Tho type of task which subjects wore tested on was analysed 
for differences in effectiveness of MP. A classification of tasks in 
terms of their symbolic, perceptual or motor components was produced. 
Tasks categorised as having a high motor component wore found to have 
the highest proportion of comparisons in which MP improved performance 
above no practice. This is in direct opposition to a hypothesis put 
forward by Perry and later tested by Morrisott that MP facilitates 
performance to the extent that tasks have a high symbolic component.
Tho assumption bohind this hypothesis was that MP involved tho 
rehearsal of verbal material. This is little more than a rote 
rohoarsal procedure. Tho rosults of tho literature review show that 
MP is not rote rohoarsal in a different guise. MP may woll include 
a rote procedure, but thoro is evidence that some form of iinagory of 
tho actions servos to augment and elaborate tho memory trace.
2.3. Theories and Hypotheses of Mental Practice
Tho remaining part of this chapter is concerned with suggested 
accounts of MP that havo appoarod in various reports. Tho processes by 
which Ml1 is thought to affect performance Imvo boon widoly speculated 
upon within tho litoraturo. Thoro are some quite elaborate accounts 
such ns tho "psychonouromusculnr hypothosis" which closoly aligns with
a motor theory of mind, whereas others such as the "attontional 
focusing hypothesis" are loosely formulated suggestions. Each of 
those accounts is considered on its theoretical merits and capability 
of explaining the empirical evidence presented earlier.
2.3.1. Motivational Hypothesis
One hypothesis of why MP is effective is that during an MP 
instruction the subjects are asked to think about the task and this 
helps to sustain their interest. It is suggested that this sustained 
interest functions to enhance performance at recall, Richardson 
(l967h). This process might be especially effective when MP groups 
moot together for a group practice session, Corbin (1972). If it 
can be .assumed that increased arousal accompanies increased motivation 
and that arousal can be measured by E.M.G. responses, then Williams 
(1970) has shown that MP and control no practice groups did not differ 
in their E.M.G. responses. The relation between E.M.G. recordings 
and arousal/motivation is unclear. Hockey (1979) notes that the 
relationship between different measures of arousal and the perfor­
mance effects of arousal is unknown. One generalisation mado by 
Hockey is that there is relatively bettor performance on delayed 
recall tasks with higher levels of arousal, and that delayed rocall 
is bettor for material loomed during high arousal statos. Immediate 
memory does not seem to depend on one single factor. Tho majority 
of tho work on arousal and memory has boon concerned with verbal 
learning and arousal is often operationally defined in terms of 
whito noise lovols.
2.3.2. Trace Consolidation Hypothesis
Tho hypothesis horo is that oach practice trial or sossion,
loaves a trace which will decay at some exponential rate. MP 
ro-activates the trace slowing the effective rate of decay, Corbin 
(1972). This hypothesis suggests that memory is laid down gradually 
as a permanent trace by a process of consolidation. One assumption 
made in this hypothesis is that the strength of the trace would bo 
a function of the amount of time spent performing or rehearsing the 
task. Given this assumption one would predict that MP following 
more than 13 trials of training would bo more effective than MP 
following loss than 15 prior training trials. This is not tho case,
MP has a more pronounced effect following only a few trials. One 
explanation of this is that MP does not simply re-activato or con­
solidate a memory trace but elaborates existing memory traces. Thus 
mental rehearsal of a task may have some optimum level of prior 
training past which further prior training does not produce any 
significant increase in performance, since further practice on tho 
task has a compounding rather than olahorativo effect on memory.
2.5.3. Symbolic Learning Hypothesis
Skills vary to tho extent that they can be symbolically coded 
as a function of the symbolic task component, Perry (1939). The use 
of symbolic hero is confined to languago. Perry suggests that tasks 
which contain a high amount of procedural information about discroto 
operations are capable of boing vorbalisod (linguistically codod) to 
a grontor oxtont than other tasks. It is this capability of linguistic 
coding which in,-ikes Perry claim that a .symbolic form of encoding is used. 
Tliis rathor restricted use of tho term symbolic is unfortunato and docs 
not fit in with a more general interpretation such ns Kolors and Smytho 
(1979) who point out that a symbol is first and foremost something
which stands in the place of something else. To this end any form 
of mental representation is symbolic (images, motor programmes) but 
not necessarily linguistic.
One prediction from this hypothesis is that tasks which are 
classified as highly symbolic (by Perry's definition) should show the 
most consistent benefits from MP. The analyses performed earlier 
show that symbolic tasks do not have the highest success rate with 
MP but the lowest. Tasks classified as motor have tbo highest success 
rates with MP while perceptual tasks are close behind.
This suggests that Perry's original hypothesis is incorrect 
in that tasks with a high proportion of discrete procedural elements 
are not those in which MP most consistently improves performance.
The hypothesis can bo redefined if a different interpretation of 
symbolic is used, which refers to any form of representation, but this 
changes Perry's initial intention.
2.3.4. The Symbolic Perceptual Hypothesis
Mental practico enables one to examine a representation of 
performance and "gain insight" which can load to a modification of 
performance, Sago (1977)« Involvomont in MP does not ensure improved 
performance but provides for a new porcoptual organization through 
insight. Corbin (1972) suggests that
" Hogard]ess of the skill to bo learned, some mental 
imagining is necessary prior to and during the improvement 
of performance through insight." p .103
It is hypothesised that MP involvos examining an imago and 
improving performance by modifying tho imago and subsequent performance.
Tliis loosely formulated hypothesis has some resemblance to 
Kosslyn's (l90o) theory of mental imagery in which images are supposed 
to exist as a form of representation in memory and that although they 
may be generated from a more basic form of encoding they can bo 
examined by perceptual mechanisms and produce specific functions in 
recall and problem solving tasks. The next chapter is concerned with 
Kosslyn's and other theories of mental imagery in much greater detail.
One prediction which stems from this hypothesis is that somo 
prior experience is necessary for imago formation. Furthermore there 
is a strong implicit assumption that the font) of imagery is visual/ 
spatial. This is explicitly stated in Kosslyn's model of mental 
imagery. The empirical evidence from the MP literature shows that 
when MP is accompanied by visual cues performance improves most consis­
tently. This can bo taken ns support for some form of visual/spatial 
imagery hypothesis. Interestingly enough it also seems to bo the case 
that action cues produce consistent improvements following MP. This 
suggests that visual images may not bo the solo conti'ibutor to MP and 
some form of action or motor imagery may also bo involvod.
2.3.9. The Psychonoiiromnsciilnr Hypothesis
The psychonouromuscular hypothesis is based on a belief that 
images of movements oxcito minimal movements (dotoctod by E.M.G. 
recordings) and this producos kinaosthotic feodbnek rosombling actual 
movement, llichnrdson (l9f>7*>). Ulicli (19<>7) has shown that subjects 
who appoar to benefit most from MP show a medium lovol of musclo 
activity. This report is not very clear though as to what controls, 
such as base-lovol E.M.G. recordings, wore taken. One possiblo 
suggestion is that actions are roprosontod in torms of motor activity.
Indeed Jacobson (1932) proposed a similar account of all mental 
activity which led Liberman and his associates to produce a motor 
theory of speech perception, Liberman, Cooper, Shankwoilor and 
Studdort-Kcnnody (1967). More recently Woimcr (1977) has proposed 
that acting,perceiving and comprehending are intimately connected, 
in that they may bo thought of as simply different aspects of the 
same fundamental process, and that a "motor theory of mind" has 
the greatest power of explanation. Exactly what would constitute 
a motor theory of mind is, wisely, omitted from Woimor's account 
but one possibility is that "motor programmes" or rules for acting are 
tho fundamental units of a cognitive system. The psychoncurotnuscular 
hypothesis is more specific than this since it is claimed that those 
"rules" result in the activation of tho musculature and that imagery 
is tliis activation.
Tho evidence from past research concerning tho effectiveness 
of action cuos in MP would seem to support a notion that imagory 
involved tho representation of actions which resembled tho motor 
activity in tho task, but this docs not necessitate that the images 
arc motor programmes, whatovor a motor programme might bo, nor that 
they involve tho motor production system to tho oxtont that specific 
muscle groups aro activated as implied by tho psychoneuromusculnr 
hypothesis.
T h e S p a c e d  I'r.'icl i c e  IlypotltOH i s
Ono rather obvious hypothosis of MP is that MP is equivalent 
to having a rest. Tho role of MP ns a rest poriod being that of 
essentially dissipating inhibition, Holding (l9f>5). In which case 
n long MP/rost poriod is not nocossarily more beneficial than a short
ono. Ono prediction from this hypothesis might be that alternate 
action and mental practice periods should be most effective. There 
have boon a number of studios which have compared MP with alternating 
mental and actual practice, Smyth (19713) for example. The results 
have largely shown that indeed this form of practice produces greater 
improvements than MP alone but not greater than actual practice.
Those results do not really support MP though as improvements in 
performance could have been brought about by actual practice alone.
As Smyth points out, alternating MP and actual practice needs to bo 
compared with alternating rests and actual practice, or alternating 
an interfering mental task with actual practice task.
The hypothesis of spaced practice can not bo rulod out but 
it does seem that MP involves some kind of active participation on the 
subject's part. Powell (1973) showed that nogativo MP, in which 
subjects imagined throwing darts which widely missed a target, did 
not improve performance as much as a positive MP group who imagined 
their darts to hit the required target. Rawlings and Rawlings (l97/*) 
have also shown that MP roducos rominisconco for high imagers but 
increases performance, which suggosts that a simple spacod practice 
explanation is incorroct, ns rominisconcc produces improvements in 
spacod practico.
2.3.7. Selective Attention Hypothesis
'Die final hypothesis suggests that MP enables ono to attend 
to various aspects of the task in a way which is impossible with roal 
practico bccauso tho overt activity required mokes much grontor demands 
on attention. Tims sometimes MP may bo even bettor than actual prnctico.
Corbin (1972) suggests that MP benefits the learner by calling 
attention to important details of the desired movement and allowing 
the redundant information to bo filtered out, as it woro.
This explanation assumes that MP is simply the focusing 
of resources on to a particular part of the action. It is not clear 
whether a specific or general resource is implied, although it does 
seem that a general limited capacity model of attention is intended. 
There is no evidence to dato which boars directly on this issue 
within the MP literature.
2.%il. Summary of Mental Practice Hypotheses
Seven hypotheses, some of which are rather vague, have beon 
extracted from the literature on mental practice. Eacli one has a 
different explanation of tho observed improvement effects following 
MP. Of tho seven hypotheses some can bo dismissed on tho basis of 
existing empirical evidence, namely, the motivational hypothesis, tho 
symbolic learning hypothesis, and tho spaced practico hypothesis.
Each of these hypotheses have been directly contradicted by existing 
experimental evidonco.
Tlie remaining four explanations have not beon put to tost 
by any previous research. There is no reason why those hypothesos 
should bo mutually exclusive since thoy offor different lovols of 
explanation. Tho trace consolidation hypothesis offers an explanation 
in terms of a change in memory representation. Two hypotheses, sym­
bolic perceptual nnd psychonouromuscular, each relato to processes 
by which changes in memory roprosontation can come about nnd both 
refer to an imago process. Tho fourth hypothosisos attention as a
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process by which changes in memory can come about when it is used 
as an agent in an image or some other cognitive process. Attention 
can be considered as a possible necessary agent but not a sufficient
procedure by which changes in momory representation may occur.
I
-One strong implication throughout the MP literature has 
been that imagery is the fundamental process which accounts for MP 
effects. This is explicitly stated in the symbolic/perceptual and 
psychoneuromuscular hypotheses, although they disagree as to the 
nature of imagery, and implied in all past experiments. The most 
common instruction to subjects is "I want you to imagine that you
In view of the close link between MP .and imagery the next 
chapter presents a review of some of the experimental and theoretical 
evidence for various kinds of image processes.
•4X%\ *' f pi
- '.9 -
process by which changes in memory can come about when it is used 
ns an agent in an image or some other cognitive process. Attention 
can be considered as a possible necessary agent but not a sufficient 
procedure by which changes in memory representation may occur.
I
One strong implication throughout the MP literature has 
been that imagery is the fundamental process which accounts for MP 
effects. This is explicitly stated in the symbolic/perceptual and 
psychoneuromuscular hypotheses, although they disagree as to the 
nature of imagery, and implied in all past experiments. The most 
common instruction to subjects is "I want you to imagine that you
In view of the close link between MP and imagery the next 
chapter presents a review of some of the experimental and theoretical 
evidence for various kinds of image processes.
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CIIAPTEH THREE
MENTAL IMAGERY
Tlioro seems to bo some confusion in the mental practice 
literature on the distinction between mental practice and mental 
imagery. Richardson (l9f>9) treats mental practice as one application 
of mental imagery, while Corbin (1972) refers to mental imagery and 
mental practice as if tbc two terms were interchangeable. Similar 
confusions are apparent in most of the research on mental practice.
It is not clear whether mental practice is a specific practice 
procedure which uses some form of mental imagery, or mental practice 
is another instance of mental imagery. This conceptual uncertainty 
is not surprising since both MP and mental imagery arc seldom defined. 
From the previous chapter it now seems clear that MP is a form of 
practice which enables certain aspects of a task to be rehearsed.
On the basis of the evidence from the analysis of the typos of cues 
used during MP it might bo suggested that it is the visual/spatial 
aspects of a task which are rehearsed by Ml’. The most convincing 
hypotheses of MP assume an imagery procoss as the psychological 
process underlying this form of practice. There is some ovidonco 
on the function of imagery in MP but there havo boon fow investiga­
tions of mental imagery within the MP litoraturo. Convorsoly, there 
lias boon a considerable amount of litoraturo on mental imagery within 
cognitive psychology in recent years, but very little mention of MP. 
There is somo consensus amongst cognitive psychologists that mental 
imagery is a visual/spatial process, although Pylyshyn (1973) and 
others disagree.
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Frequently, in MP experiments subjects arc instructed to 
"imagine performing x". Individual differences in the amount of 
improvements that have occurred following MP, have boon accounted 
for in terms of imagery differences by Richardson (1969)« Clark 
(i960) obtained subjective reports of the use of imagery during the 
MP of a basketball task. The results suggested that vividness and 
controllability of imagery wore important individual difference 
variables. Further studies by Start and Richardson (1964) and 
Richardson and Start (1964) investigated the effects of four imagery 
subtypes on the level of skill in performing a gymnastic task (single 
leg up start on a high bar). The four different imagery subtypes 
were vivid controllable imagery (VCl), weak controllable imagery 
(WCI), vivid uncontrollable imagery (VUl) and finally, weak uncon­
trollable imagory (WUI). Four groups of subjects wore assigned to 
the four different imagory conditions according to their scores on 
Gordon's (1949) and Sheehan's (1967) imagory questionnaires. Each 
group then had one five minute MP period per day for six days. None 
of the subjocts had performed the task previously but all had attendod 
ono demonstration. Aftor an MP period it was found that the (VCl) 
group had the highest performance rating on the task. The noxt highest 
performance rating was given to tho (WCI) group, followed by tho (WUI) 
group and finally the (VUl) group. Richardson (1972) concluded from 
those results that controllability of imagory is an important predictor 
of tho effects of MP on performance. Unfortunately, there are a number 
of inadequacies in tho experimental design. First, there wore no 
control groups. In particular it would have boon informative to hnvo 
had "no practice" and nlso "actual practico" groups with which to 
compare tho MP group. Second no baso lino performance score was takon. 
Tho effect of this is that it is not possiblo to nssoss tho amount of
improvement due to MP. Third, the predictive validity of question­
naires of imagery is poor, since they often correlate with social 
desirability scores (Dumdell and Wotherick, 1975)» However, they 
do not correlate with performance tasks which are thought to align 
with imagery processes, e.g. concept formation or spatial thinking 
tasks (Dumdell and Wetherick, 197<>). Finally, the performance 
measures were judges' ratings rather than error rates or time on 
task*
The role of imagery in MP seems important, but unclear. It 
is a predominant feature in several of the previously discussed 
hypothoses of MP. Those explanations of MP which do refer to imagery 
as an explanatory construct pay little attention to the volumes of 
research which have been concerned with imagery as a cognitive process. 
One obvious reason for this is that a large amount of research on MP 
was carried out between 1930 and 19f>0. During this period imagery was 
omitted from mainstream psychology by more radical behaviourism. Since 
then there have been a number of reviews and experimental investigations 
of MP, which still disregard research in cognitive psychology in more 
recent years. Work was also conducted, before the behaviourist era by 
Galton, Titchener, Fochner, Wundt and others.
This chapter presents a review of research into imagery in 
psychology. Tho review initially follows a chronological progression 
through tho introspection1st, behaviourist and information processing 
eras of psychology. A review of current imagery research paradigms 
within cognitive psychology follows in which the work of Pnivio,
Kosslyn and Shepard is considered. Theoretical arguments presented 
by Pylyshyn are discussed, which suggest that imagery has no importance
for psychological explanations of behaviour since it has no explana­
tory powers. Furthor theoretical discussions by a wider group of 
psychologists presenting a propositional or common codo theory of 
memory representation are presented. The alternative theories of 
imagery representation put forward by Paivio, Kosslyn and Neisser 
are then outlined. Finally a connection is made between imagery 
and actions as suggested by motor control and MP literature.
3.1. Imagery llofore behaviourism
Imagery was a major topic of interest in psychology prior 
to the publication of J.D. Watson's book "Psychology as the behaviour­
ist sees it" in 1913. Interest in imagery dates back to Aristotle who 
regarded images as the "stuff of mind". Tho philosophical investiga­
tion of imagery had a strong influence on subsequent psychological 
investigations of imagery. Tho early introspective psychology of 
Wundt and his followers accepted Aristotle's belief that thought was 
impossible without images and that memory consisted of images.
Borkoloy disagreed with tho notion of generalised or abstract images, 
bolioving that they must always bo of concroto objocts and could not 
represent abstract thought. Kant in his "Critiquo of Pure Roason" 
explicitly doscribos tho way in which imagos can bo connected with 
concopts only by means of a schema.
" Indeed it is schemata not images of objocts which 
underline our pure seimihlo concepts. No imago could 
ever be equaled to the concept of a triangle in general.
It would never attain tho universality of tho concept 
which rondors it valid of all triangles, whothor right 
anglod, obtuse angled or acute angledt it would always 
bo limited to a part only of this sphoro. Tho schoma 
of tlie triangle can exist nowhero but in thought. It 
is a rule of synthesis of tho imagination in respect 
to pure figures in space."
Kant (1929) A.l'il
Kant suggests that memory representations are not in tho 
form of an image* Instead ho suggests a more abstract form, sucli 
as schemata, which determine tho referent of an image and also 
generate images. Imagos aro still considered to play a role in 
memory and thought although it is necessary for them to have a 
schematised rule system. This rule system allows them to be uni­
versally applicable for concept representation. The trend away from 
imagos ns tho "stuff of mind" has recently boon reflected in psycho­
logical theories of representation. In particular, Pylyshyn (1973) 
and Anderson (1978) do not wish to give imagos tho status of a 
representational medium. (A detailed account of their position 
follows later).
~«2. Early Psychological Approaches
In tho latter part of tho 19th and early in tho 20th century 
psychology emerged as a separate discipline. Imagery was one of tho 
key issues studied by two kinds of psychological investigation. Tho 
first followed tho Wundt school of trained introspoctionists who 
analysed their own thoughts and psychological procossos. Titchonor 
(1909) roports,
" I can quite well got Locko's picture, tho triangle 
that is no triangle and all triangles at one and tho 
sumo time. It is a flashing thing come and gone from 
moment to moment; it hints two or throe rod angles, with 
tho rod linos deepening into black, soon on a dark groon 
ground. It is not thefe long onough for me to say 
whether the angles joining to form the complete figure, 
or whether all throe of tho nocossary angles aro given. 
Nevertheless it means trianglo •••••••••••••••••••••••
I represent tho meaning of affirmation, for instance, 
by tho imago of a littlo nick folt at tho back of tho 
noc k.... " p.22
The oxtract might woll bo usod ns an argument against
Horkoley's attack and thon lator Kant's attack of imagery. Titchoner 
who novor appears to have had an imagoloss thought, claimed that sub­
jects who reported iinagclcss thought required further training in 
introspective analysis. This raises the question; are images a product 
of thought, or are they a product of training in introspection? The 
latter reduces images to a mere experimental artifact.
3.2.1. Subjective Questionnaire
Another form of psychological investigation which is closely 
related to introspection is the use of questionnaires. Unlike the 
Wundtian introspection techniques, questionnaires require no prior 
training, o.g. Galton (lfl03) •'"id later Hotts (1909). Galton admini­
stered a questionnaire to lOO subjects which asked them to recall 
such things as their breakfast table. Ho also asked questions about 
the strength and controllability of their imagery. The results indi­
cated very little about the imagory process except for distinguishing 
between people who reported "good" or "weak" images. In excess of 
ton per cont of Galton's subjocts claimed not to have images. This 
ten per cont consisted of scholars and scientists and consequently 
Galton surmised that imagery was a characteristic modo of thought for 
those of "lessor mental abilities".
Lator tlotts rofinod Galton's questionnaire by asking subjects 
to rate the vividness of tho.ir visual imagory and also to rate the 
vividnoss of their imagory in othor sensory modalitios, i.e. auditory, 
visual, olfactory, tactilo otc. The results of Motts questionnaire 
wore that auditory and visual imagos were reported ns being more vivid
than any other
' . 2.2 Objective Assessment
Tho second method of measuring mental images involved the 
use of objective rather than subjective tests. Woodworth (1938) 
describes .a number of tests developed in the first decade of the 
twentieth century. A summary of those techniques follows with some 
of Woodworth's criticisms.
(1) Association
Subjects are given five minutes to recall objects having 
characteristic colours and then a further five minutes to recall 
objects with familiar sounds. Subjects are classed ns "visualisors" 
if colour is n bettor cue and "audilos" if sound is a bettor cue. 
Woodworth observes that a violin may be recalled as a sounding object 
without tho subject having any imago of the sound tho violin makes. 
Furthermore, properties of objects are a function of experience with 
those objects, rogardloss of how a subject uses a given modality in 
thought and/or imagery.
(2) Word type frequency
Here, the relative frequency of "sight words", "sound words" 
and "fool words" etc. is tabulated in a subject's prose and is then 
usod to class tho imagery or thought modo of that subject. Objections 
mentioned previously also apply to this typo of test. In addition 
Woodworth also notes that there is nothing to provont tho non visualiscr 
from seeing what is worth seeing, remembering it ns "being seen" and re­
porting it ns such in their proso.
(") Looming by eye or ear
Subjects are classified according to thoir rolativo momory
for visually versus nuditorially presented lists. According to 
Woodworth subjects could translate modalities internally immediately 
after a stimulus presentation. Therefore the modality of presenta­
tion does not dictate representation, for example, an audile who 
becomes deaf does not stop thinking.
(fi) Method of distraction
This type of tost rests on the assumption that internal 
processing will ho disrupted more if subjects have to process multiple 
stimuli in the same modality than if they could process multiple 
stimuli in different modalities. Subjects are instructed to learn a 
list of words while being subjected to auditory, visual or kinaes- 
thotic distractions. Those with poorer recall having had interference 
in a given modality are then assumed to bo using that modality to rep­
resent the words. Woodworth considers that the processing loads of 
different stimuli may bo more or loss demanding. Consequently a 
stimulus may be more or less distracting or interfering for reasons 
other than the mode of internal representation, sucli ns familiarity 
with or gonornl processing load of the stimulus.
(r>) Spelling
Words are road to a subject who is asked to spoil them 
backwards. It is assumed that if subjocts use a pictorial imago tho 
letters can be "rend off" ns easily in reverse ns in tho normal manner. 
I,'erna1d (1')12) found that nobody could road from Images equally easy in 
roverso order. Woodworth obsorves that .subjects reporting visual imagory 
tond to do hotter than other subjocts in a tost of this type. It is 
unclear whether or not tho tost is actually measuring imagery ns such.
It could bo that suhjocts imagine tho objocts rather than tho writton
word. It is also possible that some words are more difficult to 
imagine than others for a number of reasons, o.g. familiarity, 
abstractness. The tost could merely measure one's ability to chunk 
letters or measure memory capacity. Other factors such as word 
pronouncability or the sequential nature of auditory presented 
material could also influence a subject's performance.
(6) The letter square
This tost is based upon similar reasoning as the spelling 
test. Subjects arc road a scries of letters or digits and asked to 
arrange them mentally into a matrix of n rows by k columns. They 
are then requested to recall them by rows, columns or along the 
diagonals. If "pictorial-images" arc formed then recall in any 
direction should bo possible. All the limitations of the spelling 
test apply equally here.
(7 ) Description of a picture
Subjects ore asked to describe a picture from memory and 
then asked to what oxtent they used visual imagery. Fcmald (1912) 
noted that, thoso subjects who gave moro complex descriptions also 
reported use of imagery, although thoso who reported use of a verbal 
memory gave moro accurate and loss incorroct descriptions. Subjects 
could do woll in tho tost by naming the objocts in tho picturo and 
then recalling only the names.
Angoll (l910) and Fomnld (1912) examined tho majority of 
those objective tests and found that they had only low validity.
Tlioy did not corrolate well with subjects' direct reports of imagery. 
Woodworth and Shlosborg (1935) noted that work had not continued on
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this topic (mental imagery) because of the lack of adequate experi­
mental methods.
3.3. Imagery and Behaviourism
A central tenet of behaviourism was the failure of intro­
spective reports to provide common, objective evidence for investi­
gating mental processes. Consequently, they believed that psychology 
should only ho concerned with observable behaviour. Such tilings as 
consciousness, mental states, mind, will and imagery wore openly 
denounced. Watson (1013) suggested that imagery was subsumed by 
"subvocal thought", which consisted of verbal memory with accompanying 
laryngeal movements which are potentially measurable.
Watson claims that any rehearsal of scenes, etc. is 
facilitated by verbal rathor than imagery processes. Ilo implies that 
things are represented in memory in the form of words.
Towards the 19f>0's psychology again began to enquire about 
thought, attention and imagory. The status of imagos and tho like 
was not ns empirical phenomenon os in the pro-bohaviourist ora, but 
ns explanatory concepts or hypothetical constructs, MncCorquodalo and 
Meehl (l94fi). Explanatory concepts are incorporated into theories of 
information processing in ordor to account for bohnvioural phenomenon. 
Imagery is a primo examplo of an explanatory concept.
Tho ro-omorgenco of imagery ns an area of interest to 
psychologists brought with it a new approach to experimental lnvosti - 
gation. While experimenters became moro subtlo in thoir reasoning tho
basic methods of investigation still closely resembled the pre- 
behaviouristic approach. Two classes of investigation are to be 
found; quantative, subjective assessments of mental imagery and 
objective studies of mental imagery. The former uses questionnaire 
methods, while the latter uses reaction times (or chronometric 
analysis) and interference techniques. Often the two approaches are 
incorporated so that experimenters both objectively measure such 
variables as reaction time to a particular stimulus and question 
subjects on their use of imagery.
Richardson (1980) points out that there has been no radical 
change in the way mental imagery is investigated in psychology. In 
recent years artificial intelligence (A.I.) and computer simulation 
have brought a now kind of experiment to psychology involving simu­
lation and computational modelling. Sloman (197&) claims that compu­
ters have revolutionised the way wo have been able to think about and 
investigate mental events, such ns mental imagery. There has, as yet, 
been little development of A.I. techniques to the study of mental 
imagery, except in Kosslyn's (1980) approach. These sections present 
a review of the experimental investigation of mental imagery since 
the behaviourists. Thoro appear to be only two major levels of 
analysis; quantative, subjective assessments and objective studies.
The former relies on questionnaire data while the latter makes use of 
reaction time and selective interference.
Z.'i, Qunntntivo and Subjective Investigations
This method of research extends Galton's methodology to detect 
differences between both individual subjects and particular stimuli in
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thoir ability to goncrate images. Richardson (1980) outlines tliroo 
procedures for this research.
a) Instructions to subjects to uso mental imagery in 
learning and memory experiments. Typically,a list of stimulus 
words are displayed and subjects are instructed to learn the list
by forming images of the semantic content of one word. These experi­
ments normally involve using mnemonic strategies in a pairod-associate- 
1earning paradigm. Inferences are made about the learning curves and 
recall scores of various word lists. Word lists have boon produced 
with ratings of imagoability and concreteness (amongst other things) 
by Paivio, Yuillo and Maddigan (1 9 6 8) and Gilhooly and Logie (l980a,b).
b) Closely related to a) is the subject's report as to what 
extent a particular stimulus invokod an image. Correlations are then 
made between the subject-rated, imago evoking potential of a particular 
stimulus, and the subsequent recall tost performance of that subject 
with that stimulus. One example of this kind of tost is the probability 
of recall of variously rated words or objects, Paivio (1978).
c) Finally, subjects aro classified according to thoir 
controllability and vividness of imagery. Comparisons arc thon mado 
botwoon the differentially classified groups' performance on cognitive 
task thought to involvo mental imagery, such as spatial manipulation. 
Durndoll and Wethorick (l97f>) carried out a variety of such tests.
The rosults of this method of rosoarch, which emphasisos 
introspective assessment of imagery are not very convincing. Dumdoll 
and Wothorick (197^’) tested suhjocts witli known controllability and 
vividness of imagery (ns mensurod by Potts questionnaire, rovisod by 
Sheehan (1967) and Gordon's (19^9) controllability of imagery ques­
tionnaire) on five cognitive tasks. Thoso tasks foil into throo
classes; divergent thinking, problem solving and concept formation» 
The results wore that performance on the divergent thinking task by 
subjects rated as high controllable imagers, was better than a simi­
larly rated low controllable imagery group. No differences were 
found between high and low vividness of visual imagery groups. No 
effoct was found for the presence or absence of instructions to use 
imagery but subjects' own ratings of thoir use of imagery correlated 
significantly and positively with task performance.
Subjects' performance on the problem solving task showed 
no effects for vividness of visual imagery, controllability of visual 
imagery, or the presence of instructions to use imagery. The time 
taken by subjects to solve the problems showed a significant, but 
negative correlation with the subject rated use of mental imagery. 
Similarly, subjects' performance on tho concept formation task did 
not differ with tho rated vividness or controllability of subjects' 
visual iinagory. No significant correlations wore found between 
subjects' own ratings of imagery during tho task and thoir porformanco 
scores.
These results suggost that either imagery has no boncficial 
effects on problem solving and concept formation tasks or tho dimen­
sions of imagery measured by tho various questionnaires are not important 
to imago processes.
Subjects may not bo ablo to introspect on thoir u h o  and typo 
of imagery. Imagery questionnaires aro heavily biasod towards Galton's 
early intuitions ns to what might bo Important factors in imngory.
Despite more sophisticated techniques of questionnaire dosign involving
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classes; divorgont thinking, problem solving and concept formation. 
The results were that performance on tho divorgont thinking task by 
subjects rated as high controllable imagers, was bettor than a simi­
larly rated low controllable imagery group. No differences were 
found between high and low vividnoss of visual imagery groups. No 
offoct was found for tho prcsenco or absence of instructions to use 
imagery but subjects' own ratings of thoir use of imagery correlated 
significantly and positively with task performance.
Subjects' performance on the problem solving task showed 
no effects for vividness of visual imagery, controllability of visual 
imagery', or tho presence of instructions to use imagery. Tho time 
taken by subjects to solve tho problems showed a significant, but 
negative correlation with tho subject rated use of mental imagery. 
Similarly, subjects' performance on tho concept formation task did 
not differ with tho rated vividnoss or controllability of subjects' 
visual iinagory. No significant correlations wore found between 
subjects' own ratings of imagery during tho task and their performance 
scoros.
Thcso results suggest that oithor imagory has no beneficial 
effects on problem solving and concept formation tasks or tho dimen­
sions of imagory measured by tho various questionnaires are not important 
to imago processes.
Subjects may not bo ablo to introspoct on thoir uso and typo 
of imagery. Imagery questionnaires nro honvily binsod towards Gnlton's 
onrly intuitions as to what might bo important factors in imagory.
Despite more sophisticated techniques of questionnaire design involving
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factor annlysisj tho initial selection of tests for the analysis 
can be biased towards particular factors. Tims current questionnaires 
may bo artifacts of an earlier bias rather than sensitive quantifiers 
of important dimensions of mental imagery. There is no reason to 
expect that imago processes are open to introspection. If imagery 
is a cognitive process then subjects may bo completely unaware of what 
it involves, in much the same way as they are unaware of perceptual 
processes. Furthermore, any introspective analysis of cognitive 
processes may bo incorrect in that tho results of introspection may 
suggest particular processes but that these may be apparent rather 
than actual processes. Assuming questionnaires are unbiased quanti­
fiers of important dimensions of imagery, and that subjects are able 
to openly and correctly interpret cognitive processes, there are still 
doubts ns to how tho questionnaire will bo interpreted by different 
subjects. Subjects may differ in what they call an image, how they 
view controllability or in what they regard as a vivid imago.
The post-behaviourist research on tho subjective quantifi­
cation of montai imagery faces serious methodological problems which 
limit tho power of such approaches. This typo of research has boon 
concerned with identifying what correlations exist botwoon mental 
imagory and other nbilitios, and under what situations tho uso of 
imagery has bonoficinl effects. This approach seems inappropriate at 
tho present since tho underlying psychological processes involved in 
mental imagery have not yet been identified. The descriptions of mental 
imagery provided by questionnaire analysis anil correlation studios have 
not been particularly helpful in furthering our understanding of montai 
imagery. It may ho of interest to know the extent of a subject's 
ability to consciously access their cognitive processes and tho kind of
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reports made About imagery at a purely qualitative level,
3,5« Objective Investigations
Rather than assessing the effects of imagery in various 
situations or quantifying subjective descriptions of mental imagery, 
this approach attempts to identify the cognitive processes that produce 
and operate on images within a more general modol of cognition. This 
section reviews various techniques including selective interference, 
chronometric analysis and the symbolic distance effect which allow 
inferences to be made about image processes.
3.3.1« Interference Techniques
Interference techniques have been used to identify any overlap 
between imagery processes and other cognitive processes. The major 
assumption underlying these techniques is that any interference caused 
by concurrent tasks is duo to competition for a comnon resource, 
brooks' (1968) study is one of the most familiar examples of this 
approach. Brooks asked his subjects to imagine a block diagram of a 
letter "F" (as in figure 3*1)* and from a proscribed starting point 
in a proscribed direction, to categorise oach corner ns being Inward or 
outward facing, with a yos (Y) or no (N) response. The responses that 
subjects wero required to make were either verbal, "yes" or "no"| motor, 
tap with left hand for "yes", right hand for "no"j or perceptual motor, 
pointing to successive Y's or N's on a shoot with randomly positioned 
Y's and N's. As a control subjects were required to classify words as 
nouns or not from sentences rend out by the experimenter. The most 
important result was that suhjocts took longer to point to Y's or N's 
when Imagining the F than when processing the sentences.
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Ono cx])lanntion of this result is that a visual based 
pointing task interferes with visual imagery. Further experiments 
showed that the conflict is not visual but more abstract, arising 
from the different directions in which the subject had to monitor 
the physical array of Y's and N's and the imagined "F". When 
subjects had to respond by scanning a tactile array of Y's and N's 
with their eyes closed, similar differences between imago and sentence 
processing occurred, suggesting a spatial rather than visual conflict.
naddeloy and Licborman (reported in Baddcloy, 1976) had 
subjects perform the F tost while monitoring a particular typo of 
concurrent stimulus. Ono group of subjects (visual, non-spatial) 
had to press a key whenever the brighter of two stimuli appeared*
Another group of subjects (auditory, spatial) had to track a swinging 
pendulum by moans of the sound it emitted. While blindfolded, the 
subjects wore required to keep a light beam directed at a photo-oloctric 
coll on the pendulum. Whenever the light hit the cell the frequency 
of the sound omitted from the pendulum changed. The results showed 
that the auditory, spatial tracking impaired the performance on the 
"F" test, more than did the visual non-spatial task, supporting 
Brooks' spatial processing hypothesis.
Ono might attribute the differences in intorforonco effects 
to the complexity of the response demanded of the subject, rather than 
l.lie upatlal mill.mil-• In I,he lladdeley and l.ielieimaii nlmly auditory 
tracking is a moro complex task which has a greater rosponso domand 
than a brightness detection task with n key pressing rosponso. This 
difference in task complexity and response demand could be responsible
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for the observed performance differences in the "F" test.
Segal and Fusella (1970) asked subjects to form either 
visual or auditory images while performing a concurrent auditory 
or visual signal detection task. They found that reporting the 
presence of a faint blue dot on a screen was interfered with more 
by forming a visual image, than an auditory image. Forming 
an auditory image interfered with the detection of a faint tone 
embedded in white noise, more than forming a visual image did.
Using signal detection theory they concluded that these findings 
wore duo to decrements in subjects' sensitivity (d*) rather than 
changes in their criterion for responding, (p).
Recently, Schorr, U«lznno and Smith (1978) extended Segal 
and Fusella's study in an attempt to identify whether interference 
caused by images was modality specific or relation specific. By 
relation specific they meant spatial or temporal. The experimenters 
varied the relation and modality of the imagery task. Subjocts were 
instructed to form one of four types of images; visual spatial, 
visual temporal, auditory spatial or auditory temporal. Whflo main­
taining imngos of the typo instructed, subjocts hod to perform a visual 
detection task which featured eithor a temporal or a spatial relation.
Tho temporal relation of tho visual detection task required 
subjocts to judge whethor two dots of light appeared simultaneously 
or successively. The spatial relation comprised judging whether two 
dots of light were horizontally or vertically positioned.
Tho images that subjects wero instructed to form wore either
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of two colours (visual) or two instrument sounds (auditory), a flute 
and a violin. The images were either to be of the two colours or 
sounds in different locations simultaneously (spatial), or of the two 
successively at the same location (temporal).
The experimenters found that there was more interference to 
the detection tasks with instructions to form visual images rather 
than auditory ones. No significant effects for the temporal or 
spatial nature of the imago instructions were found. This was taken 
as supporting a visual/pcrcoptual rather than a spatial/relational 
hypothesis of mental imagery. Only "skilled” imagers were used, which 
could have biased the results as there may have boon a preference 
towards the visual modality. Generating an imago with two "pieces" 
of information in it (two sounds or colours in different positions) 
might bo more complex than generating two consecutive images each 
with one piece of information in it. The absence of an auditory 
detection task makes it difficult to compare different forms of 
imagery.
~.r)«2. Chronomotric Analysis
Chronomotric analysis usos reaction times (HT's) to infor 
processing time in mental activities. Possibly the best known work 
on mental imngory using this tochniquo is that of Shepard and his 
associates in the "transformations on representations of objects in 
space" experiments, Shepard and Motzler (1971)« Cooper and Shepard 
(l973a,b), (1975) and (1978)» Typically subjects aro presented with 
two throe-dimensional block diagrams, one of which is rotated oither 
in the depth plane or the picture plane, or both. TI10 subject's task 
is to idontify the two diagrams ns being same or different.
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Tho results of those experiments were that the latency 
of a subject's response increases as a direct function of tho angle 
of rotation. From those results Shepard infers that subjects actually 
rotate an analogue representation of the object, in their imagination. 
Further experiments by Cooper (1975) showed that giving subjocts prior 
knowledge of tho degree of rotation of tho stimulus object reduced 
their RT's to a uniform level, regardless of tho angle of rotation.
By having subjocts press a button when they wore ready to receive the 
stimulus and then again when they made their decision, Cooper was 
able to record both preparation times and response times. When pre­
paration time was analysed it was found to increase ns a direct function 
of tho angle of rotation. Consequently, giving subjects advance warning 
of the degroo of rotation of an object allows them to prepare or antici­
pate the now configuration of tho object before responding. This 
suggests that a similar process of mental rotation is carried out on 
already presented objects and expected objects.
In yet a further study Cooper (1976) had subjects imagine 
a familiar two-dimensional polygon, rotating in a circular field at 
a predetermined rato. Tost shapes then appearod at both cxpoctod and 
unexpected oriontations. Subjocts wore required to decide whether 
tost shapos matched tho original (oxcopt for angle of orientation) or 
not. Tho results showed that tost sliapos occurring at expoctod angles 
of rotation had uniform decision timo, while tost shapes in an unoxpoctod 
orientation had decision times which increased ns a direct function of 
the angle of departure from tho oxpectod orientation.
Finally, Cooper and Podgorny (1976) found that RT increased 
uniformly with tho anglo of rotation lndopcndont of tho complexity of
r V
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tho stimulus. Thus it sooms that it is tho .act of mental rotation 
which affects NT, not amount of information contained in tho stimulus. 
This distinction between complexity demands and specific resource or 
process demands suggests that spatial processing of images is a distinct 
cognitive process. By using the RT to decide the equivalence of two 
objects, Shepard and his associates have boon able to conclude that 
images of objects are represented in an analogous way to tho actual 
display and that this is closely linked to tho perceptual inputs.
Another chronomotric approach to tho study of mental imagery 
has been that of Kosslyn and his associates. Kosslyn bases his work 
upon a model of mental imagery which resembles a computer controlled 
display on a cathodc-ray-tube (C.R.T.). Images resemble displays on 
a CRT which can bo "lookod-ovor" by a "mind's-oyc". Consequently 
liis experiments have been directed at such topics as "scanning",
"zooming in on", or "magnifying" visual images and analysing tho time 
taken to perform those tasks.
Kosslyn (1973) gave four groups of subjects ton lino 
drawings of real objects, (o.g. flowor, aoroplano, clock-tower). Two 
groups were instructed to oncodo an imago of tho objects, whilo tho 
remaining two groups were instructed to verbally dcscribo tho objects 
and encode their descriptions. An RT task then followed in which tho 
nemo of a given drawing was presented and followed by a test probo 
which was a possible property of tho object. Half tho tiino the object 
drawing had included the property and half tho time it had boon absont. 
Subjects wore required to respond if the property had boon includod 
by pressing a button. In addition one group of imagers was instructed 
to focus on one part of tho imago prior to tho tost proho, whilo tho
other imagers wore instructed to focus on the whole object. Similarly, 
the verbal group had to either verbally describe a given cn(j 0f t]l0 
drawing or describe the whole drawing prior to the tost probe.
The results were that both the imagery groups had quicker 
RT's than the verbal encoding groups. The RT of the imagery group 
which had to focus upon one end of the drawing increased as a function 
of the distance of the probe property from the point of focus indepen­
dently of direction. A similar increase in RT occurred in the equivalent 
verbal encoding group but this was not independent of direction.
In this experiment Kosslyn uses the time taken to scan images 
as a tape measure with which to assess the properties of mental images, 
lie assumes that if distance regulates the time to scan between portions 
of the imago then images can bo thought of ns containing spatial infor­
mation, and preserving the relative internal distances among portions 
of objects.
However, since the amount of information and the distanco 
between parts of the picture wore highly correlated one cannot distin­
guish between increases in RT duo to distance and increases duo to 
information. Consequently, this experiment cannot distinguish botweon 
latencies in RT caused by scanning a visual imago and those causod by 
searching an associated network ns in Anderson's (1972) FRAN model.
More rocently, Kosslyn, Hall and Roister (197^) separately 
manipulated the number of items in the display and the distance between 
parts. In a lottor classifying oxporimont they found that the timo to 
classify the probed lottor increased linonrly with distance between
letters, and independently of the number of interpolated letters. 
Similarly in a map experiment in which subjects imagined a map with 
various landmarks on it, RT to a test probe increased with distance 
between objects and independently of the number of objects. Finally 
in a series of oxperimontsinvolving faces, subjects wore presented 
with drawings of faces containing various coloured eyes and with 
various distances between the eyes anti the mouth. When asked to 
imagine the face, then fixate on the mouth, and then report the 
colour of the eyes, RT increased ns a function of the distance from 
eye to mouth. Other instructions to imagine the faces at either 
"half-size", "full-size" or "overflowed" until the mouth filled the 
imago, produced similar differences in RT to identify oyo colour. 
Overflow took longer than full-size and full-sizo took longer than 
half-size.
From those and other similar experiments reviewed in Kosslyn 
(l90o), ho concluded that images are "quasi-pictorial" representations 
depicting all the information normally contained in a picture. A 
fuller description of Kosslyn's model of mental imagery follows in 
the noxt section (3»5)«
Kosslyn has amassed a great doal of experimental ovidonco to 
validato his assumptions about the relationship botwoon imago processing 
and RT. One cannot help wondering what it must fool like to be a subject 
in Ills oxperimonts. The complicated nnturo of his instructions to form 
images, scan them, zoom in on parts, magnify or shrink the wholo imago, 
must leave some of his subjocts in a state of bewildcrmont. It scorns 
highly probable that the pressures brought about in such experiments 
may encourage experimenter offoots and demand characteristics, as
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described by Ornc (1962) and Rosenthal (1967).
Other experiments have boon performed by Posner and Mitchell 
(1967)» Posner, Boies, Eicholman and Taylor (1969), Posner (1973)* 
Paivio (1971) and (1977), Paivio and Bogg (1974) and Moyer (1973) 
which also use RT's to infer imagery processes. As in Shepard's and 
Kosslyn's experiments subjects are asked to judge two stimuli as 
being similar or different. However, the match can be based upon a 
shared attribute such ns a common verbal label or on some physical 
property. Consequently, inferences about the nature of a code used 
to store information in memory are dependent upon the relationship 
between the stimuli and the subject's RT.
Posner and Mitchell (1967) instructed subjects to indicate 
if pairs of letters wore the same or not; same could have boon in terms 
of physical indontity (AA or na), name identity (An or Bb) or rule 
identity (An - vowels). They found that "same" responses wore faster 
for physical matches and slowor for rule matches. This can bo taken 
ns cvidonco for a separate imago form of representation based on tho 
visual/porcoptual properties of a stimulus ns Paivio (1978) suggests. 
Alternatively, the same results can bo used ns ovidonco for a lovols of 
processing view of memory such os Crnik and Lockhart's (1972).
In later experiments, Posner ot nl (1969), subjects were pre­
sented with the first letter auditorily, tho second visually and were 
given prior knowledge ns to tho upper or lowor case nature of tho 
second lettor. Posnor ot nl found that audio-visual matching was ns 
efficient ns visual-visual matching} while visual-namo matching producod 
slowar RT's. It seems that subjocts could have gonoratod visual images
of tho auditorily presented letters with which to compare the second 
stimulus.
Paivio (1978) reports a study by Rosenfield (1967)»which 
used Carmichael, Hogan and Walter's (1932) technique of presenting 
ambiguous figures with labels. Subjects were first presented with a 
visual or verbal stimulus, followed by a visual stimulus in one group 
and a verbal stimulus in another. Tho task for tho subject was to 
judge the two stimuli as tho same or not. It was predicted that if a 
common (amodal) coding was used tho subject's RT should bo unaffected 
by tho type of comparison. If a pictorial code was used then RT's 
should bo quicker if the second stimulus is a picture. If a verbal 
coding is adopted then RT should bo quicker if tho second stimulus 
is verbal. Tho results were that faster RT's occurred when tho second 
stimulus was a picture. Furthermore, when tho two stimuli wore of tho 
same typo (visual or verbal) RT's wero faster than if they woro different. 
In a similar study Paivio and noggs (l97/<) required subjects to search 
through arrays of pictures of words for a target item. Search times 
wero consistently faster for picture targots with picture arrays than 
any other combination. When, in tho same study subjects woro prosontod 
with face and name pairs tho faco-faco comparisons wero fastor than tho 
name-face comparisons ns predicted.
Anothor variation on tho snmo-difforont theme is Moyer's 
(1973) experiment using the'hymbolic distance effect" in which subjects 
nro asked to idontify tho larger of two ohjocts. An underlying assumption 
hero, is that RT to choose botwoon two stimuli varies invorsoly with tho 
magnitude of the perceptual differencesj Johnson (1939)• Moyer presented 
names of animal pairs, such os "dog-mouse" and "rnbhit-mouso" and asked
subjects to judge which of the two was the larger by a switch under 
the appropriate name. Reaction time increased as the magnitude of 
the actual size differences increased. This was taken to indicate 
that size information was stored in an analogous way and the compari­
sons were made in an imago processing system. Paivio (1975 a,b) 
found similar results when judgements wore made across conceptual 
categories, o.g. mouse-toaster produced faster decision times than 
cat-toaster, lie also found that contrasting pictures of objects 
produced faster decision times than contrasting names, oven when the 
pictures wore scaled to give incorrect size information.
However, Banks and Flora (1977) instructed subjects to rate 
.animals on a 1-10 scale of intelligence. A second group of subjects 
was then presented with pairs of these animals and asked which of the 
two animals were the more intelligent. They found that judgement time 
decreased ns the rntod intelligence of the two animals became more 
similar. Similar effects for judgements of ferocity wore found by 
Kerst and Howard (1977)• Paivio (19 70) found that judgements between 
the pleasantness of words had a similar inverse relationship. Pnivio, 
however, porsists in bolioving that an imagery system must bo involved 
in these judgements.
5.5.5. A Summary of the Investigation or Imagery after Behaviourism
Before moving on to assess theories of mental imagery, a 
summary and evaluation of the techniques used to investigate mental 
iinagory is worthwhile. Tho qualitative, subjective assessment of mental 
imagery has boon concerned with tho identification of tho proportios of 
imagery, by questionnaire assessments and the correlation of those 
properties witli other psychological tests. A good roviow of this nroa
is provided by Richardson (1980). The main characteristics to 
emerge add little to Galton's early intuitions. Factors such as 
vividness and concrotonoss of visual imagery, while being widely 
reported, may not be of any explanatory use. Tho experiments of 
Durndell and Wcthcrick (1976) cloud tho usefulness of such approaches. 
One assumption is that imagery is a stimulus based potentiality as 
well as a subject based capability.
Imagery questionnaires, as they are currently used, have 
little predictive or explanatory power. It is possible, however, 
that questionnaires could provide us with some indication of the kind 
of things which people are able to report about their imago experience. 
Furthermore, tho ratings of concreteness and imagcability of words 
seems a reliable indicator of their probability of recall. This 
approach docs not give much insight into what kind of imagery processes 
might function within tho cognitive system.
Tho objective assessment of mental imagery has triod to 
placo imago processes within a cognitive system. The techniques 
employed have fallen into two main categories; selective interference 
on tho ono hand and chronometric analysis on tho other. The former 
has boon less froquontly used but lias led to some apparently roliablo 
conclusions about tho relationship botwoon images and spatial represen­
tations. Tho major weakness with this approach is tho strength of tho 
assumption that interference is caused by competition for somo specific 
cognitive process. It has boon pointod out that somo oxporimonts could 
have manipulated a gonoral capacity rosponso demand rathor than a 
specific cognitive resource. Tho application of tills technique ponnits 
somo flexibility. Some oxporimontors havo usod imagery as an inter-
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forcnco agent to other cognitivo tasks, while others have used cogni­
tive tasks to interfere with imago processes.
Chronomotric analysis assumes that mental processes can 
bo inferred from reaction time data. Increases in reaction time arc 
assumed to reflect increases in the amount of mental processing. 
Unfortunately subjects can and sometimes do, chose to malto slower 
responses. Consequently reaction times may not bo able to distinguish 
between processing demands and subject response strategies.
Three different types of reaction time studies have boon 
identified; mental rotation, imago scanning and mental comparisons, 
including the symbolic distance effect. Mental rotation of objects 
has been quite successful in reliably identifying spatial properties 
of visual images. Claims about analogue representations arc not as 
well-foundod, since discrete operations such as transformations of 
matrices could conceivably bo performed to produce similar offocts.
No reference to images has been made in this type of oxporiment, 
tlicroforo subjects are loss likely to "co-operate" with the oxpori- 
montor, although use of tacit knowledge cannot be rulod out.
Imngo scanning, and other similar procedures have boon widoly 
used to support a CRT model of mental imagory. Tho findings consistently 
follow this model, although tlioro are a numbor of criticisms. Tho major 
reservations with this technique are that the complex instructions to 
subjects might enforce compliance by tho subject to the experimenter's 
hypothosis. Frcquont roferoncos aro modo to images and operations to 
imagos by tho oxporimontor during tho experiment. Finally, tho ovidonco 
for spatial representations in imagos is strong but there is littlo
evidence for other pictorial properties. Mental comparisons have 
been used more widely than other RT techniques within mental imagery, 
though perhaps not as extensively. The assumptions are similar to 
other RT studies but the findings are open to alternative explanations. 
Experiments of this kind are, as yet incapable of isolating specific 
forms of representation in images. Paivio's dual coding model (to bo 
described in full later) which depicts visual/porcoptual and verbal 
processing systems reflects the inadequacy of this approach to distin­
guish between visual coding and other explanations of the same data.
3.6. Theories of Mental Imagery
The remaining sections of this chapter present a review of 
the major theories of mental imagery. The models of imagery put forward 
by Paivio (1978) and Kosslyn (1980) are contrasted with the proposi- 
tionalist accounts favoured by Pylyshyn (1973) and Anderson (1978).
An alternative model of imagory is suggested by Woimer (1977) in the 
framework of a "motor theory of mind". Finally, Neisscr's (1976),
(1978) schema theory presents imagery as an everyday cognitive evont.
Tho theme is one of images and representations.
".6.1. Pnivlots Dual Coding Model
Dual coding thoorios have boon suggested which idontify two 
distinct forms of representation for images and vorlml information, 
Wallach and Averbach (1933), llrooks (1968), Tvorsky (1969), Paivio 
(l97l)| (1978) and Posnor (1978). The most recent and well dofined 
theory being that of Paivio's dual coding model. Paivio»s modol 
suggests that vorbal and imago systoms constitute two distinct forms 
of representation, processing and organizing characteristics. Tho
79 -
relationship between the image system and the verbal system is shown 
in Figure 3(ii) which is taken from Paivio (197^)»
Imagons are assumed to be perceptual isomorphs or analogues 
of objects and events, containing information such ns size, shape and 
colour. Imagons arc the representational units used to generate con­
scious images and to process pictorial information.
bogogons are taken from Morton's (l9f>9) model of word re­
cognition and are discrete representational units which correspond to 
the functional units of natural language. Unlike iinagcns those units 
are arbitrarily related to perceptual inputs.
According to this model the two systems function independently; 
for this reason we are able to simultaneously perform such tasks as 
watching a flow of traffic while answering crossword clues. Whon two 
tasks require simultaneous use of a particular system inhibition occurs, 
honco one cannot answer crossword cluos while roading a book, unless the 
two aro rnlatod and bocotno one task. The inter-connections betwoon tho 
two systems permit objects and pictures to bo named, and pictures to bo 
drawn from tho names of objocts; although thoro could indoed bo soino 
items wo cannot name or concopts wo cannot imagino.
Tho most systematic ovidonco for distinct verbal and imago 
codes comes from the studios of Posner and Ills associates, and Paivio 
mentioned earlier. Tlioso experiments use RT measures to dotoct differ­
ences between matching pictorial and verbal stimuli. Tho independence 
botwoon the two forms of matching and the lower HT for pictorial matching 
loads Paivio to hypothesize a dual coding model of cognitive processing.
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Fig 3.2 The verbal and image systems of Paivlo's dual coding model
showing the roprosentationn1 units ("imagens" and "logogens") 
and tho interconnections botweon the image and verbal systoms. 
(Paivio, 1R7R P.3H1)
The ability of the verbal and image system to translate 
inputs into the opposite system suggests a common code exists between 
the two systems. The existence of an underlying coimion code makes 
further specific coding systems redundant. Anderson (1978) claims 
that any arguments made for specific coding systems can also bo 
accommodated by a common coding system. If there is a translatory 
mechanism which can deal with information from multiple-codes then 
it is more parsimonious to represent information in a common code.
The dual-coding model accommodates pictorial and verbal information 
but not motor, cmtlonal or social information. Does this moan wo must 
add an additional distinct representational system for each of those 
other cognitive processes?
A common coding system does not necessarily diminish the 
functionality of an imago system. Imagery as a distinct process, 
acting on ainodal representations, is suggested by nichardson (i960).
In this conception, imagery functions ns a method of recall and rehearsal 
which permits memory representations to bo actively intogratod and differ­
entiated.
".6.2. Kosslyi^s CUT Model
Kosslyn (1980) proposes that images resemble displays produced 
on a enthodo-rny-tubo (CUT) by an oxocutive computer programme. This 
model has been n prototypo to onnblo Kosslyn to devolop a computational 
simulation of image processes, lie regards images nst-
" temporary spatial displays in nctivo memory that arc 
generated from more abstract representations in long 
term memory." Kosslyn, Pinker, Smith and Schwartz 
(1979) p.536
Tho main force of Kosslyn's model is not nimod at a description of imagos,
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but at tlio process which can be per formed on thoms-
"Intorprotivo mechanisms (a mind's eye) work over 
(look at) these internal displays and classify 
them in terms of semantic categories as would bo 
involved in realizing that a particular spatial 
configuration corresponds to a dog's oar, for 
example." Kosslyn ot al (1979) p.53<>
Ho does, however, strongly claim that images are quasi-pictorial in
that they "depict" rather than "describe" information in a spatial
medium.
Images are thought to bo based upon two sorts of data 
structures:-
a) a surface reprosentation/matrix or visual buffer, 
which is a quasi-pictorial entity in working memory;
b) a deep representation in long term memory from which 
the surface representation is derived.
Kosslyn regards the surface representation as a "proper imago". Images 
arc represented hero by a configuration of points in a matrix, which ho 
calls a "visual buffer". This visual buffer is also involved in per­
ception and functions ns if it wore a co-ordinate space. Images, (or 
in the case of direct perception, information) are represented in this 
space by selectively filling in colls of the matrix. The information 
which can bo contained within this surfaco representation includos 
spatial extent, brightness, contrast and veridical correspondence 
botwcon points on the object and points on the representation. Kosslyn 
suggests that some of the proportion of tills surface representation are 
that tho rate of firing of a coll decreases with the distance of tho 
coll from tho ccntro of tho matrix. Consequently imagos and porcopts 
fade towards the periphery. Tho surfaco roprosontation lias only llmitod 
resolution, so that small objects become obscurod and the spntiol modium
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in which tho images occur lias a limited extent, with a central region 
of high activation. Finally tho matrix of tho surface representation 
corresponds to a visual short term memory. Representations on this 
matrix decay with time but can bo refreshed by rehearsal.
The second data-structuro in Kosslyn's model of imagery is 
a deep representation from which tho surface representation is genera­
ted in tho case of images. Two sorts of deep representation are 
described; that used to store "litoral" or "depictive appearance" data, 
and a factual store of "descriptive, conceptual" data. Tho litoral 
(or perceptual) store depicts how information in tho surface structure 
is arranged. The factual store is of a propositional nature and 
contains information about "parts" of images and procedures for identi­
fying those parts. Other information in this store includes tho name 
and address of a particular object representation, names of super- 
ordinate semantic categories to which tho object belongs and a classi­
fication of tho object's size.
Kosslyn's simulation inodol emphasises tho processes which 
images undergo. This simulation modol includes procedures, such 
ns PICTURE, PUT and FIND which operate on "litoral" data storos to 
produce and transform images on tho surface representation. Thoso 
hypothetical procedures arc based upon subjects* actual performances 
in imagory experiments.
Kosslyn's research has boon devoted to identifying tho opera­
tions which can bo porformod on imagos and then incorporating thoso 
findings within Ills modol. Unfortunntoly, no experiments to tost tho 
model itsolf have ns yet been devised. This theory roflocts a formal
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simulation of a CRT proto-model rather than a simulation of mental 
imagery. The adequacy of such a proto-model to provide an explanation 
of mental imagery is limited. The model assumes, for example, that 
something resembling a "CRT display screen" exists within the cognitive 
processing system. There is some suggestion from Marr (1975) that per­
ceptual processing utilizes a visual buffer to construct a "primal 
skotch" of objects, but this is supposed not to have any "screon-liko" 
properties and to be inaccessible to conscious processing. While 
computer simulation is a useful aid to theorising, a simulation is 
purely a description of a system, and not a test of that system. 
Consequently, any procedures which function within the simulation 
need not be present in actual behaviour.
Kosslyn's model does not attempt to show how imagery might 
function in a cognitive system, his main concern is with how an image 
system itself might function. Kosslyn claims that images are distinct 
forms of representation, with separate propositional and image repre­
sentational systems (i.e. "literal" and "factual" stores). These two 
systems interact to produce images and classify objects. Therefore, 
Kosslyn's CRT model seems to bo an extension of Paivio's dual coding 
model of mentol imagery in this respect.
3.6.3. Nolssor'a Model of Mental Imagery
Neisser (1976» 1978) presents an informal account of how 
images function within a "schema" theory of cognition. In this model 
images are "plans" for perceiving and acting. Cognition is seen as a 
dynamic process in opposition to the temporal flow-chart models of 
information processing.
"In an information processing model an imago is treated 
ns a train of processes that arise in the middle of the 
apparatus instead of at the left-hand-end and then pro­
ceeds along the sequence normally." Noisscr (197$) p.80
Noisscr claims that perception is most often veridical and 
always continuous. To achieve this continuous activity "looking" 
involves anticipating inputs as well as interpreting "picked-up" 
information. Schemata function as anticipations and plans which, 
together with the information in the environment, determine what is 
seen. Perception does not involve constructing an imago for inspection 
by an "inner man" but produces plans for obtaining more information.
In Figure 3.3 Neisser's "perceptual cycle" is outlined showing the 
dynamic nature of perception and action.
Noisser implicitly assumes a common code, since ho notes 
that perceptual activity is not restricted to a single sensory system. 
Information from one modality produces explorations, which roly on 
plans or imagos in another. Schemata accept information from many 
sources simultaneously and direct explorations of many kinds.
Mental images are thought to bo activo but as yot unfilled 
expectations of anticipated information. They are not only able to 
operate ns input procossos, but are also able to anticipate actions, 
ns in preparing to hit a crickot ball, the batsman imaginos his strike 
boforo the ball hits the bi\t.
While nn imago represents stored information it is not usod 
ns stimulus information would bo. Wo do not oxamine our imagos ns wo 
would a real object. It is not n picture but n plan for obtaining 
information. A vorlml report of a visual imago, thoroforo, is at most
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"In .in information processing model an imago is treated 
ns a train of processes that arise in the middle of the 
apparatus instead of at the left-hand-end and then pro­
ceeds along the sequence normally." Ncisser (1978) p.80
Noisscr claims that perception is most often veridical and 
always continuous. To achieve this continuous activity "looking" 
involves anticipating inputs as well as interpreting "pickcd-up" 
information. Schemata function as anticipations and plans which, 
together with the information in the environment, determine what is 
soon. Perception does not involve constructing an imago for inspection 
by an "inner man" hut produces plans for obtaining more information.
In Figure 3.3 Noisser's "perceptual cycle" is outlined showing the 
dynamic nature of perception and action.
Noissor implicitly assumes a common code, since ho notes 
that perceptual activity is not restricted to a single sensory system. 
Information from one modality produces explorations, which roly on 
plans or images in another. Schemata accept information from many 
sources simultaneously and direct explorations of many kinds.
Mental images are thought to be activo but as yet unfilled 
expectations of anticipated information. They arc not only able to 
operate as input processes, but are also able to anticipate actions, 
as in preparing to hit a cricket ball, tho batsman imagines his strike 
boforo tho ball hits tho bat.
Whilo an imago represents stored information it is not usod 
ns stimulus information would bo. Wo do not examine our imngos ns wo 
would a real object. It is not a picturo but a plan for obtaining 
information. A verbal report of a visual imago, therefore, is at most
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Fi g a 3.3 Noirnor'a perceptual cyclo, taken from "Copnition and 
Reality". 1976 p.21
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a report of what you are prepared to see, not what you do see.
Images can be modified, though, in order to match changes in the 
environment or our own desires.
Noisser appears to regard images as having primarily a 
spatial nature and to bo part of a cognitive process which is 
familiar to all subjects.
"This account of imagery is not introspective. Any 
organism which anticipates the layout of objects in the 
environment and directs appropriate movements as a 
result may be said to have spatial imagery." 1978 p.99
Images are not exclusively visual, as anticipatory schemata can direct
reaching, touching and listening ns well as looking. It is the
spatial arrangements of objects rather than the way they look which
is contained within an image.
One prediction made by Ncissor is that if images aro antici­
patory schemata then eye movements in looking and imagining should bo 
similar. However, ns we can look at things in many ways the predicted 
eye movements cannot bo derived. It is possible that in a situation 
involving systematic motion, such as in tennis, some predictive oyo 
movement patterns can bo gonorntod. Antrobus, Antrobus and Singer 
(19M) found similar eye movements in "imagers" and "lookers" in a 
tennis match situation. Ilcbb (i960) also suggested that eye movements 
might bo an organising feature in imagory.
Much of Nolsser's model is purely speculative and not oxplicit 
enough to generate more than a few testable predictions. This modol is 
far less explicit than are tlioso of Paivio and Kosslyn. Noisscr doos, 
however, present a functional model of how imagory is accommodated 
within a cognitive framework. Furthermore, this notion of imngory is
capable of describing all typos of imagery in everyday situations. 
Finally, Ncisser seems to use the terms anticipation, plan, imago 
and schemata with a certain .amount of flexibility and interchanging, 
making it difficult to interpret what each of those terms is being 
used to describe.
‘S.fi.fr. Motor Theories of Mental Imagery
Motor theories assume that representations are made in terms 
of motor acts; as distinct from motor imagery which relates to images 
of movements, which may bo in some other form, such as "pictorial".
The earliest motor theories of imagery can bo found in Bain (1855) 
and Washburn (1916). More recently Woimer (1977) suggests that 
images are represented in terms of skilled actions. Woimor claims 
that the mind is intrinsically a motor system and that everything 
mental is a product of constructive motor skills. Ilis arguments are 
aimed at showing the equivalence of perception and action but ho seems 
to profor an action representation system which is capable of inter­
preting perceptual stimuli. Perception and action are indeed intrin­
sically linked within n cognitive system, but to claim that this 
representation is motoric in nature is dubious. Tho prosont under­
standing of how motor acts are roprosontod docs not permit Woimor to 
make any claims about what that representation is. If one nssumos 
that motor acts are represented ns "motor programmes" thon ono must 
provide a definition of a motor programme. Perhaps ho would agree 
with tho currem(; belief that n motor programme in a net of abstract 
rules which control tho output of lower motor production centres.
This definition is still sufficiently vague to be of little use.
Ilowovor, assuming that some form of action representation
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can be agrocd upon there still remains the problem of explaining 
how it is that motor acts, and indeed other events, can often bo 
perceived before they can be produced. For example one might bo 
able to recognize a good dive from a diving board without being 
able to produce such a dive oneself. If imagery is to be based on 
an action production system then how do wo form images of actions 
that wo cannot produce. Furthermore any improvements in performance 
which occur as a result of imagining would bo difficult to explain 
if imagery was the reactivation of our existing motor programme. 
Studies on second language learning and child language acquisition 
suggest that both adults learning a foreign language and children 
learning a first language can perceive and understand speech before 
they can produce it, (Gluckshcrg and banks 1975)» Therefore perceptu­
al and production processes seem to have some functional independence. 
Woimor claims that all images and all mental acts are "motoric"; if 
by motoric ho moans part of a cognitive system which controls action 
then this is no different to Noisser's claim. It seems that what is 
lacking from this motor theory of mental imagory and of motor theories 
of mind is some specification of the mental representations involved.
The specific processes of images are not discussed in 
Woimor's account but it is assumod that there is no distinction 
botwocn a sensation and an image. A similar pattern of excitation 
follows instructions to imagine an ovont ns accompanies the actual 
event itself (or its direct sensory consequences).
This model of mental imagory does not specify how images 
are formod or what function they fulfill. Any suggestion that images 
(or thought) consist of motor programmes of skilled actions has diffi-
culty in explaining how novel images are generated. Furthermore, a 
motor theory of mind assumes that all "programmes" are prewired, 
otherwise perceptual recognition processes could not be accommodated 
since recognition precedes production in skill acquisition.
3.6.3« Propositional Accounts of Mental Imagery
The major figure on the propositionalists' view of mental 
imagery has been the research of Pylyshyn, (1973, 1978, 1980). He 
disagrees with claims that mental images are units of representation, 
or explanatory constructs for cognitive psychology. Pylyshyn does 
not question the existence of images, or the empirical results of 
imagery experiments. Ho believes, instead, that images are not 
explanatory constructs and that one cannot explain the cognitive 
processes involved in imagery without reducing "images" to a more 
primitive level. It is the representational status of images on 
which Pylyshyn has most to say. Ho believes that all explanations 
need to bo at a representational level and adopts a reductionist, 
mechanistic approach. Ho claims that mental representations cannot 
be investigated by introspectivo techniques since subjects do not 
have conscious access to the functional representation (i.c. one that 
figures in human information processing).
One argument is that if subjects can translate between verbal 
and pictorial codes (ns in Pnivio's model) there must bo some represen­
tation which Is more abstract and not available to conscious experience, 
lie suggests that this representation is amodal and of a propositional 
nature.
A proposition, according to Pylyshyn, is an assertion which
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can bo true or false. Both pictures and words must bo interpreted 
before their conceptual contents can bo represented. Propositions 
are found in the deep structure of language and pictures, but are 
not necessarily exprossablo by natural language or drawings. Thus 
the concepts and predicates in propositions may bo perceptually 
well defined without having any explicit natural language level.
Similarly motor acts might be represented as abstract mental concepts.
A propositional representation is one which does not corres­
pond to a raw sensory pattern, but is highly abstracted and inter­
preted. It is not different, in principle, from tho knowlodgo assorted 
by a sentence, or potentially assorted by some sentence. There is a 
dependence on tho classification of sensory ovonts into a finite sot 
of concepts and relations. Consequently, what wo know about some 
event or object is formally equivalent to a finite number of logically 
independent descriptive propositions.
Pylyshyn regards Baylor’s (1972) programme of a block visuali­
sation task as evidence for a propositional representation. This modol 
hypothesises two closoly rolatod ropresontational systems, tho S-Spaco 
for symbolic factual information and tho I-Spaco for imaginai information. 
Thoso two systems closely resemble Kosslyn’s modol of mental imagory, 
but they make use of a propositional framework. This propositional 
account reduces imagery to a product of recall in working memory.
Pylysliyii (197^) boliovos that representations are structured 
descriptions and that early stagos of perceptual processing are auto­
nomous of highor cognitive processes. Any arguments for analoguo 
representations, such ns Shopnrd's montai rotation oxporiments, can be
accommodated by a propositional model. The increase in RT accom­
panying a mental rotation would still be produced if subjects had 
represented a rule system about what operations have to be performed 
on a particular structured description to arrive at a particular 
ondstato. Pylyshyn suggests that such modelling, as that in production 
systems, support a propositional account of mental representation. 
"Production systems" have boon used in artificial intelligence to 
represent procedures for achieving desired goals (Simon, 1973).
(A production system for a simple motor skill is described in 
Chapter XII).
Anderson (1978) points out that wo cannot distinguish 
botweon processes which act on representations and representations 
themselves. Therefore, any attempt to distinguish between a proposi­
tional and analogue representation is impossible, lie notes that this 
is because wo are looking for a behavioural distinction, whereas wo 
ought to look for neurological .and physiological constraints. Those 
must bo looked at, in addition to subjoctivo criteria such as 
parsimony, efficiency, optimality and plausibility, in futuro evalua­
tions of cognitive models.
"«7 Mental Imagery - Some Conclusions
Tho oxtont of any theoretical overlap betwoon MP and montnl 
imagery is not reflected within cognitive psychology. While cognitive 
psychology lnrgoly ignores MI’, rosoarch workers in MP nttrihuto its 
offocts to cognitive processes of montnl imagory. Tho main limitations 
to imagery rosoarch within cognitive psychology rolato to tho usefulness 
of imngory ns an explanatory contruct. From tho oarly days of psychology
•in which images wore the "stuff of mind", mental imagery has been a 
controversial topic for investigation. The main reason for this 
•appears to bo the inability of psychologists to derive an acceptable 
paradigm for its investigation.
Theories of mental imagery have been concerned with the 
representation of visual imagos. There are those who argue that 
imagos are coded "raw" in memory, while the propositionalists argue 
that imagery has no explanatory powers at all in psychology. The 
functional properties of imagery are often used to distinguish 
between these two arguments. It is unfortunate that the functionality 
argument and the representation argument are often treated as one and 
tho same. As a result it is often argued that images are not repre­
sented in memory and that they have no functional value to a cognitive 
system.
Tho way out of this problem seems, in tho first instance, 
to ho to show that arguments about tho representation of imagos and 
tho functionality of images are indoed two separate arguments. One 
can then address those nuestions about representations independently 
from those about the functions of images. It may ho that imagos do 
indeed constitute an explanatory construct for psychology but that 
they aro not distinct units of representation.
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CHAPTER TOUR
THE IUNCTTONAI, KQ1IIVAI.ENCE OK IMAGES OK 
MOVEMENTS AND MOVEMENTS
The review of the mental practice literature revealed that 
improvements in performance following MP are most frequent when 
subjects have visual cues, relating to the task, to aid them. Of the 
seven hypotheses offered to explain the effects of MP four are capable 
of encompassing all the empirical evidence. Those arc:-
1. trace consolidation
2. syinbolic/percoptual imagery
3. psychoncuromuscular imagery
km selective attention
Those four hypotheses arc not mutually exclusive since they 
refer to throe different levels of explanation. The first level of 
explanation is concerned with describing how knowledge is retained 
and to some extent organised in memory but not with how that knowledge 
is represented. Trace consolidation is an explanation of how MP might 
produce less forgetting by organising memory.
The second level of explanation is directed towards under­
standing how knowledge is represented and the process that might act 
on that representation. Two typos of representation have boon proposodj 
a) symbol Ic/porceptiial which specifies a quasi-pictorial typo of repre­
sentation, and 1)) psychonouromuscular which specifies a motor type of 
representation. Included within this level of explanation is a process 
which acts on those representations to produce performance improvements. 
This process is imagery. Imagery is concoivod not ns a form of ropro-
sontntion but as a specific process which enables the mental 
execution of an action.
The third level of explanation is not concerned with the 
retention of knowledge, the representation of knowledge nor a specific 
process enabling the mental execution of actions. The selective atten­
tion hypothesis offers an explanation at the level of resource allocation 
to an unspecified process. This level of explanation is concerned only 
with how any process might bo put into operation within a finite system.
The level of explanation at which this research is aimed is 
tho second, the typo of representation and the specific process or 
processes which act upon that representation. Increased retention of 
knowledge by a process similar to trace consolidation may bo a direct 
consequence of MP. MP may indeed necessitate selectively attending to 
a particular process. Noithcr of those levels of explanation captures 
tho essence of MP though. They may be conscquonccs or necessities of 
tho second level of explanation but they are not specific enough to 
explain what MP is. Instead an explanation which pormits tho montal 
execution of an action by supposing a form of representation and a 
process which acts on that representation captures MP. It is this 
kind of explanation which cognitive psychology, as a whole, seeks for 
behavioural phenomona.
liecently, My rue (1 *)M 1) has shown that subjects who are asked 
to describe the ingredient« and tho procedure used to cook two dishes 
(lemon moringuo pie and sherry trifle) have a high consistency in thoir 
ordering of ingredients and steps, furthermore they put pauses and 
superfluous comments at the end of phases of cooking, o.g. pastry,
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f i l l i n g )  t o p p in g ,  w h ich  c o r r e s p o n d  t o  a c t u a l  p h a ses  in  th e  c o o k in g  
o f  t h e s e  d i s h e s .  Ilyrno s u g g e s t s  t h a t  s u b je c t s  m e n ta lly  c o o k  th e s e  
d i s h e s ,  lie s t a t e s  th a t  any e x p la n a t io n  o f  m enta l c o o k e r y  n eed s t o  
ho in  term s o f  th e  m ental e x e c u t io n  o f  p la n s  o f  a c t i o n .  Ho d oes  n o t  
go  v e r y  f a r  in  s p e c i f y in g  what "m en ta l c o o k e r y "  i s .  What i s  need ed  
i s  an e x p la n a t io n  o f  how t h e s e  p la n s  a r c  r e p r e s e n te d  and what p r o c e s s  
a c t s  upon  th e s e  p la n s  t o  p ro d u ce  t h e i r  m en ta l e x e c u t io n .  C o n s e q u e n tly  
any e x p la n a t io n  o f  MP c a l l s  f o r  th e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  a ty p o  o f  r e p r e ­
s e n t a t io n  and a p r o c e s s  t o  a c t  on i t .  The m ost l i k e l y  p r o c e s s  c a n d i ­
d a te  b e in g  m ental im a g e ry .
A review of the montal imagery literature, in the previous 
chapter, found very little literature pertaining to movements or 
actions. There is, however, a considerable amount of theoretical and 
empirical literature on visual imagery. There arc two opposing 
theories of montal imagery, namely propositional versus analoguo 
representations. Extremists sucli as Kosslyn (l9fl0) and Anderson 
(1970) havo modified their views on imagery. They regard imagery as 
a process which acts upon representations to produce functionally 
specific behavioural effects. This is a somewhat simplified account 
of their views, thero still is disagreement about the typo of informa­
tion represented, the naturo of this representation and the procoss of 
imago generation. Pylyshyn (1980) still maintains that images havo no 
function within cognition and that thoy arc merely epiphonoinena of 
some other cognitive process.
From th o s o  argum ents s e v e r a l  m ethods o f  e x p lo r in g  m ental 
im agery  h a ve  em erged , q u o s t i o n n a i r o s / i n t r o s p o c t i o n ,  c h r o n o m o tr ic  
a n a ly s is  and s e l e c t i v e  in t o r f o r o n c o .  Q u e s t io n n a ir e s  and i n t r o s p e c t i o n s
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have boon shown to have little predictive value or explanatory 
power, Durndcll and Wetliorick (1976). Chronomotric analysis assumes 
that mental events can ho accurately measured by reaction timos (RT). 
Any increase in RT is assumed to be caused by an increase in mental 
processing It is quite conceivable that an increase in RT may be 
duo to a particular strategy of responding. An example of this is 
the speed accuracy trade-off, whore some subjects actively choose 
to respond more slowly. Selective interference carries with it an 
assumption that stimuli which interfere with imagery (or any other 
cognitive process) involve similar cognitive processes. Nevertheless 
some experimental paradigms seem to bo emerging from this turmoil 
which might be usefully employed to investigate mental imagery and in 
particular imagery of movements as might relate to mental practice.
Few studies of imagery have had any direct bearing on move­
ments and actions. Sheehan's revised form of notts* questionnaire 
includes questions about kinaosthctic imagery. There arc two rocent 
experiments hy Khol and Roenkor (19O0) and Hall (in press) which 
consider imagery and movements. Kohl and Roonkcr found that positive 
transfer from one limb to anothor occurred when subjects imagined 
tracking on a pursuit rotor with tho opposito hand. Ammons (1958) 
amongst others, had previously shown that physical rohoarsal with one 
limb produces positive transfor to tho contralateral limb. Kohl and 
Roenkor havo shown that a similar positive transfor also occurs when 
subjects imagine tracking with one limb. Hie results of their experi­
ment present problems for a psychoneuromuscular explanation or motor 
theory of mental imagery. The psychoneuromuscular explanation suggosts 
that imngory of movements involves subliminal neuromuscular activity on 
tho imagined limb, Jacobson (1932), Shick (1970) and Woimer (1977)«
However, in this experiment subjects were instructed to imagine using 
one specific limb but wore later tested for a transfer effect with the 
opposite limb. Imagery had facilitated an improvement in a non imagined 
limb, which would not have been subliminaly activated according to the 
above theory. This suggests imagery of movement involves something 
other than the subliminal activation of a particular limb.
Hall has adapted Paivio's approach to investigating imagery 
by presenting subjects with patterns of movements and asking them to 
rate the imageability of those movement patterns, lie then tested their 
ability to recognise particular movement patterns in a scries of 25» 
two-choice, recognition tests. Finally ho tested subjects' recognition 
for big!» and low imagery rated movement patterns. The results showed 
that movement patterns which had boon highly rated for imageability 
also had higher recognition scores. From these results Hall concludes 
that instructions to use imagory can influence the learning and retention 
of movements. Furthermore lie suggests that images of movements take the 
form of quasi-pictorial representations.
Tho experiments of Kohl and Roonkor (1980) and Hall (in press) 
arc oncouraging. It is possible that subjects in tho Kohl and Rocnkcr 
experiments anticipated the bilatoral transfer effect and imaginod using 
oithor hand. Furthermore, tho rosults could bo accounted for by a motor 
theory of imagory if, ns Fowler and Turvoy (1978) suggest, motor activity 
is centroiled by highly organised units. Imagery may Involve motor 
commands and activation of motor production centres at a level which 
specifies collections of muscle groups which are normally activated 
togotlier as one "co-ordlnatlvo structure". Co-ordinativo structures 
need not he directly connected muscle groups, for exnmplo tho two hands
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of a drummer form one co-ordinntivc structure when drumming.
The Hall experiment relies on subjective introspective 
reports of imagery ratings. It is conceivable that subjects might 
have inferred for themselves that patterns of movements which 
resemble regular pictoral patterns ought to bo rocogniscd more 
readily than irregular ones.
One of Pylyshyn's main attacks on mental imagery is that 
images are cpiphonomcna of more abstract forms of cognitive repre­
sentations. Images can bo considered ns real psychological phenomena 
only if they can bo shown to have some functional properties which 
are not direct derivatives of some underlying propositional or more 
abstract representational code. linages must bo shown to produce 
now or different conceptualisations or configurations of represen­
tations. This moans that imagery must have some effect on what is 
stored in memory, which could not have come about without tho forma­
tion of an image.
A scries of experiments aro reported by Finko (1979, 1980) 
in which ho was ablo to show that perceptual motor biasing, which 
normally occurs ns an nftor-offoct of pointing at targets while 
viewing the targot through gogglos fittod with displacing prisms 
(Welch 1978) can occur when subjects imagine either pointing at 
targets, tho visual feedback resulting from pointing, or both.
Subjects woro seated in front of a target which was positioned approxi­
mately at arm's length from tho subject. The important contrasts mndo 
worn between groups of subjects who pointed at tho targot wearing 
goggles fitted with prisms, nnd subjocts who imaginod pointing a t  th o
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tnrgct and also imagined producing tlio appropriate errors in pointing. 
All groups of subjects wore then required to actually point at the 
target (with their arms hidden beneath a screen). The results showed 
that errors in pointing in both groups wore equivalent. From this 
and other experiments Finko concludes that imagery and errors of 
movement arc functionally equivalent.
The essence of Finkc's approach to the experimental investi­
gation of mental imagery is to show that biasing or after-effects 
which normally occur in reality can occur when subjects imagine the 
same conditions. This approach has two advantages, first it uses 
an experimental situation which has loss predictable outcomes (from 
a subject's point of view). The second advantage is that the results 
of the experiments may bo taken as evidence for the functional pro­
perties of imagery.
If it can bo assumed that mental practice is comparable with 
actual practice, to the extent that similar cognitive processes aro 
involved then it would follow that processes which interfere with, 
bias, inhibit or produce nftor-offocts in actual practico would have 
a similar offoct in mental practice.
^ i.1 . E xperim ent I
Tn short-term memory experiments using a linear positioning 
task, it has been shown by Patrick (1971), Craft and llnndrichs(1971), 
Stelmacli and Walsh (1973) and Laalis (197^) that a novol movement 
interpolated between acquisition and recall of a standard movomont 
interferes with recall. This interference is produced by distorting
tho location of tho recalled movement in the direction of the 
location of tho interpolated movement. If movements can be rehearsed 
by means of mental imagery then it should bo possible to instruct 
subjects to imagine tho interpolated movement. Furthermore, if 
movements and imagery are functionally equivalent then similar 
biasing after-effects should occur at recall when tho interpolated 
movement is imagined.
The first experiment tests tho hypothesis that an imagined 
movement can produce a bias in short-term memory for linear movements 
comparable to that produced by actual movement. This bias is con­
trasted with errors produced in memory for linear movements when tho 
same retention interval is filled with counting backwards in threes. 
As counting does not, intuitively, involve any incompatible movement 
information, such as spatial locations, distances or velocities, it 
is hypothesised that this activity will have very little interfering 
effects upon a subject's memory for a linear movement.
In contrast to imagining or performing a different movement, 
imagery of tho standard movement should consolidate tho memory trace. 
Tho inclusion of a condition whore subjects aro asked to imagino tho 
movement they have just performed should result in a lower orror-nt- 
recall than tho backwards-counting control group.
1^.1.1. Method
(1) Kxperimental Design
A two-factor independent groups dosign was usod, typo of 
interpolated activity having four lovols and location/distanco of 
movement having two levels. Tho typos of intorpolatod activity were
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counting backwards in throes, rehearsing by imagining the same 
movement, making a novel movement, and finally imagining a novel 
movement. The location/distancc of movement was varied by altering 
the oxtont of the movement such that novel interpolated movements 
were cither half or double the original movement.
(2) Subjects
48 right-handed subjects wero randomly selected from a pool 
of 7(i undergraduate volunteers, from the Psychology Department at the 
University of Warwick. The only constraint being equal numbers of 
each sex. Subjects wore then randomly assigned to one of the eight 
experimental groups, six per group, three male and throe female.
(~) Apparatus
The apparatus consisted of one linear slide comprising two 
75 cm stool rods of 1 cm diameter mounted in parallel 2 cm above a 
plywood base. An alloy block 5 cm x 5 cm x 4 cm was free to slide 
along the two steel rods, the top of this block having a circular 
holding knob of 2 cm height and 1.5 cm diameter. Attached to one 
side fnco of the slide block was a pointer which aligned to a milli- 
motor scale hidden from the subject's view. Along tho track, one 
either side of tho slide knob, were two adjustable stops which altorod 
tho usoablo track longth. Parallel to tho slido track was a third 
stool rod, 75 cm long and .25 cm diameter, upon which wore mounted two 
adjustable light units, one red, one green. The whole apparatus was 
placed on a table 70 cm high. Tho lights wore timed and powered to 
flash at regular intervals by two "Hirkbcck timers" (soo Fig. 4.1).
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Tiß+.l Basic apparatus
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(A ) Task nml Procedure?
The task was a standard linear positioning task in which 
subjects move a slide along a track until it reaches a stop. This 
is repeated fifteen times and then the subject has to recall the 
movement by moving the slide along the track with stop removed. 
Throughout the experiment subjects wore able to see the wholo of 
the slide track, except the mm scale measure. All subjects received 
15 learning trials in which they took hold of the slide knob with 
their right hand and moved this to the stop position which had 
previously boon sot by the experimenter. Subjects wore instructed 
to then release the knob momentarily before grasping it again and 
returning it to the start position. The end-stops wore sot to give 
a track length of cither 30 cm or 60 cm. Tho green light was sot at 
the start position and tho rod light at tho stop. A two-socond time 
interval betwoon each trial was used. The rod and groon lights 
flashed alternately at two second intervals between each light. 
Subjects wore instructed to time responses so that thoy arrived at 
the stop point ns tho red light npponred. Following tho learning 
period thoro was a 40 second retention interval during which one of 
tho proscribed interpolated activities was performed.
A .1 .2 .  I n t e r p o la t e d  A c t i v i t i e s
( l )  Counting backwards (Clt 3d). (Clt ho)
Two g ro u p s  o f  s u b je c t s  w ore in s t r u c t e d  t o  cou n t backw ards in  
t h r e e s  a lo u d  from 35') u n t i l  th e y  w ere t o l d  t o  s t o p  by th o  e x p e r im e n te r . 
IX iring t h i s  t im e  th o  red  l i g h t  rem ained  o f f  and was rem oved t o  th o  
s t a r t  p o s i t i o n  n s was th o  s t o p .  Ono g rou p  h a v in g  p r e v i o u s ly  lo n m o d  
a 30 cm m ovem ent, th e  o t h e r  g rou p  a f>0 cm m ovem ent.
(2 )  N o v e l , a c t u a l  movement (NAM ~ o ) , (NAM f>0)
During the Uo second retention interval these two groups 
wore required to move either half or twice as far as the original
movement (i.c. if the original movement was of 30 cm the now move­
ment was of 6o cm and vice versa). For those groups the rod light
was positioned at the new stop point. Subjects were instructed to
move to tho now stop point, momentarily release the slide, take 
hold again, and return the slide to tho start position, timing their 
arrival at tho stop point to coincide with tho light appearing. In 
all, ton moves woro made to tho now position.
(") Novel, imagery of movement (NIM jO), (NIM Go)
Tho two groups of subjects woro required to sit with their 
arms at their sides and imagine moving to tho now location of either 
half or twice the extent of tho previous movement. Everything else 
was tho same as in tho actual movement group, except no movements 
wore made. Subjects woro told that thoy woro to timo cacti of their 
imaginary movements to arrive at tho stop as ttio rod light appeared 
and that thoy would bo required to moke 10 such imaginary movements.
(4) Imagery of movements of the same extent (SIM ~o), (SIM (i0) 
Two groups of subjocts woro roquirod to imagino making tho same 
movement ns thoy had boon previously producing. In these conditions tho 
apparatus was not altered from tho previous looming trials. Instruc­
tions given to subjects were exactly tho same as In the other imagery 
conditions. Ton imagery trials were given in tho ho second retention 
intorvnl.
Immediately following tho ond of tho 40 second rotontion interval
(2 )  N o v e l ,  a c t u a l  movement (NAM ~ 0 ) ,  (NAM f>0)
D u rin g  th e  40  s e c o n d  r e t e n t io n  in t e r v a l  t h e s e  two grou p s  
w ore  r e q u ir e d  t o  move e i t h e r  h a l f  o r  t w ic e  a s  f a r  n s  th e  o r i g i n a l
movement ( i . c .  i f  th e  o r i g i n a l  movement was o f  30 cm th e  new move­
ment was o f  60 cin and v i c e  v e r s a ) .  F or  th o s e  g rou p s  th e  red  l i g h t
was p o s i t i o n e d  a t  th e  now s t o p  p o i n t .  S u b je c t s  w ere  in s t r u c t e d  t o
move t o  th e  new s t o p  p o i n t ,  m om en tarily  r e l e a s e  th e  s l i d e ,  ta k e  
h o ld  a g a in , and r e t u r n  t h e  s l i d e  t o  th e  s t a r t  p o s i t i o n ,  t im in g  t h e i r  
a r r i v a l  a t  th e  s t o p  p o in t  t o  c o in c id e  w ith  th e  l i g h t  a p p e a r in g . In 
a l l ,  t o n  m oves w ere  made t o  th e  now p o s i t i o n .
( " )  N o v e l ,  im a g ery  o f  movement (NIM j O ) , (NIM 60 )
The tw o g rou p s  o f  s u b je c t s  w ore r e q u ir e d  t o  s i t  w ith  t h e i r  
aim s a t  t h e i r  s i d e s  and im a g in e  m oving t o  th e  now l o c a t i o n  o f  e i t h e r  
h a l f  o r  t w ic e  t h e  e x te n t  o f  th e  p r e v io u s  m ovem ent. E v ery th in g  e l s e  
was th o  same a s  i n  th e  a c t u a l  movement g r o u p , e x c e p t  no movements 
w ore m ade. S u b jo c t s  w ere  t o l d  th a t  th o y  w ere t o  t im o  each  o f  t h o i r  
im a g in a ry  m ovem ents t o  a r r i v e  a t  th o  s t o p  a s  th o  r o d  l i g h t  a p p oarod  
and th a t  th o y  w ou ld  b o  r e q u ir e d  t o  mnko 10 such  im a g in a ry  m ovem ents.
(U)  Im agery  o f  movements o f  th e  same o x t o n t  (SIM 3 0 ) ,  (SIM f>0) 
Two g r o u p s  o f  s u b jo c t s  w ore  r o q u ir o d  t o  im a g in e  making th o  same 
movomont ns th o y  had b oon  p r e v io u s ly  p r o d u c in g . In  t h e s e  c o n d i t i o n s  th o  
a p p a ra tu s  was n o t  a l t e r e d  from  th o  p r e v io u s  le a r n in g  t r i a l s .  I n s t r u c ­
t i o n s  g iv e n  t o  s u b je c t s  w orn  e x a c t l y  th e  same as  in  th e  o t h e r  im agery  
c o n d i t i o n s .  Ton im a g ery  t r i a l s  w ero g iv e n  in  th e  *iO se con d  r e t e n t io n  
in t e r v a l .
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Immediately following tho end of tho 40 second retention intorval
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all rrouns were instructed to recall the movement they 
had been required to learn during the acquisition trials. 
During recall the stop and the red light were removed to 
the far end of the apparatus and no lights appeared.
Subverts were instructed to move in their own time to 
where they thourht the original movement to have been, 
release the slide, take hold again and return to the stop 
noint. In all, ten such unpaced recall trials were given. 
The recall trials were scored for magnitude of error from 
the criterion position, taking note of the sirn of the error 
to the nearest 0.5 cm.
Variable error and constant error.
The most widely used dependent variables in linear 
positioning studies are variable error (VL) and constant 
error (Cb) . briefly M l  is the standard deviation of the 
subjects' responses over trials, with respect to the crit­
erion position. Constant error i-; simply the mean error 
with respect to the criterion position over trials. The 
two measures are relatively independent in that a particular 
subject's recall data may have a low mean or constant error 
but a hi/?h variance and therefore a high standard or var­
iable error (VL). Conversely a subject may consistently 
reproduce the same incorrect movement, this would result 
in a hirh positive or negative Cl but a low Vt| of course, 
one might obtain a high Ml and C l or low M l and CL. The 
former reflects widely fluctuating but consistent over or 
undershootinr, while the latter reflects consistent accurate 
recall. To summarise, the two measures might be combined to 
reflect four different recall patternsi-
all croups were instructed to recall the movement they 
had been required to learn during the acquisition trials. 
During recall the stop and the red light were removed to 
the far end of the apparatus and no lights appeared.
Subjects were instructed to move in their own time to 
where they thought the original movement to have been, 
release the slide, take hold again and return to the stop 
point. In all, ten such unpaced recall trials were given. 
The recall trials were scored for magnitude of error from 
the criterion position, taking note of the sign of the error 
to the nearest 0.5 cm.
Variable error and constant error.
The most widely used dependent variables in linear 
positioning studies are variable error (VL) and constant 
error (Cl.). Briefly Vc is the standard deviation of the 
subjects' responses over trials, with respect to the crit­
erion position. Constant error It ".imply the mean error 
with respect to the criterion position over trials. The 
two measures are relatively independent in that a particular 
subject's recall data may have a low mean or constant error 
but a high variance and therefore a high standard or var­
iable error (VL). Conversely a subject may consistently 
reproduce the same incorrect movement, this would result 
in a high positive or negative Cc. but a low Vt| of course, 
one might obtain a high Vii and CL or low Vl and CL. The 
former reflects widely fluctuating but consistent over or 
undershooting, while the latter reflects consistent accurate 
recall. To summarise, the two measures might be combined to 
reflect four different recall patternsi-
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(i) Low VL and low CL - consistent accurate recall of the 
to-be-remembered movement.
(ii) Low VL and high Cl - consistent inac'urnte recall of the 
to-be-remembered movement, where positive CL reoresents 
overshooting and negative CL represents undershooting.
(iii) High VE and low Cl - inconsistent recall about the 
criterion position, e.g. large oscillations about the 
criterion position.
(iv) Hirh VE and high CL - inconsistent recall about an 
incorrect position, e.g. large oscillations about an 
irrelevant position.
These two measures have been taken (Laabs, 1973) to 
reflect perceptual and memory processes in linear positioning 
movements. CL might be taken an a measure of the amount of 
perceptual biasing in a subject's recall with high negative 
and positive values indicating under and overshooting respect­
ively. VL might be taken a- a measure of the relative strength 
of the memory trace, in which the value of the VL is inversely 
related to the strength of the memory trace. Furthermore, VL 
is thourht to reflect the strength of the memory and any"noise" 
from the motor production system. Consequently, a weak memory 
trace will be swamned by low noise, alternatively, a rise in the 
noise level will swamp a previously strong memory trace.
However at present no systematic investigation of the signal/ 
noise ratio of VL has been carried out.
L.l.1 Results
l-’rom the raw error ncores of each subject on the rete- 
nt'on trials constant error (Cl ) and variable error (Vl ) were 
calculated. (Appendix C shows raw scores and computed Cc, Vr. 
scores for each subject). Ct is the most relevant measure in 
this experiment since it indicates the amount of directional 
bias in the recalled movement. Separate 2-way ANOVA's were 
carried out on each of the two dependent variables. A summary 
of the mean and standard errors for each condition and each 
dependent variable, CL and VE is shown in Table L.l.
I n t e r p o la t e d -  
S ta n d ard  move
CD
60
CD
30
.............
NAM
60
NAM
30
NIM
60
NIM
30
SIM
6o
SIM
30
X -0.1 -0.4 -4.5 4.8 -4.7 4.2 0 0
CE
s , e .
- ------------------
1.62 2.18 0.82 1.25 1.72 1.71 0.17 0.23
* 1.4 1.4 2.1 2 .1 1.0 1.- 0.3 0.5
VE
s * e .
1
0.75 0.4l
___
0.04 0.5 0.33 0.26 0.12 0.1
Table 4.1 Experiment Is Summary of mean (X) and standard error (s.e.)
for CE and VE in each experimental condition. The value 60 
or 30 refers to the magnitude of the to be recalled movement.
SOURCE SS df Ms F ratio Pr
location/distance
OF MOVEMENT 0.054 1 0.054 0.206 >0.05 NS
TYPE OF INTER- 
POUTED ACTIVITY 10.33 3 6.44
ccITv••S’CJ <0.001 • • +
INTERACTION 0.106 3 0.035 0.134 >0.05 NS
ERROR 10.466 40 0.262
TOTAL 20.056 47
Table 4.2 Experiment Is ANOVA Summary 4 x 2  design using VE as the 
dependent variable
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U). Variable.error
A 2-way ANOVA using Vl as the dependent variable reveal­
ed no significant effects for locatioiVdistance of movement,
1(1,40)=0.206 p > .05. a highly significant effect for type of 
interpolated activity was found, F(3,40)=24.58, p^.001. The 
interaction was not significant, F( 3»40) = .1 34, p ^ . 05.
Further analysis of the main effect for interpolated activity 
using Tukey's H3D test shows that NIM and oll>i have significan­
tly less Vh than NAM and that SIM ha3 significantly less Vii 
than C3. A matrix of the differences between each pair of 
means is shown in Table 4.3. The effects of type of inter­
polated activity on VL can be seen in figure 4.2 where the 
interesting feature is the relatively low levels of found
in the two imagery conditions.
(2) Constant error
Analysis of Cu by a 2-way ANUVA showed a highly 
significant effect for extent of movement, F(1,40)~125• 51. 
p ^ .001 and for the interaction between location/distance 
of movement and type of interpolated activity 1(3.40)=43.95 
p<,.001. No significant effect for interpolated activity 
alone was found, F'( 3,40)=0.44, p ^ . 05. Decomposition of the 
interaction effect into simple effects using an F’-test reveal­
ed a significant effect for locatioiVdistance of movement 
when a different movement was imagined, (NIM) F(l,40)=123.5R 
p .001 and also for location/distance of movement when a 
different movement was actually made (NAM), F( 1,40)=1?3.72, 
p/^.001. In figure 4.3 one can see how the two types of 
interpolated activity which involved either forming an image 
of (NIM), or actually making (NAM) a different movement, prod­
uce remarkably similar biasing effects, in opposite direct­
ions, on the to-be-recalled movement. None of the differences 
between counting backwards (CJ) and imagining rehearsal (olM) 
of the same movement were significant, nor was the difference 
between forming an image and actually making a movement of a 
different extent to the to-be-recalled movement.
(*1) degression analysis
Finally a regression analysis was performed on each 
nubiect's error score over the ten trials. As shown in figures
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(1) Variable error
A 2-way ANOVA using Vt. as the dependent variable reveal­
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means is shown in Table 4.3. The effects of type of inter­
polated activity on Vb can be seen in figure 4.2 where the 
interesting feature is the relatively low levels of Vn, found 
in the two imagery conditions.
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p^.001 and also for locat ion/d istance of movement when a 
different movement was actually made (NAM), F( 1 ,40) =1 23* 72 . 
p/^.001. In figure 4.3 one can see how the two types of 
interpolated activity which involved either forming an image 
of (NIM), or actually making (NAM) a different movement, prod­
uce remarkably similar biasing effects, in opposite direct­
ions, on the to-be-recalled movement. None of the differences 
between counting backwards (CD) and imagining rehearsal (¿>1M) 
of the same movement were significant, nor was the difference 
between forming an image and actually making a movement of a 
different extent to the to-be-recalled movement.
(1) hegress ion analysis
Finally a regression analysis was performed on each 
aublect's error score over the ten trials. As shown in figures
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X NAM CD NIM SIM
2.14 1.42 1.06 0.39
NAM 2.1/» 0.72 1.0«•* 1.73**
CD 1.42 0.36 1.03**
NIM 1.06 0.67
SIM 0.39
Tnliln ft,"5 KxporìiikmiI li CoiitrnMtiiifi mnntiH o C typo of iiitorpolntoil 
nativity. Ili l'foroncoH liotwoon monii hIiowi tonotlior with 
Pr lovol ori Tnkoy1« USD tont.
** ■ P r <»01 VE na t lio  dopon don t V n r in b lo
*» I
V.
 E
. 
cm
s
Q  60cm CRITERION
INTERPOLATED ACTIVITY
Fin. i^.2 Rxporimont Is Monn VK
SOURCE SS ur
location/distance
OF MOVEMENT 242.24 1
TYPE OF INTER- 
POLATEI) ACTIVITY 2.37 3
INTERACTION 254.45 3
ERROR 77.12 4o
TOTAL 576.38 47
Ms F ratio Pr
242.24 125.51 <.001 ***
o.nc 0.44 >.05 NS
84.82 43.93 <.001 ***
1.93
Tallin h ,h IOx|M>rtiiK'iil 1: ANOVA Summary 2 x 4  <IohI(|ii iihI iiii CH oh 
tlip i|p|ipii<1('iit v a r ia b le
* 1 1 3  -
SOUIICE SS df Ms F rntio Pr
30, 60 -NIM 230.32 1 230.52 123.50 <.OOl ***
30, 60 -NAM 250.O0 1 250.00 133.72 <.001 ***
NIM, NAM -30 130.30 3 46.12 23.90 <.001 * * *
NIM, NAM -60 110.60 3 39.55 •cCI <.0Ol * * *
ERROR 77.12 /|0 1.93
Tallio /|,5 Kx|x>rlmciit I: I>c c o m |>»m ì  l ion ol' i i i l o r a c t i o n  o f j 'o c t  
Sclio rró K -toH t tiHinn c e  o h  t lio  d opon don t vnrinlilo
C.
E.
-c
m
s
Q  60cm CRITERION 
'Q 30cm CRITERION
i t'i -
INTERPOLATED ACTIVITY
Exporiinont Ii Moan CE
4.4 and 4.5 tho moan errors over trials separate the NIM and NAM 
conditions from the SIM and CB conditions. There appear to bo differ­
ences in tho patterns of errors over trials between tho imagery 
conditions NIM and SIM and tho counting backwards and actual movement 
conditions, CB and NAM. Those differences relate to the differences 
in VE previously described. Unfortunately VE collapses all tho error 
scores for all of one subject's recall trials to one numerical value.
If there is a tendency for error scores to increase with each recall 
trial then this would produce a high VE value. Similarly a fluctuating 
error pattern over recall trials would also produce a high VE value. 
These two recall patterns, however, are not equivalent and lead to 
different theoretical interpretations. By subjecting each subject's 
recall patterns to a linear regression analysis it is possible to 
distinguish between similar high and low VE values. Table 4.6 shows 
the slope coefficients j) and tho intercepts oc for each subject in each 
condition when trials and error scores are regressed. If thoro is any 
tendency for errors to increase from trial to trial thon a high positivo 
p value should bo found. As can bo soon tho highest positive value of 
tho P coofficiont is 0.59, and some aro negative but nono aro signifi­
cantly different from 0. (Soo Clmtfiold 1975 pp 174-177 for a tost of 
significance of regression coefficients). Interestingly tho intercept 
coofficionts rofloct tho amount of bias introduced by a particular 
interpolated activity. In conditions NAM and NIM the value of 
(incomes positive or negative depending upon tho extent of tho inter­
polated movement . This mlri’ors the pat tern of results found using CE
as a dependent variable
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EXPERIMENT!
• NIM 60 
° NAM 60 
x C B  60 
° SIM 60
Mu. '*.r> Mean error recall trials for each condition with 
a 60 cm original movement
A
- 1 1 8 -
Condition cn
60
CD
30
NAM
60
NAM
30
NIM
60
■
NIM
30
SIM
60
SIM
30
j Subject •* 1.83 2.03 -4.4 6.53 -4.0 6 4.46 0.2 -0.2
1 * -0.21 -0.59 0.1 -0.39 -0.32 o.oi 0.01 0.08
2 - 0.23 0.73 A . 13 7.07 -7.2 4.87 -0.17 -0.26
•
► - . —  |
-0,02
--- ---
-0.22 0.12
.
-0.79 0.01 -0.30 0.04 0.03
3 * -0.77 1.f>7 -9.13 3.6 1 -2.4 8.6 0.1 -1.00
/» 0.37 -0.30 O. !')
•
0.26 -0.16 -0.25 0.01 0.12
4 1.76 5.26 -3.0 6.37 -2.13 1.6 0.3 -0.80
i--------- fi
-,0f> -0.38
-1.67
o.o4 -0.58 | -0.16 0.15 -0.01 0.15
5 1^
vT•C1 -3.86 8.6o -4.06 3.33 -0.03 0.20
___ P -0.12 II
-0.17 -0.16 -0.49 0.16 -0.02 0.03 -0.01
6 « -0.17 - 3 . 2 -6.2 ; 2.8l -4.4 4.13 -0.03 -0.73
I ?
!
-0.161
1
0.07
J
0.24 0.65
.. 1.
-0.22 0.10 I 0.02 0.12
i
Table 4.6 Expriment I: Depression analysis. The slope coefficient 
(p) mid the intorcopt valuo f*< ) aro shown for each subject 
in each condition. Each subject's error score has been 
repressed apainst the recall trial number. (See Chatfiold 
( 107*5) 1>1> 1 1 7 7  for tests of sipnificanco of repression 
coefficients - followin'! the students t distribution)
i^.I.^ i. Discus si on
Tho results of tliis experiment clearly demonstrate that 
instructions to imaninc interpolated movements of a given location/ 
distance produce a biasing effect in subject's memory for linear 
positioning movements of tho same direction and approximate magnitude 
as actual movements. Indeed in this respect real and imaginary move­
ments appear to bo functionally equivalent in much tho same way that 
Finko (1979) has demonstrated real and imagined displacement of 
visual-inotor-co-ordination are functionally equivalent.
Tho similarity between imagery produced biasing and movement 
produced biasing is so strong in terms of tho direction and magnitude 
of the bias as measured by CE, that imagery of movements would seem to 
possess tho same characteristics ns producing movements. Imagining a 
movement and producing a movement do differ insomuch ns producing a 
movement has directly observable features of movement activity such 
ns limb displacement, whilst imagining a movement has no such directly 
observable features. As well as finding aspects of imagery and move­
ments that nro functionally equivalent one should find some circum­
stances under which there aro differences. Wlion characteristics of 
tho memory trace for tho criterion movement nro considered using VE, 
differences between imagery and production of a movement nro found. 
Imagery of a different movement to tho criterion movement produces 
bins (CE) but results inn significantly lower VE than production of 
a movement of a dl I'ferenl extent to the criterion movement. Similarly 
imagining tho criterion movement produces a similar amount of bins (CE) 
ns counting backwards but lias lowor variability (VE) than counting 
backwards. If we take VE ns a monsuro of tho strength of tho momory 
trnco plus noise from other sources such as tho motor or response
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production systems thon the fact that imagery has a lower VF, than 
conditions whore an output is required (as in counting backwards 
and producing a movement) can bo interpreted as evidence for a 
restricted involvement of the response system in imagery.
Further support is given by the regression analysis. Those 
conditions with a high VE do not have a correspondingly high p regre­
ssion coefficient. This suggests that the increased VE is not due to 
a compounding of error in memory, whereby each recall trial is con­
structed from the previous recall trial with the addition of a "noise" 
component at each trial.
Movement I m agery and Movem ent P rod  i c t io n
An alternative explanation of high VE in the NAM conditions 
is that movement production and movement recognition are two separate 
cognitive systems. Imagery involves the movement recognition system 
but not the movement production system. Anderson ( 1 <jfiO) points out 
that two different models arc needed to explain recognition and pro­
duction processes. Schemata or frame theory as outlined by Minsky 
(1975) are officient recognition mechanisms. The schema or frame 
provides the necessary information to fill in missing details and to 
guide future perceptual searches by looking, listening, etc. "Produc­
tion systems" ns outlined by Simon (1973) are mechanisms for modelling 
procedures lined iu  skilled activities. Ilrlofly, "production systems" 
provide rules which allow desired goals to lie achieved. Schmidt's 
(l97r>) schema theory of motor control sketches out two separate 
systems, one for the recognition of correct movement, tile other for 
tlie production of movements. Schmidt's thoory lacks any formal dos-
T T
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crij)tion of how those two separate systems might operate. Perhaps 
the more formal models of frames and production systems from cogni­
tive psychology are the mechanisms operating in Schmidt's schema 
theory.
Schmidt's schema theory is an amalgamation of previous 
"closed loop" theories of motor control; such ns Adams (l97l) in 
which feedback is used to establish a "perceptual trace", and open- 
loop theories, Pew (19(>C>), in which motor responses are "pro programmed" 
and executed without any reference to any feedback. The schema concept 
of motor control suggests that movements are initiated from a "response 
schema" which is a system of rules generated from past responses. The 
"recognition schema" is used to control the execution of a current 
movement and is based on past sensory consequences of movements.
This model has provided a bridge between the more extreme views of 
the open and closed loop theorists but it is sufficiently vague to bo 
virtually untostahle. The suggestion of two separate but inter-related 
systems for movement production and movement recognition is not without 
support from other areas of psychology. In studies of memory it is 
widely accepted that recognition experiments produce a higher proportion 
of correct responses than rocall experiments. If ono can assume that 
different retention characteristics represent different processes thon 
this supports a difforontiation of the recognition and production 
systems. Of course there Is some sense in which these two systems are 
related since in everyday life recognition and recall are often 
instantaneous. However, there are cases in which one cannot recall tho 
correct action or word, hut is able to recognir.e it ns soon ns it occurs.
Modelling by production systems provides a detailed sot of
rules which require an existing state and a desired state, then 
given these two parameters a particular production rule will allow 
this action to ho produced. A schema provides a framework which 
fills in missing details and enables expectations or plans to bo 
generated. Schemata appear to he loss well defined than production 
systems, since they are models for connecting knowledge structures 
and incoming information rather than procedures for producing actions 
(in a general sense), both production systems and schemata are rule 
systems providing a structured model which may ho appropriate to the 
different processes of recognising and producing actions.
If action production and action recognition do indeed consti­
tute two different hut inter-related processes then it is possible that 
images of movements could he either related to the action production or 
the action recognition system. Tho equivalence between images of 
linear positioning movements and actual linear positioning movements 
found in Experiment I suggests that images are related to one of these 
proposed systems. Given Laabs (1973) and others' suggestions for VE 
being a two component error term, then it seems that images of move­
ments are not directly rolated to the motor production system.
Tho most important finding of the previous experiment is 
that a method of observing imagery effects has boon established in 
which movements are the key focus. No other experiments have as yet 
been able to produce' such consistent, imagery effects where movements 
ore concerned. The results cannot be explained by subjects' compliance 
with the experimental hypothesis nor the use of tacit knowledge since 
in a debriofing session no subjects wore able to stato what predictions
had been made
Ono possible alternative explanation might bo in terms of 
adaptation theory as for example in Sckulcr's (197^ *) account of 
spatial vision. The biasing effects of the novel interpolated 
activities could bo duo to subjects adapting to ono particular 
location and bonce having a lower threshold for that pathway. If 
this is so, then in the case of the imagery conditions subjects are 
adapting to an imago. This does not explain the image but the bins. 
The focus of this thesis is towards the explanation of images of 
movements. Having established a procedure which permits imagery 
effects to bo inferred without reliance upon introspective techniques 
further investigations of imagery are possible.
CIIAI’TER FIVE
IMAGES O f MOVEMENT AND THE MOTOR 
PRODUCTION SYSTEM
In the previous experiment it was concluded that imagery of 
movements appears to bo based on a recognition system rather than a 
production system. This relates to two of the hypothetical explana­
tions of mental practice, which postulate two forms of imagery. The 
more formal of those hypotheses is the psychonouromuscular explanation 
of MP, Richardson (l9f>7i>) and Ulich (l9(>7)« MP involves images of 
movements and those images arc minimal movements (detected by E .M .G . 
recording) which oxcito kinaesthctic feedback and lienee produce a 
motor image of movement. This hypothesis assumes images are the 
result of some action production system. It has its roots in a motor 
theory of mind, Jacobson (1932), Weirncr (1977)» and a similar process 
to the motor theory of speech perception of Liberman ot al (1967) is 
postulated. Recognition is based on template matching and the tomplato 
is a motor-programme used for producing the particular event. Hence 
actions would ho rocognisod by matching the perceptual input with a 
motor copy of producing the same action. In recognising visual stimuli 
the process scorns to roly upon the matching of eye movements used to 
scan the ohjoct.
Certain logical flaws are apparent here. In 4 |i<* case of visual 
stimuli tho motor theory of mind makos visual information almost rodundant. 
An extreme consequence of this suggestion is that blind pooplo ought to 
bo able to recognise objects if they are made to make the appropriate 
oyo movements. This makos tho retina and visual cortex largely redundant
and the work of Hubei and Wcisol mistaken. Of course this is taking 
the argument to an extreme. Noissor (1976) points out that tho 
patterns of eye movements used to recognise objects is rarely consis­
tent within subjects, furthermore in tho case of familiar objects no 
eye movements are necessary. Mimicry might be used to support a motor 
theory of action recognition, as Piaget suggests that this is one of 
the ways that children can acquire knowledge. If one accepts a motor 
theory of action recognition then one in faced with tho problem of 
explaining how the actions are recognised before they have boon 
produced. Indeed there is a more general problem of how novel movements, 
or speech sounds, etc., are recognised without over having boon produced. 
The one possibility is that all productions arc pre-programmed and are 
simply lying dormant awaiting activation, but this seems highly unlikely.
Tho second hypothesis, tho perceptual symbolic explanation, 
is much loss precise than tho psychoneuromuscular hypothesis. As this 
hypothesis is stated in tho MP literature it is not clear what processes 
imagery involves. Tho suggestion is that MP involves examining an imago 
and forming a "new perceptual organisation of tho task, Corbin (1972), 
Sago (1977)« As this hypothesis stands it is too vague to bo testod.
Tho research on montal imagery within cognitive psychology, however, 
has producod more specific hypotheses. In particular Kosslyn (1975), 
(1976), (190o ) lias developed a model of mental imagery which explicitly 
states that visual images are quasi-pictorial, in so much ns they contain 
similar informal ion In Mini which would he found in a picture. KUrthor“ 
more Kosslyn claims that images aro inspected and examined by a "mind's- 
oyo", which uses the same perceptual processes ns are normally used in 
tho interpretation of visual sonsory stimulation. Thus imngos nro 
oxaminod by tho porceptual system to produce novel organisations of tho
information contained in the image. This model of mental imagery 
specifies in much more detail the kind of process hinted at in the 
MP literature.
Two predictions arise from the above hypotheses. The first 
prediction, derived from the psychoncuromuscular hypothesis, is that 
the biasing effect upon a subject's memory for a linear positioning 
movement caused by imagining a movement to a novel location will bo 
suprossod when the subject has to perform a motor task whilst attempting 
to form an image. The second prediction derived from the perceptual/ 
symbolic account of mental practice, relates to the visual/spatial 
aspects of imagery. If images arc inspected using the perceptual 
system normally used in seeing, then a visual task during subjects' 
attempts at imagery will supross the bias caused by imagery.
’>.1. An Interference Paradigm
Those two predictions introduce a novel interference 
paradigm, which might bo characterised as a "second order intorforonco", 
in which stimuli are presented concurrent with an instruction to imagino 
a linear movement. Following Hrooks (1967, 1968) experiments involving 
competing perceptual and imagery tasks, it lias boon suggested by bower 
(l97(1), Neisser (197(,)| Norman (1976) and lladdeley (1976), amongst 
others, that visual imagery and visual perception intorforo with each 
other because they compete for limited special purpose resources. It 
is proposed that imagery is subject to stimulus specific interference 
rather than any general capacity loading. A series of experiments by 
Phillips and Christie (1977a, b), have testod tills hypothesis and 
found that visualisation of a displayed pattern over n four second
127 -
retention interval is subject to interference from (what they class 
as) tasks which demand general purpose resources, such as mental 
arithmetic. They also found that visualisation is interforred with 
by visual perception and more so by certain kinds of perceptual 
tasks. Their results showed that visual perception interferes with 
visualisation specifically when it involves the "active formation of 
schematic representations of novel visual configurations". However, 
mental arithmetic may well involve the use of visual imagery for 
some subjects in certain situations. Steiner (1Ofl1) has found that 
visual imagery does indeed play a role in mental arithmetic with 
some subjects.
One problem with using an interfering concurrent task to 
explore the nature of mental imagery is to distinguish between compe­
tition for some general purpose resource and competition for some 
specific modality resource (Phillips and Christie, 1077a,h). Indeed, 
Knhnoman (1973) suggested that distinguishing between and measuring 
the non-specific demand on general capacity made by a particular task 
is a basic problem for oxporimontal psychology. Allport (1980) takes 
the view that interference tasks are unclear in their effect on central 
processing capacity and agroes with Nolsscr (1976) that experiments on 
attention and general purpose processing capacity hove boon of little 
use in extending our understanding of attention but have boon usoful 
in telling us about the specialised subsystems that are called on and 
may he competed for by the particular task chosen for investigation. 
Thus interference paradigms are suited to investigating specific 
resources that may be competed for by different cognitive processes.
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If it can be assumed that interference to some primary task 
is caused by the competition for a common resource by some secondary 
task then imagery processes may be inferred from the effects of such 
secondary interference tasks. It has previously been argued in the 
review of mental imagery (Chapter Three) that selective interference 
affords the moot powerful experimental investigation of imagery, 
with the least assumptions.
As it is extremely unlikely that subjects will be able to gues3 
the experimental hypotheses, any results should be unaffected 
by "demand characteristics". By incorporating a second order 
interference stimulus with the interpolated imagery instructions of 
the previous experiment the predictions from the psychoneuromuscular 
hypothesis and the symbolic/perceptual hypothesis can be tested.
If a particular second order interference stimulus suppresses the 
biasing effects of instructions to imagine linear movements then 
inferences can be made regarding the processes involved in imagery 
of this kind. Suppression caused by a visunl/npatinl interference 
stimulus can be taken as suggesting a visual/spatial imagery process. 
Alternatively, if a motor interference stimulus suppresses the biasing 
effects of imagery, then thin suggests a motoric imagery process.
In tho present experiment cortsin experimental controls were 
used to deni with some of the problems in using interference techniques. 
Counting backwards in threes was used as a baseline with which to compare 
any bins in memory. To rule out any error or bias which might be induced 
by the ?nd order interference tasks themaelveo these wore presented as
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1st order and 2nd order interferences (i.e. witli or without accompanying 
imagery instructions). This control also allows the effects of each 
interference task to be compared with each other. This is important 
as it enables distinctions to bo made between interference produced 
by imagery instructions and interference produced by other tasks.
5,2ml. Method
(1) Experimental design
All seven of the treatments in the experiment were first 
combined in a one-way independent groups design. The seven treatments 
were all typos of interpolated activities, namely counting backwards 
in throes, an actual movement of a different extent, an imaginary 
movement of a different extent, an imaginary movement with visual 
second order interference, an imaginary movement with motor second 
order interference, visual interference, motor interference. A subsot 
of these seven conditions was then included in a two-way-indopondont 
groups design. The factors wore interference stimulus and order of 
interference. Interference stimuli was either visual or motor, whilst 
ordor of interference was either 1st order, i.o. alone, or 2nd order,
i.o. with an instruction to imagino a different movement.
(2) .Subjects
A total of 42 subjocts randomly selected from a group of 65 
voluntocr undergraduate psychology studonts at the University of Warwick 
who had not previously taken part In Kxporimrul T. tirplal numbers of 
either sex were assigned to onch of the seven experimental conditions 
giving a total of six subjocts in onch group.
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(3) Apparatus
As in Experiment I with the addition of a Marconi Instruments 
X-Y display (model TF2213) connected to a variable frequency control 
box. This was centred 25 cm above the track at eye level to provide 
visual/spatial interference. A hand-held dynamometer was used for 
the motor interference condition.
(^ i) Task and procedure
As in Experiment I subjects were required to learn a movement 
of a given extent on a linear-positioning-task. This was then followed 
by one of the experimental interpolated activities prior to recall of 
the learned movement.
Subjects were required to first learn a 50 cm movement by 
moving the slide to the stop position fifteen times, as in Experiment I. 
Unlike the procedures of Experiment I the lights were on permanently 
during the learning phase as their flashing could have been a sourco of 
interference whon combined with the interpolated movement of a different 
extent in Experiment I.
Subjects' instructions wore to move the slido to the stop 
witli their preferred hand, momentarily roleaso the slido, take hold 
again, and return to the start for tho next trial. Subjocts wore told 
to move at their own rate. Tho experimenter gavo an instruction to 
start the next trial 2 seconds after the subject returned to tho start 
point, tho wholo slide being visiblo throughout the experiment.
Following tho acquisition trials a 50 second rotontion interval followod 
in which one of tho sovon typos of interpolated activities occurred. 
During this poriod tho stop and lights wore positioned at tho onds of
the track unless otherwise stated below
5.2.2. Interpolated Activities
(1) Counting backwards (CD)
Countinp backwards in throes from 359 aloud for hO seconds 
preceded by a 10 second instruction period.
(2) Novel Actual Movement (NAM)
Subjects had to move the slide to the 60 cm point 10 times 
with the stop and red light positioned at this now location. The light, 
together with an audible tone, occurred at 4 second intervals for 40 
seconds.
(") Novel Imaginary Movement (NIM)
As in Experiment I subjects wore instructed to imagine moving 
to tho f)0 cm point 10 times with tho stop and rod light positioned at 
this now location. Subjects wore instructed to begin each new "move" 
as tho light and tone occurred providing pacing for tho ton imaginary 
moves during the 40 second period.
(4) Imagining a f>0 cm move with visual interference (NIMV)
Subjocts wore presented with aLissqjou figuro oscillating at 
a rate of 2 per second displayed on the X-Y monitor. At tho sarno timo 
subjects wore instructed to imagine moving to tho f>0 cm position in 
time with the tone and red light. The end stop and red lights were 
positioned at tho f>() cm mark ns in tho imagery alone and actual move­
ment conditions. Again, 10 imaginary moves wero required in n 40 
second period.
(?) Imagining a 60 cm move with motor intorforonco (NIMM)
This group of subjects wore instructed to imagine the same 
60 cm movement ns above whilst maintaining a constant pressure of 
15 lb on the dynamometer with the same hand they had moved the slide 
with for 4o seconds. Everything else was as in the previous imagery 
conditions. The experimenter gave verbal feedback whenever the pressuro 
on the dynamometer deviated from the 15 lb load.
(Ci) Visual interference (V)
Subjects wore presented a lissqjou figure on the X-Y monitor 
as mentioned above without any instructions to imagine a movement.
During this period the lights and end stops wore removed to the end of 
tho slide.
(7) Motor interference (M)
This consisted of squeezing tho dynamometer at a constant 
pressure of 15 lb with tho end stops and lights removed to tho end of 
tho track and no imagery instructions given. Subjects wore required 
to squeeze tho dynamometer with tho same hand as used in moving the 
slido along tho track.
All subjects who had to make or imagine a different movo from 
tho 30 cm extent woro givon two demonstrations by tho oxporimentor of 
tho new movement. This was to onsuro that tho groups had some knowledge 
oT where the new movi'ment was. This accounted for the first 10 seconds 
of tho 50 second retention intorval. Other groups who did not hnvo to 
mnko or imagine a different movemont had their tasks explained to thorn 
during tills period.
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Following tho 50 second retention interval 10 recall trials 
wore required, from all subjects, of the 30 cm movement without any 
end stop or lights to guide recall. Subjects wore instructed to move 
in their own time to where they thought the original movement was in 
tho same manner as subjects in Experiment I.
Tho recall trials wore scored for magnitude of error from 
the criterion position, taking note of tho sign of the error measured 
to tho nearest 0.5 cm.
5.2.3. Results
Tho error scores for each subject are shown in Appendix (D) 
from which CE and VE wore calculated as in Experiment I. Each of tho 
above dependent variables wns used to analyse tho seven experimental 
conditions in a one-way ANOVA. Tho means and standard error for CE,
VE are shown in Table 5«1«
(1) Constant, error
A one-way ANOVA using CE revealed a significant offoct for 
typo of interpolated activity, F(6,35)= 15.M3, p <«001. Further 
analysis using Tukoy's USD tost showed differences between moans as in 
Table 5»3» In figure 5»1 tho moan CE for each typo of interpolated 
activity is shown, tho main point being tho way in which imagery whon 
combined with visual interference produces no moro bias at recall than 
oilier activities which do not include a different extent in any form.
(2) Variable error
Using VIC ns tho dependent variable for a one-way ANOVA 
involving all seven typos of interpolated activity produced a signifi­
cant F value of F(6,33)“ P <»001 (soo Tablo 5»/*). Aftor further
l V i  -
Tallin ^.l liximrlmont 11: Summary of Minan (X) an<1 »«tanilaril error (h.o.) 
of CB and VIC for ondi experimental condition.
»-  m  -
SOURCE SS df Ms F Ratio Pr
TYPE OF 
TOLATED
INTER­
ACTIVITY 350.033 6 58.339 15.834 <.001 ***
ERROR 128.939 35 3.684
TOTAL 478.974 41
Toll ln 3.2 Kx|i<’rInic’iil. lit ANOVA mimiii.iry ono-wny <1nsl(|ll CH
h h  tho dopnndont vnrinlilo
n f .  -
NIM NAM NIMM CD M V NIMV
X=6.22 X=5.94 X=5.02 X=0.85 X=o .63 X=0.34 X=-1.03
NIM 0.28 1.2 5.37** 5.59** 6.56** 7.25**
NAM
X=5.94
0.92 5.09** 5.31** 6.28** 6.97**
NIMM
X=5.02
4.17** 4.39** 5.36** 6.05**
cn
X=0.85
0.22 1.19 1.88**
M
X=0.63
0.97 1.66*
V
X-O.34
1.37
NIMV
X=-1.03
Tnblo 5.3 Hx]>orimoiit II: Contraiitiiiu moans Tor typo of interpolated 
activity. CH ns tlio dependent variable with tli fferoncos 
botwoon moans shown. (* indicates significant differences 
nt .05 level on Tukoy's USD tost). (** indicates significant 
differences nt .01 lovol on Tnkoy1« USD tost).
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analysis using Tukoy’s IISD(a) tost (soo Table 5.5) only moving .a 
different extent produces a significantly higher VE, although when 
a loss stringent tost is used (Nowman-Kouls) imagery and visual 
interference produce a significantly greater VE than imagery alone.
In figure 5.2 the above moans are shown graphically.
The following results take four of the above interpolated 
activities which together form two factors: interference stimuli and 
typo of interference. The four conditions arc motor interference, 
visual interference, motor interference with imagery and visual inter­
ference with imagery. Again each dependent variable (CE, VE) was 
subjected to a separate 2-way ANOVA.
(") Constant error
The results of a 2-way ANOVA using CE as the dependent 
variable gave a significant effect for interference stimulus F,(l,20)= 
16.067 p< .001 and a significant interaction botwoon intcrforonco 
stimulus and level of intorforonco, F,(l,20)= 12.633» p < .005. Level 
of intorforonco alone had no significant effoct, F,(l,20)= 3.29» p >.05. 
Using an F tost to look at the simple offocts of tho interaction 
rovoalod significant differences botwoon lovol of intorforonco with 
a motor stimulus F,(l,20)= 1^.59» P < .OOl and also between tho two 
2nd order intorfcronco stimuli (visual and motor) F,(1,20)h 28.81, p <.001. 
In figure 5.3 it can bo soon that visual and motor intorforonco alono 
produce no significantly different effects on recall. When imagery is 
included only motor interference with imagery produces a significant 
increase in tho si/,o of error of tho to-bo-rocalled movement.
Tnltlo
t"<>
SOURCE SS df Ms F ratio Pr
TYPE OF INTER­
POLATED ACTIVITY 8.336 6 1.39 8.176 <.001 *«♦
ERROR ‘wl • CT \A 35 0.17
TOTAL 14.189 4i
•4 Experiment lit ANOVA summary one-way don inn ttsinfl VE 
oh the dopondont variable
- 1/(0 -
NAM NIMV V NIMM M CD NIM 
X=1.94 X=i.i7 X=l.o8 X=0 .7 4 X=0.71 X=0.64 X=0.55
NAM 0.77* 0.86* 1.20** 1.23** 1.30** 1.39**
X-1.94
NIMV 0.09 0.43 0.46 0.53 0.62
x=i.i7
V 0.34 0.37 0.44 0.53
X=1.08
NIMM 0.03 o.io 0.19
X=0.74
M 0.07 0.16
X=0.71
cn 0.09
X=0.64
NIM
XnO.55
Tnlilo 5.5 Experiment IIi Contnuitinn menu« for type of interpolated 
activity with VIC as the dependent variable. * .05 pr lovcl 
of nipnificanco on Tukcy's (a) test. ** .01 pr lovol of 
sinnificanoe on Tukoy's (a) tost
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AND AND 
MOTOR VISUAL
INTERPOLATED ACTIVITY
K1<J. r,.2. Exporimont TT : Monti VH
V i 2  -
SOURCE SS d f  MS F r a t i o  Pr
LEVEL OF 
INTERFERENCE 12.5 1
INTERFERENCE
•STIMULUS 6 1.03« 1
INTERACTION 48.751 1
ERROR 75.985 20
TOTAL 198.274 23
12.5 3.29 >.05 NS
61.038 16.067 < .001 * * *
48.751 12.835 < .005 * + *
3.799
Tallio 5.6 lix|M>rimont 11: Two-way ANOVA uniiin CK an Ilio <1o|K'M<1nnt 
variatilo
1/|3 -
SOURCE SS df Ms F ratio Pr
LEVEL Of' INTERFERENCE 
V, NIMV VISUAL 0.02lf>7 1 0.02167 0.057 >.05 NS
M, NIMM MOTOR 55.427 1 55.427 14.59 <.001 ***
INTERFERENCE STIMULUS 
V, M ALONE 0.3/t3/| 1 0.3434 0.090 >.05 NS
NIMV, NIMM WITH
IMAGERY 109.4/t3 1 109.443 28.801 C.OOl * * *
ERROR 75.983 20 3.799
Tallin 5.7 lOximrimont I I :  i I. i on o f  in te r a c t io n  tnim fo r  CIO
in t o  i t s  sim ple main o f f o c t «  union S olio ff^  F -to s t
- l'l't -
P  1st ORDER INTERFERENCE 
2nd ORDER INTERFERENCE
</>E
u
l
LU
u
F i o .  5 .3 . Experim ent I I I  V is u a l  and M otor I n t o r fo r o n c o , CE
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(4) Variable error
Finally, using VE as tho dopondont variable, a significant 
effect was found for interference stimulus, F,1,20 = 5»(>fl, p< 0.03, 
whilst level of interference had a non-significant effect, F,l,20 =
0. 99, p> 0.05 as did tho interaction effect, F,l,20 = O.035, p> 0.05 
(see Table 5*8)• The effect of source of interference was such that 
visual (X = 1.24) produced a slightly higher amount of variability 
than did motor (X = 0.722) interference (see Fig. 5.4).
(9) Regression Analysis
As in Experiment I a regression analysis was performed on 
tho raw data for each subject and each condition. Table 5«9 shows tho 
resulting intercept and slope (|>) coefficients, none of tho /J's are 
significantly greater than 0. It can bo scon that the absence of any 
significant slope coefficient is similar to tho findings of Experiment
1. This suggests that in conditions such as NAM, and whore tho varia­
bility is relatively high this is not causod by an increase in the 
error score from trial to trial. Instead it seems that subjects in 
these conditions oscillate about a particular point but those 
oscillations are quite large. Tho intercept coefficient £.:) is a 
reflection of tho amount of bins in a subject's responso. In tho
NAM, NIM and NIMM conditions tho intercepts are all high positive vnluos, 
whereas in nil other conditions this value is oithor low negative or 
low positive.
5.2.4. Discussion
Tho rosults of this socond experiment demonstrate that imngory 
produced biasing is suppressed by visual, secondary interference stimuli. 
Conversoly imagery of a movement of a different oxtont is capable of
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SOURCE SS df Ms F ratio Pr
LEVEL OF INTERFERENCE 0.017 1 0.017 0.99 > .05 NS
INTERFERENCE STIMULUS 0.972 1 0.972 5.68 <.05 *
INTERACTION 0.006 1 0.006 0.035 >.05 NS
ERROR 3.4n 20 0.171
TOTAL 4.406 23
T.-ilili« r>.fl Kx|N>rliniMit: 11: ANOVA Siiiimi.ii*yt 2 x 2  iIo mI||||( u hIlift VU îih 
tlio il('|)('ii(l('iit variablo
-  l'if»
SOURCE SS df Ms F ratio Pr
LEVEL OF INTERFERENCE 0.017 1 0.017 0.99 > .05 NS
INTERFERENCE STIMULUS 0.972 1 0.972 5.68 <.03 *
INTERACTION 0.006 1 0.006 0.033 >.05 NS
ERROR 3.411 20 0.171
TOTAL 4.406 23
Tallio T.» Hx|M>rlni<>iit Ils ANOVA Stiiidi.iry, 2 x 
ilio <to|>onilont variable
iIohIiiii, m miimi VK an
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Q  1st ORDER INTERFERENCE
I INTERFERENCE
Kid» r>.'i t?X)»orlmrnt TTi Vtmml Arid Motor Intorforvnco, VK
- i'.n -
Condition CD NAM NIM NIMV N1MM V M
Subject
1 P
0.87
0.01
6.86
-0.18
3.46
-0.18
-4.27 j 
-0.03
---------------------- ( -
2.47
0.01
1.33
0.07
2.40
0.00
i  2 ■ <
2.00 6.46 6.40 1.00 5.27 -0.10 1.10
P -0.09 0.05 -0.16 -0.22 0.24 0.19 0.09
3 • y 0.37 1 2 . 1 2 5 9.80 -2.47 6.80 -0.70 1.03
P -0.22 0.19 -0.07 0.07 -0.03 0.15 -0.37
4 0.93 0.23 9.27 1.97 5.07 1.27 0.07
P 0.13 -0.27 -0.18 0.06 -0.10 0.06 -0.39
5 OC 1.03 9.47 5.67 -2.93 6.13 ‘ -1.33 0.97
I P 0.09 -0.33 0.13 0.04 -0.10 -0.09 0.20y . ____________ L -
6 • c 2.47 5.06 6.47 -2.13 3.60 -1.47 -0.87
p -0.08 0.16 -0.25 1 0.19 0.12 -0.09 0.01 |
Table 9.9 Experiment 111 Hepression analysis. Tlio slope coofrlcicat 
(?) and tho Intercept value (•*) nro shown for each subject 
In each condition. Each subject's error scoro lias boon 
repressed apainst tbo recall trial number.
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biasing tho recall of a to-bo-romcinborod movement when imagery is 
accompanied by a motor stimuli. Tho two stimuli (visual and motor) 
do not, themselves, interfere with recall except when their VE is 
compared. Tho effect hero is that the visual stimuli produced a 
higher VE than tho motor task. Thus visual/spatial stimuli do not 
bias recall of a linear positioning movement. However, it seems 
that visual spatial^timuli do affect a subject's memory for a 
linear movement. This suggests that images of movements are equiva­
lent to real movements at a memorial level. Furthermore, there 
appears to bo some evidence that stimuli which suppress imagery of 
linear movements also interfere with a subject's memory for a linear 
movement. This is a further indication that images of linear move­
ments manipulate memory representations and that those are interfered 
with by a visual/spatial stimuli.
Tho psychonouromuscular theory suggested by Ulich (l9(>7) 
and Richardson (l9(>7b) which hypothesises a motor theory of mental 
imagery has not been supported by tho present experiment. Support is 
found for tho symbolic pcrcoptual hypothesis of MI’. Kosslyn (1980) 
hypothesised imagory to bo of a quasi-pictorial naturo. This concep­
tion of how an imagery representation system might operate is based 
on tho notion that visual images might bo liko displays producod on 
a cathodo-ray-tubo by a computer program operating on storod data 
(Kosslyn, Pinker, Smith and Schwartz, 1979). Tho suggestion is that 
images are ... "temporary spatial displays in active memory that aro 
generated from more abstract representations in long-term memory. 
Intorprotivo mechanisms (a "mind's oyo") work over ("look at") these 
internal displays and classify them in terms of semantic categories, 
(ns would bo involvod in realising that a particular spatial confi­
~ n o  -
guration corresponds to a dog's onr, for example)" (Kosslyn, ot al, 
1979, p.536).
No interfering effect on moinory due to visual and motor 1st 
order interference was found when CE was analysed. Comparisons made 
using VE showed that 1st order visual interference produces more 
variation than 1st order motor interference. On the assumption that 
VE is a measure of error duo to noise in the memory and output systems 
and output is assumed to bo of a constant noise level, then visual 
interference has the effect of introducing more noise to the memory 
for the movement. This is supported by the failure of any (£) 
regression coefficients to bo significantly different from 0. The 
offccts of both 1st and 2nd order visual interference stimuli on VE 
suggests that the representation in memory of information about linear 
positioning movements is in a form which is capable of being interfered 
with by visual/spatial stimulation but not by motor activity.
ny using an experimental paradigm similar to that of Finko 
(1979) in which unexpected biasing after-effects arc produced following 
n mental imagory task it has beon possible to show that mental imagery 
and movement information have somo "functional equivalence". Tho 
implications of this technique by which imagery can bo shown to have 
some functional significance and which overcomes methodological 
criticisms raised by Pylyshyn (1973) find others, are profound. Such 
vague procedures as mental practlco can be subjected to experimental 
analysis to determine tho underlying process and memory structuro by 
which improvement following MP is brought about.
'.5« Summary
From tho theories of MP two contrasting liypothoses were 
chosen, each of which implied a different structural account of how 
imagery is employed in MP. In order to distinguish between those 
two accounts a second order interference technique showed that 
imagery does not have any biasing effects on recall when this is 
competing with a visual/spatial stimuli which involves watching a 
two dimensional oscillating display.
Tho interfering effect of a visual/spatial distractor 
stimuli upon imagery may not bo duo to competition for some specific 
resource but due to tho greater complexity of tho visual/spatial 
stimuli relative to tho motor stimuli. Tills is unlikely, though, as 
their effects on motor short-term memory were equal in terms of CE.
An alternative explanation is that tho motor stimuli did not tax tho 
correct level neuromuscular system. It could have boon that squeezing 
a dynamometer did not interfere with imagery of a movement because it 
did not involve tho same musclo groups required to move tho slide 
along tho track. According to Hornstoin (1966), and Gallistol (i960) 
differential control of movemont occurs at different lovols of tho 
system. Tho higher up tho system hierarchy ono goes tho greater 
number of "dogrocs of freedom" aro covorod by a particular control 
centre. Tho typo of movement control involved in operating a squoozo 
would lie di ITerenl from Hint Involved In moving one's nnn to a set 
position simply because tho fonner involves a different control of tho 
motor system than tho latter.
Whilst tho possibility of a visual imagery explanation of MP
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CHAPTER SIX
A FURTHER TEST OF THE PSYCHONEUROHUSCULAR HYPOTHESIS
In the previous experiments it was concluded that MP of 
a linear positioning task involves the manipulation of a quasi-pictorial 
representation by an image (veneration and inspection process.
However, there are certain limitations to this conclusion. First the 
suppression effects of a 2nd order visual/spatial interference stimulus 
on imagery could be simply due to the complexity of the visual task. 
Conversely the lack of any inhibitory effects of 2nd order motor 
interference on imagery could bo duo to the insufficient complexity of 
the motor task. More specifically the motor task may not have taxed that 
part of the motor production system which is brought into play by the act 
of imagining a linear arm movement. The results so far do not therefore 
permit us to reject the psychoneuromuscular hypothesis.
Second, the apparatus used in the previous experiments placed 
a strong emphasis on visual cues due to the track along which movements 
were made being visible to the subjects throughout the experiment. One 
simple explanation of the 2nd order interference effect of visual/spatial 
stimulus is that subjects were prevented from looking at the track. Thus 
imagery may havo been Inhibited by tho competition between looking at a 
screen and looking at the track. In order to test this hypothesis a now 
piece of apparatus was constructed which had a screen preventing subjects 
from viewing either tho track or their arm movements throughout tho
experiment
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One concern of thle research Is to show that selective 
interference tasks cam be successfully employed to investigate cognitive 
processes involved in mental imagery. It has been claimed, Allport (1980), 
that distinctions between general capacity loading and specific resource 
demands are not always clear, if it can be assumed that biasing effects 
caused by Imagining a novel linear movement are suppressed by n visual/spatial 
stimulus then varying the complexity of this stimulus should not change this. 
Therefore one might predict that if the biasing effect of imagining a linear 
positioning movement had previously been suppressed by the complex nature 
of the visual stimulus in Experiment II, namely e LisP^ju’ figure, then 
a less complex visual/spatial stimulus should not suppress imagery, in 
addition a visual/spatial stimulus which did not prevent subjects from 
looking in the region of their imaginary movements might offer a clearer 
interpretation of the results. Alternatively if the 2nd order motor 
interference task failed to inhibit imagery because it involved a different 
part of the motor output system, then a task which uses the same joint and 
musculature systems as a linear positioning task should inhibit imagery. 
Finally in Experiment I subjects either learned a 30 cm movement followed 
by a 60 cm novel movement or learned a 60 cm movement followed by a 30 cm 
movement. This meant that both groups had different novel movements and 
different original movements. This could confound the effect of any bias 
since different movements may have different recall characteristics, 
such as larger movements being underestimated and shorter movements being
overestimated.
6 . 1 .  Experiment I I I
This experiment introduces a visunl/spatial stimulus which 
is less complex than used in the previous experiment, more compatible 
with the linear positioning task, and does not restrict the subject from 
looking above the track. Second, a motor stimuli has been devised which 
bears a closer resemblance to linear arm movements than does squeezing 
a hand-held dynamometer. Consequently the psychoneuromusculnr hypothesis 
can now be tested more fully. One might predict that a motor stimulus 
which involved activation of a similar muscle system ns the linear 
positioning movement should suppress any similar activation caused by 
neuromuscular imagery. Alternatively if a visual/spatial stimulus is 
used, which does not prevent subjects from looking at the linear posi­
tioning apparatus while imagining a linear movement, and that •» stimulus 
of relatively low complexity then any suppression affects on imagery can 
be attributed to the visual/spntinl nature of the stimulus.
6.1.1. Method
(1) Experimental Design
A two factor independent groups design was used, distance/ 
location of the novel movement having two levels, 30 cm and 60 cm. Type 
of interpolated activity having four levels, novel actual movement (NAM), 
novel imaginary movement (NIM), novel imaginary movement with 2nd order 
visual interference (NIMV) and a novel imaginary movement with 2nd order 
motor interference (NIMM),
(2) Subjects
48 right-handed subjects were randomly selected from a pool of 
98 voluntoors who wore attending an Open University summer school in
psychology at Warwick University. Subjects were of varied occupational 
back-grounds and ages. An equal number of male and female subjects were 
assigned to each of the eight experimental groups (6 subjects per group).
(3) Apparatus
(See Figure 6.1). A new slide was constructed, consisting of 
a 130 cm linear nylon track mounted on a 150 cm x 15 cm x 1.5 cm timber 
base. Two permanent end stops were fixed to give a useable track length 
of 125 cm. A moveable stop was used to determine the distance/location 
of movements along the track. A nylon cursor was free to slide along the 
track and a millimeter scale was fixed alongside the track. 30 cm above 
the track a blank screen 125 cm x 55 cm was placed horizontally above 
the track to screen the subjects' view of their arm and the track. Above 
this screen, directly parallel to the track, at eye level was a removable 
rod 125 cm in length with a red and green light, either of which could 
be positioned anywhere along the rod. Two Birkbeck timers controlled 
the lights and emitted tones at regular intervals. In addition a 20 cm 
x 20 cm wooden block wa3 set at the subject's shoulder height approximately 
60 cm from the subject. This block was attached to a weighing scale 
which registered how hard subjects were pushing. A buzzer and light 
signalled when a correct pressure had been applied.
(4) Task/Proccdutc
An in frcporlmontn I and IT subjects wore required to learn a 
45 cm movement by sliding the cursor along tho track until it reached 
a stop. After 15 self-paced trials one of the various Interpolated
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activities were performed during a 50 sec. retention interval. There 
then followed ten self-paced recall trials in which subjects had to 
move the cursor to the original position but with the stop removed.
During the whole experiment the screen hid each subject's arm and the 
track from view. The following types of Interpolated activities were used:
6.1.2. Interpolated Activities
(1) Novel actual movements 30 or 60 cms (NAM30, NAM60).
One group of subjects (NAM30) were required to move the cursor 
to the stop positioned at 30 cm. The red light being repositioned above 
this new point. The first 10 secs were used to instruct subjects on their 
task; during the remaining 40 secs 10 movements were made to the novel 
position, as in previous experiments. Throughout this interval the 
green and red lights flashed alternately at 2 sec. intervals. The (NAM60) 
group performed the same task but moving to a 60 cm point.
(2) Novel imaginary movements 30 or 60 cms (NIM30, NIM 60)
As in previous experiments subjects in each of these two groups 
imagined performing the same movement as the NAM groups. The apparatus 
being arranged exactly as in the NAM conditions.
(3) Novel imaginary movements with visual Interference 
(NIMV30, N1MV60)
Subjects in these conditions were required to Imagine moving 
as the HIM groups but with an additional task. The additional task being 
that they should determine how many times the rod light flashed and to 
discriminate which of the two lights were brighter. (The red light 
flashed ten times and there was no difference in brightness, although
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green is often seen as being brighter). This occurred whilst the 
lights were in a novel position, but not that to which they were 
imagining moving. Consequently subjects were asked to imagine one 
movement but being presented with visual cues which determined a 
different distance/location. (The green light being placed at the 
40 cm point and the red light at the 50 cm point). During the first 
10 secs of the retention interval subjects were Instructed on their 
task and given two trials of imagining moving to the 30, or 60 cm points. 
Whilst this was happening the lights were at the appropriate points, either 
30 or 60 cm. At the end of 10 secs subjects were told to carry on imagining 
moving to the same position but the lights were now moved to the 40 and 50 cm 
points. Consequently subjects were Instructed to Imagine moving to one 
point but given visual cues for a non-relevant movement.
(4) Novel imaginary movement with motor Interference 
(NIMM30, NIMM60)
The final two conditions required that subjects should imagine 
a novel movement as in the NIM conditions. In addition they had to 
perform a 2nd order motor interference task. This task consisted of 
exerting a 15 kg. pressure by pushing against the 20 x 20 cm block with 
the same arm as they had been learning the original movement. The block 
was positioned to the subject's right at below shoulder height. Thus 
subjects were pushing in the opposite direction to an imagined move.
(5) R e c a l l  t r i a l s
Immediately following the 50 sec retention Intervals subjects 
were again required to move the cursor to the 45 cm position with the 
stop and the lights completely removed. Subjects had 10 self-paced 
trials recalling their original movements. Scoring being to the nearest 
0.5 cm as previously.
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Subjects error scores at recall are produced in appendix E.
From this data CE and VE scores were calculated for each subject, the 
resultant means and standard errors are shown in Table 6.1.
(1) Constant Error, (C.E.)
A two-way independent groups ANOVA with CE as the dependent 
variable resulted in a non-significant effect for type of interpolated 
activity, F(3,40) = 0.648 p > .05. Distance/location of the novel 
movement had a significant effect on CE F(l,40) = 431.926 pr < .001.
The interaction between type of interpolated activity and distance/ 
location of the novel movement was significant, F(3,40) « 44.095 pr < .001.
A summary of the ANOVA results in shown in Table 6.2.
Breaking down the significant interaction effect into its 
simple components using a Schefffe's F test showed that when imagery and 
2nd order visual interference occurred together no effect for direction/ 
location of movement occurred, F(l,40) » 0.187 pr > .05. From Table
6.1 and Fig. 6.2 it can be seen that this lack of any effect for 
direction/location of the novel movement is because very little error 
as measured by CE occurs. All other components within the interaction 
had a significant effect, as can be seen from 'table 6.3.
(2) Variable Erroi* (V.K.)
6 . 1 . 3 .  R e s u l t s
A n a ly s in g  Vli by n two-way in dependent groups ANOVA, ty p e  o f
i n t e r p o l a t e d  a c t i v i t y  had a s i g n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t  on VE, F(3 ,40) ■  3 .75 2  p r  < .0 25 .
The d i r e c t i o n / l o c a t i o n  o f  th e  n ov e l  movement was not s i g n i f i c a n t ,
6.1.3. Results
Subjects error scores at recall are produced In appendix E.
From this data CE and VE scores were calculated for each subject, the 
resultant means and standard errors are shown in Table 6.1.
(1) Constant Error, (C.E.)
A two-way independent groups ANOVA with CE as the dependent 
variable resulted in a non-significant effect for type of interpolated 
activity, F (3,40) = 0.648 p > .05. Distance/location of the novel 
movement had a significant effect on CE F(l,40) = 431.926 pr < .001.
The interaction between type of interpolated activity and distance/ 
location of the novel movement was significant, F(3,40) - 44.095 pr < .001.
A summary of the ANOVA results in shown in Table 6.2.
Breaking down the significant Interaction effect into its 
simple components using a Schefffe's F test showed that when imagery and 
2nd order visual interference occurred together no effect for direction/ 
location of movement occurred, F(l,40) = 0.187 pr > .05. From Table
6.1 and Fig. 6.2 it can be seen that this lack of any effect for 
directlon/locatlon of the novel movement is because very little error 
as measured by CE occurs. All other components within the interaction 
had a significant effect, as can be seen from Tbblo 6.3.
(?) Variable V.rrot (V.p:.)
Analysing Vli by a two-way independent groups ANOVA, type of 
interpolated activity had a significant effect on VE, F(3,40) ■ 3,752 pr < .025. 
The direction/location of the novel movement was not significant,
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SOURCE Sums of 
Squares
Df Moan
Square
F Ratio Pr lovol
A. Distancc/Location 
of novel movement
810.163 1 810.163 431.926 <.001 ***
n. Type of interpo­
lated activity
3.646 3 1.215 0.648 >.05 NS
AXH Interaction 248.127 3 82.709 44.095 <.001 ***
Error 75.028 40 I.876
Total 1136.964 47
Tallin (i.li l'.X|M<rIiit<<nl. I l l :  Summary or a 2 way independent (iroups 
ANOVA iimI lift CF, an tlio dependent variable
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SOURCE Sums of 
Squares
Df Moan
Square
F Ratio Pr level
S ! »»" 360.255 1 360.235 192.06 <.001 ***
S !  ™ 347.225 1 347.225 185.118 <•.001 *•*
60) NIMM 350.460 1 350.46 186.842 <.001 ***
S ! mm 0.350 1 0.350 O .187 >.03 NS
Interpolated 
activity at 60 cin 120.169 3 40.056 21.355 <.001 ***
Interpolated 
activity at 30 cm 13 1.604 3 43.86« 23.387 <.001 ***
Error 75.02« 40 1 .«76
T.-»l > 1 «• 6.3 I'.X IM * I * I Ilia 'III  1 1 1 :  IN ’OnNI|K>H I I. i OM «> I' I l l l l ' I ' I I K l .  I l t l l  l l l ' l w i 'O I I  I y|M> 
of interpolated activity mid dIstance/location of novol 
movomont
EXPERIMENT JH
F(l,40) = 2.0fl7 pr >.05. Similarly the interaction between type of 
interpolated activity and direction/location of the novel movement was 
not significant, F(3,40)- 1.212 pr >.05. (ANOVA summary shown in 
Table 6.4).
Analysing the significant effect for typo of interpolated 
activity further with Tukey's USD (a) tost (summarised in Table 6.5) 
it was found that "novel actual movements" (NAM) produced a signifi­
cantly higher amount of VE than a "novel imaginary movement" (NIM). 
Whilst no significant differences wore found between other pairs of 
moans it can bo seen from Fig. 6.3 that imagery and movement have 
different effects on VE. This is most obvious in the 30 cm condition 
NIM30, but there was no significant interaction between location/ 
distance of the novel movement and typo of interpolated activity.
(") »egression analysis
Finally a regression analysis was performed on the raw data 
for each subject, regressing trials and error scores as in previous 
oxporimonts. Tho results of this analysis are shown in Table 6.6.
The slope coefficients (p) are consistently low varying botwoon 0 and 
.3 with on« exception for subject 1 in tho NIM60M condition whoso 
regression slope has a p value of .56. Furthermore in condition 
NAM60, NAM30, NIM60, NIM60M and NIM30M whore there appoarod a sig­
nificant bias, this is mirrtjred by tho intercept (•<) of tho regression 
analysis. Fig. 6.4 and 6.5 show tho mean error per recall trial.
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SOURCE Sums of 
Squares
Df Mean
Square
F Ratio Pr level
A. Distance/location O .302 1 O .302 2.087 >.05 NS
n. Typo oT i ntorpo- 
lated activity
1 .628 3 0.543 3.752 <.025 *
AXI1 Interaction 0.526 3 0.175 1.212 >.05 NS
Error 5*786 40 0.145
Total 8.243 47
Table ( Experiment Till 2-way i ixlopeiiiloiit qroupH ANOVA willi VIC 
il« Ilio floponilent variable
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NAM
X»1.344
NIMM
X=l.l43
NIMV
X=0.982
NIM
X=0.847
NAM X-1.344 0.201 0.362 0.497 *
NIMM X=l.l43 O.lGl 0.296
NIMV X=0.982 0.135
NIM X=0.847
T/iM p  0.5 Kx|h'|'IiiiimiI TTTj Comp.irl hoiih o P iiip/iii VK Por typo oP
interpol,-itoli nctivity. **<.01 pr lovol of ninni Plcnnco 
on Tukoy'a (n) tont. * <.05 pr lovol of aloniPlcnnco on 
Tukoy'a (n) test
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EXPERIMENT IK
Experimental Condition.
Fu) 6.3 Mean Variable Error for cadi condition of experiment HI
- 1(>9
Subject
—
NAMbO NAM30 NIMf)0 NIM30 NIM60V NIM30V NIM60M NIM30M
1 6» 13 -/‘.73 2.73 -5.48 2.40 0 4.48 -4.33
P
...
-0.31 -0.l4 0.32 -0.01 -o.o4 0 0.56 0.06
2 H 2.«7 -6.87 A .23 -6.90 -1.50 -2.33 5.26 -2.93
i P 0.46 -0.13 0.37 0.06 0 .11 -0.19 -0 .12 -0.23
1 3 V 2.73 -6.86 5.57 -5.07 0.20 -0.60 8.40 -4.27 j
1 /* 0.18 -0.10 0.12 0.03 0 .11 0.33 -0.24 -0.08 j
4 0( '1.07 -8.47 >f.90 -4.87 1.93 0.27 5.20 -5.50 \P 0.01 0.23 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.28 0.01 -0.08 !
5 <* 3.00 -3.80 A • 57 -5.80 -1.43 0.20 5.77 -6.03
___
P 0.36 -0.07 -0.20 0.05
t
-0.17 -0.18 -0 .10 0.69 |
6 <V 7.63 -3«53 5.66 -5.47 1.33 -1.53 4.30 -6.70 I
•• -
P
_  1
-0.19 -0.03 -0.24 -0.1
.. _ J
-0.24 1 -0.03 o.o4
a
o.i4 |
r.iblo <>.(>. Kx per ¡input ITTs depression of error score nnnlimt trinls 
Tor each subject in onch experimental condition. Bncli 
subject*« slope coefficient (j/) and intercept vnluo h )  
is shown
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EXPERIMENT III
■ -N A M  60 
°-H\SA60 
d'N IM  60V 
• - N I M  M M
Kit)* Monn Error over rocnll trlnln (f>0 emu)
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EXPERIMENT m
Mo. ('.5. Monti Error ovor rocnll triniti (to cm«)
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Discussion
Tlic results of this experiment show that a visual/spntial 
interference stimuli suppresses the biasing effect, of imagining a 
larger linear movement, on the recall of a criterion linear positioning 
movement. This suggests that imagining a linear positioning movement 
involves part or all of those cognitive resources normally used to 
process visual/spntial information. Although it is possible that 
interference stimuli could suppress imagery effects purely by means 
of their general capacity loading, this scorns unlikely in this instance. 
If it can bo assumed that monitoring two alternating flashing lights 
involves loss of an information processing load than inspecting an 
oscillating lissaiou figure then the finding that both of theso tasks 
suppress imagery suggest that it is not the general information 
processing demand of the task but the specific resource required to 
process the stimuli which causes interference with the generation and 
processing of imagery.
The absence of any interfering offocts to imagery with the 
motor interference task both supports the above arguments and suggests 
that the psychonouromuscular hypothesis of MP is incorrect. If imagery 
of a linear positioning movement involved activation of the motor output 
system with resultant nouromuscular activity, thon assuming that pushing 
with the arm involves similar nouromuscular activity ns in moving a 
linoar slide thon any biasing duo to imagery should have boon supprossod. 
As imagery with a motor Interforenoo stimulus still had a biasing effect 
on nil subjects' memory for the criterion position thon it sooms that 
imagining a linear positioning movement does not involvo the motor output 
system, to the extent suggested by the psychonouromusculnr hypothesis of
MP,
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An earlier suggestion was that the visual stimuli could 
have interfered with imagery simply by preventing subjects from 
"looking" in the direction of their imagined movement. In the present 
experiment subjects wore ablo to look above the full length of the 
track while monitoring the visual interference stimulus. Noissor 
(1976) suggests that eye movements could bo important features of 
visual imagery in so much that such images arc often used as "plans" 
for future visual searches. In the present experiment subjects may 
have boon restricted to some extent from moving their eyes. However, 
the visual interference stimuli did not prevent subjects moving their 
eyes in the direction of the imagined movements. Moreover, the role 
of eye movements is not completely clear since there are large subject 
variations in scanning items. In addition eye movements are controlled 
by a different system than other motor acts, which suggests that eye 
movements themselves may not be considered under the psychoncuromuscular 
hypothesis.
fi.2. Some Conclusions on Imagery 
and tho Psychonouromusculor Hypothesis
Imagory of linear positioning movements does not appear to bo 
caused by a process involving tho activation of tho motor output system. 
It was predicted that if imagory of this sort involved tho motor pro­
duction system then a competing motor task would suppress tho imagery 
biasing effect on an interim linear positioning task. Tho failure 
of tho motor interference tasks in this and tho previous experiment 
(reported in Chapter Five) strongly suggests that imagory does not 
involve activation of tho motor output system.
The alternative hypothesis that imagery of this sort is 
based on a visual/spatial processing system is supported by the 
results of this and the previous experiment. It is possible, 
however, that a completely different explanation of imagery effects 
in linear positioning tasks could bo suggested which did not involve 
the visual/spatial information processing system. One might argue 
that if movements were made at a constant velocity then subjects 
could rehearse the distance of their movement by counting, perhaps 
subvocally. Rehearsal by counting would permit subjects to monitor 
the time interval during which a movement was produced. Imagery of 
a linear positioning movement might involve tho generation of a time 
interval for the movement at a known constant velocity. In order to 
vary the distance of an imaginary movement either the length of the 
movement time interval could be altered by either sub-vocally counting 
to a higher number or counting at a different rate. Alternatively the 
rate of movement during tho time period could be increased. All of 
these different strategics rely on a basic time keoping mechanism 
which may involve sub-vocal counting.
A further limitation to the visual/spatial hypothesis of 
movement imagery is the strength of the assumption that interference 
or suppression is caused by competition for a specific resource. It 
was argued in Chapters Three and Five that this assumption has a 
considerable amount of support. Further support for this assumption 
can be found whon one considers tho way that varying the information 
processing load of the visual interference stimulus in Experiment III 
compared to that in Experiment II produced no change in its effects on 
imagery for a linear positioning movement. While this was not meant 
to diroctly tost any hypothesis related to the nature of interference
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tasks it docs support the assumption that interference tasks compote 
for a specific processing resource. However, Phillips and Christie 
(1977 a, b) suggest that certain tasks such ns mental arithmetic 
interfere with visualisation through their general response demanding 
load. In view of this claim it is necessary to investigate the 
interference effects duo to general response demand compared to those 
due to specific resource demand.
C H A P T E R  S E V E N
SUHVOCAL REHEARSAL AND PROCESSING LOAD
Recently, Summers and Sharp (1979) have shown that verbal 
and spatial tasks can interfere with motor tasks, such as finger 
tapping. They suggest that motor acts contain a spatial and a sequen­
cing component, both of which can bo separately interfered with by 
verbal or visual/spatinl tasks. A possible implication of this is 
that both spatial and sequential rehearsal may occur during MP. It 
may bo the case that subjects who imagine novel movements are using 
sequential (temporal)or rate information, which from Summers and 
Sharp's account is in a verbal form. Thus imagery of movements may 
involve the subvocal rehearsal of verbal labels, perhaps by counting.
An alternative explanation of Summers and Sharp's findings 
is that the processing load of cither interference task could have 
affected performance on the motor tnsk. Thus while each interference 
task contained either spatial or sequential material, it was the 
general processing load of each task, rathor than their specific com­
ponent which influenced motor performance. Therefore one cannot con­
clude that motor tasks are solely subject to spatial or sequential 
intorforonco, nor that they contain separate spatial and sequential 
components.
One possible solution is to vary both the processing load and 
the specific components of the intorforonco tnsk independently. In this 
way it might be shown that certain specific tasks produce interference 
effects which are different from intorforonco offocts produced by a
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general processing load.
7.1. Experiment IV
Operationalising processing load as the response demand 
of the interference task it is predicted that if imagery of movements 
involves a specific resource independently of the response demand 
then a particular 2nd order interference task should suppress imagery. 
Furthermore if imagery involves some general capacity then an increase 
in the response demands of any 2nd order interference task should 
affect imagery. If imagery of movements involves the subvocal rehearsal 
of verbal symbols then a 2nd order interference task which requires 
subjects to monitor a verbal message should inhibit imagery. Alterna­
tively if imagery involves a visual/spatial process then a visual 
stimulus should inhibit imagery. Finally if imagery involves the acti­
vation of a motor programme a motor interference task should inhibit 
imagery.
7«1»1« Method
(l) Experimental design
A two factor independent groups' design was used with response 
demand and type of Interference stimulus ns the two factors. Response 
demand wan manipulated by requiring one sot of subjects to respond to 
the 2nd order interference stimulus, while other subjects were told 
that tho stimulus would be present hut thoy would not have to make any 
responses to it. Tho type of 2nd order interference stimulus were 
either verbal, motor or visual, giving six experimental groups in all.
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(2 )  _ _Sub;j_octs
3» right-handed subjects wore randomly selected from a pool 
of 7» volunteers who wore attending an Open University summer school 
at Warwick University. An equal number of male and female subjects 
was assigned to each group (total number of subjects per group = six). 
Subjects' ages ranged from 21 - 65 and their occupational backgrounds 
were varied.
(5)_Apparatus
Additional to the apparatus used in Experiment III a Boll 
and Howell cassette recorder with a 6" diameter extension loudspeaker 
was used to provide a verbal interference stimulus.
(4) Task
As in previous Experiment III a linear positioning task was 
used witl) additional 2nd order interference stimuli.
(5) Procedure
Subjects wore required to first learn a 45 cm movomont on the 
linear positioning apparatus ns in Experiment III. Following this all 
subjects were required to imagine making a 60 cm movement during a 50 
sec retention period. During this period one of the throe typos of 
2nd order interference stimuli woro presented, which subjects either 
responded to or not, depending upon which condition they were in (R) 
row | km me or (NR) no re;i|Minse. The Ihrro 2nd order Inter 1‘oronCf* stimuli
woro presented as follows)-
-  1 7 9  -
7.1.2» Interference Tasks
(1) Verbal (Verb)
A tape-recorded string of random numbers was presented via 
a loudspeaker, with a 2 second pause between each random number. The 
verbal response group (Verb R) were required to shadow these numbers 
by repeating each one in the 2 sec pause while imagining the 60 cm 
movement. The verbal no response group (Verb NR) was told to imagine 
the 60 cm movement.
(2) Motor (M)
As in Experiment III a pressure plate was fixed horizontal to 
the subject at approximately arm's length and shoulder height. The 
motor response group (MR) were required to monitor their pressure so 
that a buzzer did not sound, while imagining a 60 cm movement. Thus 
every time their pressure on the plate varied from a mean pressure of 
15 kgs by more than + or - 2 kqs a buzzer would sound. The motor no 
response group (KNR) were required to push against the plate but there 
was no specific pressure requirement (i.o. they did not have to monitor 
their exerted forco) and no buzzers woro sounded.
(3) Visual (V)
As in Experiment III the guide lights were set at a non- 
relevnnt location and flashed on and off alternately. Subjects in the 
visual responso group (VR) were required to indicate which of the two 
lights were the brighter (they wore Identical) and how many times the 
red light flashed on while imagining a f>0 cm movement). The visual no 
response group (VNR) had the same 2nd order interference stimulus as 
the (VR) group hut woro simply told to imagine a 60 cm movement.
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As in Experiment III, nil groups used the first 10 seconds 
of the retention period to practice carrying out the imagery instruc­
tion before the 2nd order interference stimulus occurred. Finally 
all groups were given 10 recall trials to reproduce the 45 cm move­
ment with all the cues and the stop removed.
7.1.~. Results
Error scores to the nearest 0.5 ems wore recorded, from the 
original 45 cm location. From these scores CE and VE scores wore 
calculated for eacli subject (a summary is shown in appendix F). The 
moan and so for each dependent variable in each experimental condition 
are shown in Table 7.1.
(l) Constant Error (CE)
A two-way independent groups ANOVA of CE resulted in a signi­
ficant effect for typo of interference, F(2,30)= 78.078, pr <.001. 
Response demand did not have a significant effect on CE. F(l,30)= 1.626, 
pr >.05 nor was there any significant interaction effect, F(2,30)= 2.376, 
pr >.05 (Table 7.2 shows an ANOVA summary). Figure 7.1 shows that visual 
interference prevents imagery producing a significant directionally 
spocific bias in terms of CE. Whilst motor and verbal tasks, whether 
requiring a rosponso or not, do not suppress the imagery inducod bias.
Decomposition of the significant main effect for typo of inter­
ference using Tukey's II S D (a) test showed that visual interference 
consistently produced less bins, ns monsurod by CE, when subjects were 
trying to imagine a 60 cm novel movomont (Tablo 7.3 shows the differences 
botwoon means for each typo of interference).
UH
Ty|>o of Intorforonco Visual Motor Verbal
Responso Demand R NR R NR R NR
CE (X)
(so)
VE (X)
(so)
--- — — ---------- -----
0.39
0.70
0.66
0.21
-0.30
1.37
1.20
0.55
4.92
1.37
0.64
0.1R
5.70
1.6 1
1.03
0.37
5.20
0 .51
0.68
0.20
6.73
2.00
0.73
0.23
Table 7.1 Experiment TVt Summnry of mann (X) and standard orror (so), 
constant ori*or (CE) and variable orror (VE) for each 
experimental condition, measured in cms.
Typo of Interference Visual Motor Verbal
Response Demand R NR R ~ NR R NR
_
CE (X)
(so)
VE (X)
(so)
■------------------- -----
0.39
0.70
0.66
0 .2 1
-O.3O
1.37
1.20
0.33
----------1
4.92
1.37
0.64
O.lfl
3.70
1.6l
1.03
0.37
5.20
0.51
0.68
0.20
6.73
2.00
0.73
0.23
Tallio 7.1 Experiment TV: Summary of mean (X) and standard error (so), 
constant error (CE) and variable error (VE) for each 
oxiKjrimontnl condition, moasurod in cms.
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SOURCE Sums of 
Squares
Df Moan
Square
F Ratio Pr level
A. Intorforonco 252.003 o 126.441 70.078 <•001
I). Responso Remand 2.6233 1 2.623 1.626 >.05
Axn Interaction 7.631 2 3.016 2.376 >.05
Error 40.503 30 1.619
Total 311.720 35
l’a l i lo  2 Experim ent TVs ANOVA .Nummary. 2-w ay iiiilo|>oiiiloiii <Il'otIjim 
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Tnlilo y.T Experiment IV: Differences between moan Cli for each type 
of 2nd order iliterforenco (cum).
** <.01 pr level of sipnifiennee on Tukoy'a USD (a) tost
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rig. 7 .1 Mean Constant Error for type of interference 
and response demand
Type of Interference and Response Demand 
2nd order interference F, 2,30 -  78 078 p < 001
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(2) Variable; Error
Usinfl the amount of variation between one subject's 10 
responses (VE) as a measure of the strength of the memory trace, a 
2-way independent group's ANOVA showed that respond demand had a 
significant effect on VE, F(l,30)= 13.BA, pr <.001. Typo of 2nd order 
interference had no significant simple main effect, F(2,30)= 1.855, 
pr >.05, hut the interaction between typo of 2nd order interference 
activity and response demand was significant, F(2,30)= 12.155 pr <.001 
(Table 7.4 shows the ANOVA summary).
Decomposition of the interaction effect shows that typo of 
interference had a significant effect on VE with no response demand, 
F(2,30)= 5.070 pr <.025 hut not when a response was required F(2,30)= 
O.l'iO pr >.05. Further analysis showed that response demand had a 
significant effect on VE with visual interference F(l,30)= 13.665 
pr <.(K)1 ns did response demand with motor interference F(l,50)=
6.912 pr <.25 but not with verbal interference F(l,30)= 0.0l6 pr >.05. 
(A summary of this analysis is shown in Table 7•!>)»
The effect of both tho response demand and the interferonco 
variable on VE can ho soon in Fig. 7.2. No rosponso increases tho 
amount of VE under all typos of interference but this is only signi­
ficant in tho case of visual and motor intorforonco.
( " )  l l e g r e s s i o n  A n a l y s i s
Filially a regression analysts (summarised in Table 7.6) was 
perfoimed on each subject's error scores, liegrosslng trials and error 
Hcores it was found that there were no slope coefficiontHgreater than 
0.380, with tho majority of p values around 0.1. Thus no linear trond
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SOURCE Sums of 
Squares
Df Moan
Square
F Ratio Pr lovol
A. Intorforenco 0.2'i37 O 0.1219 1.855 >.05 NS
13, Responso Domanti 0.9117 1 0.9117 13.880 <.001 ***
AXD Interaction 1.5968 o 0.798't 12.155 <.001 ***
Error 1.9705 30 0.0657
Total 4.7227 35
Tallio 7./i lix]K3rimo»t IVt ANOVA Sumnary tablo VIC
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SOURCE Sums of 
Squares
Df Moan
Square
F Ratio Pr level
Response demand at 
visual intorforonco
O.R976 1 0.897b 13.665 <.001 ***
Response demand at 
motor interference
0.454 1 0.454 6.912 <.025 *
Response demand at 
verbal interference
0.001 1 0.001 0.016 >.05 NS
Typo of interference 
at no response
0.666 2 0.333 5.070 <.025 *
Typo of intorforonco 
at response
0.0188 2 0.009 0.140 >.05 NS
Error 30 0.066
I'ulilo 7.5 Kx]>orimont IV: llnccMii|>osillon of sicinl ricnnt interact ion 
botwoon type of intorforonoo ami response demand for VE
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Fig. 7 .2 Mean Variable Error for type of interference 
and response demand
Visual Visual Motor Motor Verbal Verbal 
Response No Response Response NoResponse Response No Response
Type of Interference and Response Demand
Interaction F, 2,30 -12-16p < 001 
Response Demand F, 1,30 -  13 88 p < -001
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Subjects Vit >fR VERBR VNR MNR VERBNR
1 «t
D
0.600
-0.036
3.333
0.167
6.066
0.067
O .867
-O.O85
4.267
0.206
11.200
-O.182
o OC
p
1.633
-0.081
'i.300
0.018
4.933
0.158
2.8OO
-O.182
3.733
0.083
4.200
0.109
3 "f 
P
0.800
0.027
4.133
0.103
6.067
-0.158
-3.467
0.248
2.533
0.339
6,000
—0*036
4 <
P
-0.267
0.085
3.467
0.170
4.433
O .103
-1.533
0.261
“1.533
0.261
5.667
0.006
5 *
P
“O .133
o .o42
4.933
0.048
4.200
0.036
-3*333
0.388
7.667
0.097
6.133
0.339
6 oe
P
-1.400
0.127
4.600
0.000
4.267
0.152
-0.867
0.012
7.533
-0.079
5.600
O .073
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Tnblo 7.6 Experiment IVs Ronrossion nimlysia. Repressino trini 
Number and error acoro of ondi subject's rocnll of tho 
45 cm movement,« ■ intorcopt, p ■ slope coefficient
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Fig.7.3 Effects of type of 2nd order interference on
imagining a 60 cm movement ( Response required)
TRIALS
x -  Verbal Interference 
° -  Motor Interference 
• ■  Visual Interference
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^0.7.'! Effects of type of 2nd order interference on imagining a 
60 cm movement (No response required)
• =» Visual interference
appears to be present in individual subjects' positioning movements.
As in previous experiments the intercept coefficient «< of the regression 
equation varies according to the type of interference, verbal and motor 
interferences produced high positive values while visual interference 
results in low or negative intercept coefficients. In Figures 7.3 and
7.4 the mean response per trial for each condition of the experiment is 
shown. The effect of visual interference is consistently to reduce the 
amount of positioning error in recalling the original movement, indicating 
that imagining a 60 cm movement has either had no effect on memory or else 
imagery has boon suppressed. Furthermore the lack of any linear trend 
over recall trials is clearly shown.
7.1.4» Discussion
The results of this experiment clearly show that imagery of 
movements is not suppressed by motor or verbal interference stimuli.
It may be that interference is caused by competition for a "specific" 
rosourco as Allport (lOflo) suggests. If no, then imagery involves 
part of, or possibly the whole of, the visual/spatial processing system. 
Alternatively interference may be caused by a loading being placed upon 
a goneral processing capacity. The rosults of this experiment, however, 
suggest that interference duo to a loading of a general capacity has a 
differential offect than that caused by a specific loading of the visual 
system. Manipulation of the response demand of the various interference 
stimuli produced a higher VE in the "no response" conditions than the 
"response" conditions.
According to Laabs (1973) VE is a measure of the strength of 
the memory trace and in addition n "noise" component. Tho weaker tho 
memory traco tho more it will be swamped by "noise" from other sources
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and tho more variable it is. If this is so then the two component 
model may reflect general, and specific, resource demands. It was 
found that as tho response demand increased, VE decreased. One 
possibility is that tho "noise" component in a positioning response 
is reduced by a load being placed upon a general resource capacity.
Tho load may act in tho same way ns a filter, by cutting out inter­
ference or noise from within tho system. Hence, movements produced 
when a response to interference stimuli is necessary have a reduced 
noise component. Consequently, tho noise component of VE is inversely 
related to a general resource demand. In the case of a visual inter­
ference task, however, tho specific resource required to produce an 
imago of a movement is taxed by tho interference task, therefore, 
biasing is suppressed.
One other aspect of this experiment is that a vorbal rehearsal 
hypothesis can bo rejected since biasing was not suppressed by a vorbal 
interference task. Summers (1977) and Summers and Sharp (1979) suggest 
that motor control includes both >a spatial and a temporal sequencing 
component and that covert rohoarsal of movements can bo either spatial 
or temporal. Thoy also suggest that those components are hemispheri- 
cally segregated. Thoy consider that temporal rehearsal is a function 
of tho loft hemisphere while spatial rohoarsal is a function of tho 
right liemisphere. This loads them to conclude that temporal rehearsal 
involves some vorbal processing capacity. Tho results of tho present 
experiment make it very unlikely that; verbal rehearsal of movements 
is responsible for tho bias produced by rehearsing or imagining a 
linear movement to a novel location. One possible implication is 
that linear positioning movements are not rehearsed in terms of thoir 
temporal or sequential components. Instead it is suggested that tho
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spatial component of linear movements is rehearsed by visual/spatial 
imagery processes.
Further evidence for the rejection of a temporal rehearsal 
hypothesis arises when the nature of the verbal interference is con­
sidered. One way in which subjects might rehearse a temporal sequence 
is by counting (perhaps subvocally). The verbal interference stimulus, 
however, was comprised of random numbers, which would have inhibited 
any counting operation which may have been employed. Furthermore the 
sequencing of the random numbers was at 2 sec intervals which may have 
conflicted with any other temporal sequencing which subjects might 
have employed. Consequently the temporal component of memory was not 
used to rehearse a linear positioning movement. The results of this 
and provious experiments strongly support a hypothesis that the spatial 
component of memory is used to rehearse movements and that this rehearsal 
is the function of an image generation and processing system. Further­
more this image system appoars to be largely a function of the visual/ 
spatial system, in so far as it appears to be relatively unaffected 
by concurrent motor and verbal interference tasks.
7.2. Summary and Conclusions
Thero is some concern within certain areas of cognitive 
psychology about distinctions botween specific and general resource 
allocation. Allport (19S0) extends Noisser's argument that interference 
tasks should bo considered to affect specific resources. Further evidence 
for the importance of specific resource allocation comes from current 
trends in artificial Intelligence, in the form of distributed processing 
models. Hinton (lOfll), for example, is currently developing a distri-
buted computational model of human movement control. In view of 
these recent developments it is important to identify performance 
differences between specific and general resource demands.
If "general resource demand" is operationalised as the 
response demand of the task and the "specific resource demand" is 
operationalised as the source and typo of stimulus* then this 
experiment shows one way in which these two processes differ in the 
motor control of linear positioning movements. It seems that increa­
sing the response load of an interference task affects VE but not CE, 
while varying the source and type of the interference stimulus affects 
CE. When the response demand is great there is no difference between 
the VE scores for each type of interference task, however, when the 
response demand is low visual and motor interference tasks significantly 
affect VE.
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Subjects in the verbal interference task conditions do not 
seem to have been affected by the response demand of a task. It is 
possible that subjects in both the "response" and "no response" 
conditions shadowed the message, rogardless of the exporimenter's 
instruction except that those in the no response condition shadowed 
sub-vocallv. This does not detract from the general finding that 
separate effocts can be ascribed to manipulation of response desumd 
and source/type of stimulus in linear positioning experiments with 
interpolated interference tasks.
Summors and Sharp's suggestion that subjects might rohearse 
the sequential or temporal aspects of a motor task is unsupported by 
the present experiment.
>*
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buted computational model of human movement control. In view of 
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If "general resource demand" is operationalised as the 
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while varying the source and type of the interference stimulus affects 
CE. When the response demand is great there is no difference between 
the VE scores for each type of interference task, however, when the 
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possible that subjects in both the "response" and "no response" 
conditions shadowed the message, regardless of the exporimentor's 
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If we assume that subvocal rehearsal of a linear positioning movement 
involves a counting procedure then the finding that a digit-shadowing 
task did not suppress biasing, due to imagery, does not support the 
hypothesized subvocal rehearsal of temporal information of linear 
positioning movements.
The results of this experiment taken along with those of the throe 
previous experiments strongly support a hypothesis of visual/spatial 
processes operating during the mental rehearsal of linear positioning 
movements. Furthermore these processes seem to be subject to both 
specific and general interferences but in different ways. It may be 
that VE and response demand follow a "l'" shaped function, with extreme 
low and high response demands producing relatively high VE while some 
optimum level of response demand produces relatively low VE.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
DISTINCTIONS HETWEEN 
VISUAL AND SPATIAL PROCESSING
Tho previous experiments have consistently shown that 
visual/spatial stimuli suppress imaocry. It was argued in Experiment 
IV that memory for movements includes both spatial and temporal infor­
mation, although a verbal interference stimulus failed to suppress 
imagery. Consequently it was concluded that imagery involved tho 
manipulation of spatial information contained within the memory for 
movements. None of tho experiments in this research, however, have 
directly manipulated spatial information. Each interference stimulus 
has been primarily visual, motor or verbal in nature. It could bo 
argued that the visual interference used in past experiments was a 
spatinl/visual stimulus. Tho same cannot bo said for tho motor and 
verbal interference tasks, which had little or no spatial content.
Tho experimental evidence presented so far is not capable 
of distinguishing botwoon rohoarsal of tho visual characteristics of 
movements and rohoarsal of their spatial characteristics. With rogard 
to imagery, Kosslyn (19B0) strongly claims that images are not just 
spatial representations but "quasi-pictorial representations" which 
contain brightness and colour information ns well ns spatial information. 
Einko amt Schmidt (1977» 197B) have shown that orientation ami colour 
information are contained within images.
If imagery or rehearsal of movements involvos tho manipulation 
of some representation normally used in remembering and producing move-
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monts then a purely visual hypothesis of mental imagery is difficult 
to maintain. It has been shown by Adams, Gopher and Lintorn (1977) 
and Johnson (l9fi0) amongst others, that linear positioning movements 
arc remembered relatively accurately when subjects are deprived of 
visual feedback. Furthermore learning a positioning movement without 
visual feedback followed by recall with visual feedback produced 
greater error in accuracy than having no visual feedback at recall.
One possible explanation is that movements were being remembered in 
terms of a spatial representation but with some fine tuning to parti­
cular modalities of input.
Further arguments against a "visual display" model of move­
ment images comes from studies of the congenitally blind, who are able 
to represent, anticipate and plan their actions and order their environ­
ment largely on the basis of movement information. Morinlin and O'Connor 
(1975) review the experimental and clinical evidence for non visual 
coding. More recently Millar (1970) reports work on tactile maze 
learning in blind and sighted children which supports a spatial 
representation hypothesis.
H.1. F.xperiment V
Tills experiment is designod to invostigato tho relationship 
between visual and spatial images of linoar positioning movements. If 
Images are based on visual displays and not spatial representations 
then a 12nd order interference task which is visual but not spatial 
should suppress any imagery produced bias in memory. Alternatively if 
imagory involves tho manipulation of spntial information then a visual 
task with a spntial component should suppress any imagory produced
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biasing effect on memory. Furthermore if images do involve manipulating 
spatial representation then a 2nd order interference which is spatial 
but not visual should also suppress the imagery produced bias.
ii.1.1. Method
(1) Experimental Design
A two-factor independent groups design was used, with type 
of interference and spatial content as the two factors. The typo of 
interference was cither visual, auditory or motor, while the spatial 
factor was either little or no spatial content or with spatial content.
(2) Subjects
36 right-handed subjects were randomly selected from a pool 
of 90 Open University psychology students who had volunteered to take 
part in experiments while attending a summer school at Warwick 
University. Six subjects per group wero used - with equal numbers of 
each sex.
(3) Apparatus
In addition to the slido and display lights used in provious 
experiments a frequency amplifier was usod to genorato tones. Those 
tones wore transmitted through one or more of oight loudspeakers 
hidden behind the subject ( hoc Fig. O.l). Tho experimenter was able 
to select which loudspeakor(s) tho tones wore emitted from by means 
of a h.iiilt of eight nwllehoH.
(>i) Task
As in past experiments subjects were first required to learn 
a ^5 cm movement on a linear positioning task, followed by instructions
1>(X> -
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to imagine a 60 cm movement whilst performing one of the 2nd order 
interference tasks.
(5) Procedure
Learning the ^5 cm movement consisted of subjects having 
15 trials at moving to a stop with the track and arm movements hidden 
from view, as in Experiment III. This was followed by instructions 
to imagine a 60 cm movement without any overt movement. The imagery 
instructions and cues (such ns lights) were as described in Experiment
III. Subjects wore instructed to make 10 imaginary moves to the 60 cm 
location during the 50 sec retention interval (the first 10 secs of 
which were used for practice and instructions). While imagining this 
now movement subjocts were given one of the two levels of the six 
typos of interference stimuli.
fl.1.2. Interference Tasks
(1 ) Visual Interference - spatial (VS) and non-spatial (VTMS)
The visual interference stimulus was comprised of the cue
lights sot in a non-rclovant location. Subjocts wore instructed to 
report which was the brighter of the two lights and how many times the 
rod ono appeared. Tho spatial components of the visual stimulus woro 
providod by tho two lights boing sot at separate locations along tho 
track. Tlio visunl non-spatial (VNS) interference stimuli consisted of 
tho two lights being placed at ono location along the track with tho 
red light tinned Intel y above the green light*
(2) Auditory Interference - spatial (AS) and non-spatial (ANS)
Tho auditory interference stimulus consisted of a tono sounded
at 2 soc intervals from ono of eight possible loudspeakers. In tho
auditory spatial interference condition the tone would first come 
from loudspeaker 1 then 8, alternating throughout the see interfer­
ence interval. Subjects were required to identify whore each sound 
source was by calling out the appropriate number (i.o. 1 - 8). In 
the auditory non-spatial interference condition the sound was emitted 
from speaker 5 at 2 sec intervals, again subjects had to verbally 
identify the sound source.
(5) Motor Kinaesthotic Interference - spatial (MS), noil- 
spatial (MNS)
The motor kinaosthetic interference stimulus consisted of a 
pressure applied to the subject’s right arm by a blunt pointer. In 
the spatial (MS) condition the pointer was applied at either of two 
separate locations on the subject's arms .at 2 sec intervals. The 
subject was required to report which of the two locations had boon 
pressed. In the non-spatial condition (MNS) the pointer was applied 
to one location and the subject had to report that it had occurred.
Finally all groups woro required to reproduce tho original 
^5 cm movement with tho stop and cue lights removed. Subjocts hasten 
recall trials with no knowledge of results.
8 . 1 . %  H e s n l t s
As previously, error scores to the nearest 0.5 an from tho 
,iri cm locat ion wore recorded. From those scores CF. and Vli snores were 
calculated for each subject (a summary can ho found ill Appendix (i).
The means and standard error of oacli dependent variable in each 
experimental condition is shown in Tablo 8.1.
Typo of Interference Visual Motor/kinaosthetic Auditory
Spatial Component S NS S NS S NS
X
CE
0.57 7.42 2.40 7.40 1.68 7.15
SO o.4i 4.83 1 .1 1 2.49 0.27 0.64
X 0.68 1.05 1.00 0.75 0.85 1.43
VE so 0.15 0.57 0.25 0.19 0.43 0.29
Table 8.1 Experiment Vt Summary of monn error etna. (X) an<l standard 
orror ( b o ) ,  conatnnt orror (CE) and vnrlnl)lo error (vo) for 
each typo of intorforonco atlmul.ua at each level of spatial 
component
(1) Constant Error (CE)
A 2 x 3 independent groups ANOVA using CE resulted in a 
significant effect for the spatial component F(l,30)= 57.225, pr <.001. 
No other significant effects wore found. The effect of the spatial 
interference stimuli was to suppress any bias as measured by CE,
X = 1.53, while non-spntial interference stimuli failed to suppress 
the biasing effect of imagery X = 7«32. (See Table 8.2 for ANOVA 
summary and Fig. 8.2).
(2) Variable terror (VE)
Using the amount of variation (VE) in a series of recall 
trials as the dependent variable for a 3 x 2 independent group's ANOVA 
a non-significant effect was found for typo of interference stimuli, 
F(l,30)= 4.122, pr >.05. No significant effects were found for spatial 
content alone but a significant two-way interaction was found 
F(2,30)= 4.717, pr (.05. (See Table 8.3 for ANOVA summary).
Decomposition of the interaction effect showed that the typo 
of interference only had a significant effect on VIC in tho non-spatial 
condition while the spatial content of tho stimulus differentially 
affected performance in tho auditory condition (see Table 8.4). As 
can bo seen from Fig. 8.3 tho auditory stimulus produces much higher 
VIC in tho non-spatial condition than any other stimulus.
( ~)  D e g r e s s i o n  A n a l y s i s
Finally a rogrossion analysis, summarised in Tablo 8.5, was 
performed, regressing each subject's error score por recall trial 
against the trial number. Tho first thing to note is that tho slopo 
coefficients (p ) are all below 0.5 and are not significantly difforont
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SOURCE Sums of 
Squares
Df Moan
Square
F Ratio Pr level
A. Typo of
inter formico
4.957 2 2.479 0.473 >.05 NS
II. Spatial content 299.067 1 299.867 57.225 <.001 ***
AXn Interaction 5.55h 2 2.777 0.530 >.05 NS
Error 157.205 30 Ul • to I» 0
Total 467.583 35
Tullio II.U Experiment V: Conni,-ini. error, ANOVA Summary
«»
E X P E R I M E N T  Y
VIS = VISUAL 
MUT = MOTOR 
AUI) = AUDITORY 
S = SPATIAL 
NS = NÜNSPAT1AL
ËU
OL-U
CW
CO
CO
2:
S NS S NS S NS
Type of mteference and spatial content
Fin.H.2 MLAN CONSTANT liKUOK R)K AU. ÎN'II.KJ 1.IU.NC1; CROUPS. 
SPATIAL IMliRHsIttiNCL P(1,30) ■ 56.329 PRcOOl.

SOURCE Sums of 
Squares
Df Moan
Square
F ratio Pr level
Spatial Content/ 
Visual
o.4i 1 0.4l 3.445 >.05 NS
Spatial Content/ 
Auditory
1 .16 1 1 .16 9.748 < .01 **
Spatial Content/ 
Motor/kinaosthotic
0.19 1 0.19 1.597 >.05 NS
Interference/ 
No spatial
1.4l 2 0.75 6.302 <.01 **
Interference/
Spatial
0.47 2 0.24 2.017 ) .05 NS
Error 3.567 30 0.119
Table H.4 Experiment V: Decomposition of tlio sipniricant interaction 
l>otween spatial content nml typo of interference for VE
M
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n 
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E X P E R I M E N T  1
VIS = VISUAL 
MOT = MOTOR 
AU1) - AUDITORY S = SPATIAL 
NS = NONSPATIAL
S NS 5 NS S NS
Type of interference and spatial content
Pin.I'.’» MIAN VAR1AJU.L liKROK TOR All lNTliRPLKLNUL CROUPS.
INTLKALTION Uli’lIVLTN 1NT1.RPTKJ.NLL AM) SPATIAL U1NTLNT F(2,30) - 4.717 PR <.
• ;1 0  -
Subject
Visual
Spatial
Visual
non-
Spatial
Motor
Spatial
Motor
non-
Spatial
Auditory
Spatial
Auditory
non-
Spatial
1 oC 0.400 10.733 2.067 3.667 3.133 8.593
P 0.000 -O.261 -O.167 0.042 -0.206 -0.152
2 «C 1.700 12.133 0.467 7.400 1.833 7.800
P -0.133 6 .121 0.215 -O.II8 -0.088 -O.O36
3 «C 1.667 I.667 1.733 1 1 .8 2.667 7.333
p -0.167 0.042 -0.006 -O .056 -0.194 -0.133
4 oC -0.867 6.067 3.333 8 .16 7 0.900 7.933
p 0.139 0.006 -O.188 -0 .194 0.091 -0.279
3 «C 1.400 2.000 3.467 6.800 2.100 4.900
P -0.091 0.018 0.024 -0.027 -0.082 0.364
6 « 0.400 11.667 4.267 8.800 3.467 7.967
P -0.009 0.115 -0.067 -O .055 -0.267 -O.130
TnMe It.5 Experiment V: Summary of Hooronsion analysts, repressimi 
ondi subjoot's orror scoro nnninst tho recall trial numlior, 
■ Intercept, p *> slope coofficiont
:’ll -
E X P E R I M E N T  Y
X= VISUAL INTERFERENCE □ =  AUDITORY INTERFERENCE 
• = MJTUR INTERFERENCE
Trials
rin.n.'* MEAN ERROR I'ER RECALL 1RIAI. wnil SPATIAL lNTERFERliN'CE
t
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E X P E R I M E N T  Y
X= VISUAL INTERFERENCE 
'['I= AUDITORY INTERFERENCE 
•= MOTOR INTERFERENCE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Trials
Fin.0.5 MIAN ERROR PER RECALI, TRIAI. Willi NUNSI’ATIAi. INTERFERENCE
from 0. Second, the intercept values (o<) systematically vary with 
the spatial content of the stimulus. In all cases whore there was 
a no spatial interference stimulus the intercept is a high positive 
value, while a non-spatial interference stimulus results in a low 
positive or negative intercept value. Figures 8./r and 8.5 graphically 
show the moan error over trials for each spatial and non-spatial 
interference stimulus. It can ho scon that this moan performance 
reflects similar characteristic fee) and (Ji) values as the individual 
regression analysis showed. Consequently a spatial component to the 
interference inhibits any imagery produced bias in memory.
8,1,A. Discussion
The results show that it is the spatial components of an 
interfering stimulus which suppress the biasing effect of imagery on 
memory. This strongly suggests that images of linear jiositioning 
movements involve tho processing of spatial information. Further 
confirmation for this hypothesis comes from the lack of any suppressing 
offocts with a visual stimulus which had little or no spatial content. 
In this experimental condition a visual stimulus failed to suppress 
tho biasing offocts of imagining a novel movoment. Furthermore non- 
visunl stimuli involving spatial information did suppress this imagery 
produced bias.
8,2« Snimnnry and Conclusions
Kosslyn's claim that imagos contain not only spatial infor­
mation hut other pictorial qualities cannot bo contestod on tho basis 
of tho present experiment. It seoms to he tho case that imagery of 
movements primarily involves spatial representations and not othor
quasi-pictorial properties which images may possess
In Experiment IV it was argued that differential inter­
ference effects wore produced by general and specific resource 
demanding tasks. Those were explained in terms of tho two component 
model of VE (i.o. VE = memory and "noise")» in which specific inter­
ference tasks affected memory while general interference affected 
any noise in tho system. Furthermore, interference to memory,by 
biasing, is reflected by CE. Analysis of tho present oxporimont in 
terms of VE showed that in tho case of an auditory or a visual 
interference stimulus a spatial content produced lower VE than a 
non-spatial content. While tho motor interference task had tho 
opposite effects, with spatial content producing higher VE than a 
non-spatial content of the stimulus. One possible explanation of this 
inconsistency is that the visual and auditory tasks containing spatial 
information wore more complex and required more general capacity than 
tho spatial motor kinaesthotic task. Tho visual and auditory inter­
ference tasks not only had a specific resource component but, because 
of their increased complexity, they also had a general capacity load.
Tho proposed "U" shaped function botwoon VE and response 
demand seems to offer a possible explanation of these results. It 
may bo tho case that tho motorAinaosthotic intorforonco task in tho 
spatial condition was less complex than tho auditory or visual intor­
foronco stimuli. Tho visual and auditory spatial stimuli seem to fall 
in tho optimum response band for a low VE whilo tho motorAi "aesthetic 
task failed to reach tho optimum level and consequently produced a 
relatively high amount of VE.
Tlie auditory interference stimulus was the only one which 
significantly varied in terms of VE with manipulation of the spatial 
content of the stimulus. The non-spatial manipulation of the audi­
tory stimulus produced higher VE than the spatial manipulation. The 
visual stimuli, on the other hand, had no difference in terms of VE 
between the spatial and non-spatial condition.
It is not completely clear whether the differences between 
the visual, motorA i »aesthetic and auditory tasks in terms of VE are 
duo to the complexity of the tasks or their specific processing 
demands. Perhaps this is because the tasks are not equal in terms of 
their processing loads, therefore interactions are difficult to 
interpret. However, it does seem that spatial tasks, regardless of 
their stimulus source, do suppress imagery of linear positioning 
movements. Furthermore both visual and auditory tasks do tend to 
follow a similar trend in terms of VE. The lack of a significant 
difference between visual, non-spatial and spatial intorferonco 
stimuli in terms of VE may be duo to the similarity of tho stimuli 
in tho two conditions; in both cases tho same two lights wero used. 
There may have boon a higher informational content in tho visual 
non-spatial condition than tho auditory non-spatial condition sinco 
there was only one tone with tho auditory stimulus whilo thoro woro 
two lights with tho spatial stimulus.
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CHAPTER NINE
FURTHER DISTINCTIONS HETWEEN SPATIAL AND NON-SPATIAL 
PROCESSES IN IMAGES OF LINEAR POSITIONING MOVEMENTS
It is supposed that the interference to imagery found in 
Experiment V is duo to the spatial characteristics of the stimuli.
The sensory media of the stimuli (visual» auditory or kinaosthetic/ 
motor) does not appear to bo the primary source of interference to 
imagery. An interference stimulus which contained no (or little) 
spatial information had no significant effect on a subject's ability 
to imagine linear positioning movements. The interference effects of 
visual and auditory stimuli with a spatial content wore similar but 
the motor/kinaosthctic spatial stimuli interfered loss with imagery 
than the others.
It has boon roportod by Crasko (l9Ro) that subjects who are 
required to judge the locations of pressure on thoir arms experience 
an illusion which alters thoir perceived arm length. This rather 
strange offoct may account for the lower interference offoct of a 
motor/1<inaosthetic spatial stimulus. This loads one to question the 
appropriateness of prossuro stimulation ns a spatial interference task.
If tho supposition that images of movements aro intorforod 
with by stimuli containing spatial information is correct, then an 
increase in tho spatial information contained within tho stimulus 
should produce increased intorforonco rognrdloss of tho modality or 
source of the stimulus. Consoquontly a motor task with a groator amount 
of spatial information should result in incronsod intorferonco to imngory.
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Moreover, a task which contains a uniform amount of spatial information 
regardless of the modality or source of stimulation should have a 
uniform interference effect upon imagery.
One task containing a high amount of spatial information is 
the learning of a finger maze. Warden (1924) and Husband (1931) have 
found that subjects report using verbal, motor/kinacsthetic and visual 
informational strategies to learn the correct path through a maze. 
Woodworth and Schlosberg (1955) include a review of maze learning in 
their experimental psychology text, in which they conclude that linear 
mazes are capable of being learned either verbally, visually or 
motorically. Sackott (1935) reports that subjects who were required 
to "symbolically rehearse" a linoar maze claimed to be using either 
visual, verbal or motoric "symbolism" during rehearsal although reports 
of visual imagery wore more frequont. Similar strategies wore also 
reported during learning and relearning phases of the experiment.
Those reports suggost that learning a linoar maze primarily 
involves tho representation of spatial relationships. Furthermore the 
spatial information contained within tho maze can be processed from 
different sources of information. This suggests that tho sources or 
sensory modalities are less important than tho informational content, 
and that tho correct path can bo learned oithor motorically, visually 
or verbally.
9 . 1 .  Experim ent  VI
Tito present experiment compares tho interference offects
upon imagery of movement, of visual, auditory and motorAinaesthotic
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stimuli. It is predicted that the interference effects of thoso 
stimuli should be equal when the stimulus contains a high component 
of spatial information as in learning a linear maze. When the 
information contained within tho stimulus has little or no spatial 
content then there should bo little or no interference effect upon 
imagery of a linear movement.
9 . 1 . 1 .  Method
( 1 )  E x p er im en ta l  D esign
A two factor independent groups design was used, with spatial 
content and source of stimulation as tho two factors. Spatial content 
had two levels, high and low, whilo source of stimulation had throe 
levels, visual, auditory and motor/kinaosthotic, giving six experimental 
groups in all.
( 2 )  S u b j e c t s
3(> right-handed subjects wore randomly selected from a pool 
of 34 volunteers who were attending an Open University summer school at 
Warwick University. An oqual nurnbor of malo and fcnialo subjects woro 
assigned to oacli group (total number of subjects per group = six). 
Subjects1 agos rnngod from 23 - rA  and their occupational backgrounds 
woro varied.
( 3 )  A p paratus
I11 addition to tho slide and display lights used in Experiment 
III a stylus maze, shown in Fig. 9*1» was used to provide spatial infor­
mation. Tills was dono with tho aid of a 12” x 12" vidoo monitor which 
was positioned at eye-level in front of tho subject. Previously a 
video-tape had boon recorded showing tho stylus movo through tho
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correct path of tho maze 5 times. An audio-tape recording was also 
made describing tho correct path through tho maze in terms of loft, 
right and upward movement directions, again correct paths through 
the maze wore described 5 times. To provide kinaosthotic/motor 
information of the maze a stylus 17 cm x 0.5 cm diameter, with a 
point at one end was used to guide tho subject through tho maze by 
tho experimenter. To provide visual non-spatial interference a 
single dot appeared in tho centre of the display monitor and would 
flash on and off at 2 sec intervals. Auditory non-spatial inter­
ference was provided by a string of random numbers played over tho 
air from a centrally positioned loudspeaker. Motor/^tinaosthetic 
non-spatial interference was provided by means of the pressure 
apparatus described in Experiment III.
(4) Task/Procodurc
As in previous experiments subjects were required to learn 
a 45 cm movement from loft to right along tho hidden track, moving 
up to a stop. Tho cue lights wore positioned above tho start and 
stop positions as in previous experiments and flashed at two sec 
intervals. After 15 loarning trials all subjocts had a 50 sec 
retention intorval during which time thoy wore instructed to imagino 
a 60 cm movement, without making any overt movements thomsolvos. As 
in previous oxporimonts tho cue lights wore placed at a now 60 cm 
location and flashed at 2 soc intervals. Aftor ten trials at imagining 
moving to the Go cm location subjects wore testod on their recall per­
formance for tho 45 cm movement, with tho stop and cuo lights removed, 
by moving ton timos to whoro thoy thought tho 45 cm movomont to ond.
During tho 50 sec rotontion interval, in addition to imagining
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a 60 cm movoinont, subjects wore required to perform one of six different 
interference tasks.
9.1.2« Interference Tasks
(1) Visual Spatial (VS)
A video-tape showing the stylus moving through the maze was 
shown on the video-monitor. Subjects wore told that they would see 
5 trials of the correct path through the maze. They were not told that 
they would bo later tested on this maze.
(2) Auditory/Verbal Spatial (AS)
An audio-tape recording containing instructions of the correct 
path through the maze was played through a contrally positioned loudspeaker. 
Subjects wore told that they would hoar 5 trials of the correct path 
through the maze, but not that they would be tested later.
(") Motor/Kinaesthetic Spatial (MS)
Subjects had their right hand passively guided through the 
maze by the oxporimontor. Subjects grasped a stylus which the experi­
menter was able to guide. The maze was hidden bonoath the card screen 
(shown in Fig. 9.1). All subjects wore taken through the correct path 
of the maze 5 times, Init not told that they would be tested lator.
(;i) Visual non-Spatinl (VNS)
A «lot of white' light appeared in the centre of the display 
monitor, which subjects woro instructed to watch. Tho dot flashed on 
and off at 2 sec intervals but did not move at all. Subjects woro 
rrwjuired to report verbally whon tho light was on.
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(5) Auditory/Verbal non-Spatial (ANS)
A string of random numbers was presented via a centrally 
positioned loudspeaker. Subjects were required to shadow these 
random numbers.
(6) MotorAinaesthetic non-Spatial (MNS)
A pressure plate was connected to a buzzer as in Experiment
III. Subjects were required to maintain a mean pressure of 15 kg with 
their right arm in order to prevent the buzzer sounding, while imagining 
making a linear positioning movement.
At the end of the experiment, after recalling the 45 cm 
movement, all subjects wore required to trace through the maze blind­
folded with a stylus pen. The total time on the maze and number of 
errors made were recorded by the experimenter.
9.1.3. Results
All subjects' positioning movements at recall and their time 
and error performance on the linear mazo wore rocordcd.
(l) Positioning Movoment Errors
Error scores to the nearest 0.3 cm from tho 45 cm point were 
recorded. From those scores CE and VE scores were calculated for each 
subject (a summary is shown in Appendix H). Tho mean and standard 
error of these CE and VE scoros in each experimental condition is shown 
in Table 9.1 below.
(2) Constant Error (CF.)
Analysing tho amount of bins ns measured by CE in n two-way
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Tnblo 0.1 Experiment VI» Summary of mean (X) and standard nrror (so) 
of CE and VE for nach oxporimontal condition moamirod in cms
_  nn/| _
SOURCE Sums of 
Squares
Df Moan
Square
F Ratio Pr level
A. Spatial Content 332.814 1 352.814 52.428 <.001 **
13. Source of stimuli 11.420 2 5.710 0.849 >.05 NS
AXI3 Interaction 31.629 o 15.814 2.350 >.05 NS
Error 201.085 30 6.730
Total 597.748 33
Table 9.2 Experiment VI: Summary of ANOVA for spatial constant mul 
source of Htiimili in terms of tlio constant error (CE) at 
recall
Fio.
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EXPERIMENT YL
VS = VISUAL/SPATIAL (MAZE) 
VNS = VISUAL/NONSPATIAL 
MS = MOTOR/SPATIAL (MAZE)
MNS = MOTOR/NONSPATIAL 
AS = AUDITORY/SPATIAL (MAZE) 
ANS *= AUDITORY/NONSPATIAL
Interference Stimulus
9.2 MLAN CONSTANT ERROR (CE) PUR ALL INTlRPEKliNCE GROUPS 
(SPATIAL - MAZE)
SPATIAL INTERPERl-NCE P(l,30) * SZ.'IZB l’R<.OOl
ANOVA, the only significant main effect was for the spatial content 
of the interference stimulus, F(l,30)= 52.428 pr <.001. The moan CE 
for subjects in the non-spatial conditions was 5.83 cms while subjects 
in the spatial condition had a moan CE of -0.42 cms. Table 9.2 
contains a summary of the ANOVA and Figure 9.2 shows the moan CE for 
each experimental condition.
(5) Variable Error (VF.)
Analysis of the amount of variation within a series of memory/ 
recall trials by VIC, a two-way independent groups ANOVA rosultod in a 
significant effect for the spatial content of the stimuli, F(l,30)= 
26.074 pr <.001. The moan VE for subjocts in the non-spatial conditions 
was O .876 cms while subjects in the spatial conditions had a moan VE of 
2.55 cms. No other significant offoots wore found. A summary of the 
ANOVA is shown in Table 9.3 and the moan VE for each experimental 
condition is shown in Fig. 9.3.
(4) Performance on Maze
Performance on the maze was analysed in tortus of orrors and 
timo to completion. Tho moon and standard orrors for each group of 
subjects' error and completion times are shown in Tablo 9.4.
ERRORS
Analysis of tho numbor of orrors in porfonnanco by a two way 
ANOVA resulted In a significant effect for spatial content, F(l,30)n 
4.899, pr <.(>5. (Soo Table 9.3 for ANOVA summary). Tho moan numbor of 
orrors for those groups of subjects who had not experienced tho mazo 
as an interference stimulus was 6.40 incorrect turns. Those groups of 
subjects who hail oxjtoriencod the maze as an interference stimulus had
12127 “
SOURCE Sums of 
Squares
Df Moan
Squaro
F ratio Pr level
A. Spatial contont 20,/i00 1 20.400 26.074 < .001 ***
D. Sourco of stimuli 0,069 2 0.034 0.044 > .05 NS
AXB Interaction 0.936 2 0.468 0.598 > .05 NS
Error 23.472 30
Total 44.877 35
Table 9.3 Exporimont Vit Summary ANOVA for spatial contont and sourco 
of stimuli In terms of the variablo orror (VE) at recall
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EX P ER IM E N T S!
Interference Stimulus
M o .  *>.3 MLAN VAKlAllLls ÜRUUU ( V . Ü . )  IO K  A L L  IN 'lliR M ilU N U ; (JHOUI’S .  
S P A T IA L  I M I .I U 'L I U .M L  F ( l ,3 0 )  ■ 20.07*1 l'U < .U ) J
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Spatial (Maze) Non-Spatial
VS AS MS VNS ANS MNS
Errors X 5.50 4.67 5.00 7.30 6 .17 6.00
SO 1.87 1.21 1 .6 7 2.8l 1.47 2.28
Completion X 
Time
48.28 40.17 49.67 114.17 77.00 79.33
Sees• se 11.90 11.77 11 .0 2 13.04 12.4l 12.52
Tablo r),,i Experiment VI» Summary of moan« anil standard errors for 
performance on tlio maze. Doth time in seconds and total 
orrors aro shown for each experimental condition
ino -
SOURCE Sums of 
Squares
Df Moan
Squaro
F ratio Pr level
A. Spatial Content 18.778 1 18.778 4.899 <.05 *
13. Stimulus Source 7.389 2 3.694 0.964 >.05 NS
AXI3 Interaction 1.056 2 0.528 0.138 >.05 NS
Error 115.000 30 3.833
Total 142.223 35
Table 9.3 Experiment VIt ANOVA Summary for number of incorroct turns 
(errors) on tlio mnsso at recall
Fin.
EXPERIMENTS!
VS = VISUAL/SPATIAL (MAZE) 
VNS = VI SliAL/NONSPAT IAL 
MS = MDTOR/SPATIAL (MAZE) 
MNS = MOTOR/NONSPATIAL 
AS = AUDITORY/SPATIAL 
ANS = AUDITORY/NONSPATIAL
Interference Stimulus
9./i MAN NUM11ER OP INCORRECT TURNS ON RECALL OP NAZE POR ALL
INTLRPERENCE CROUPS. SPATIAL 1NTERIERENCE P'(l,30) ■ 4.899, PR<.001
a moan number of 5.03 incorrect turns (Fig. 9.4 shows the moan 
number of incorrect turns per condition). No other effects wore 
significant.
TIME
A two-way ANOVA of the completion time on the maze resulted 
in a significant effect for the spatial content of the interference 
task, F(l,30)= 13.967, pr (.001. No other effects wore significant 
(see Table 9.6 for ANOVA summary). The moan completion time for 
subjects who had experienced the maze as an interference stimulus was
46.04 secs. Those subjects who had not experienced the maze as an 
interference stimulus had a mean completion time of 90.17 secs. (Fig.9.5 
shows the mean completion time per condition).
(5) Regression Analysis
Finally a regression analysis (summarised in Table 9.7) was 
performed, rogressing each subject's error score on tho linear posi­
tioning task against tho recall trial number. Taking f, the slopo 
coefficient, ns an indication of any linear trend in error over trials 
it can bo soon that tho majority of subjects had no such trend. Ilowovor, 
there aro six exceptions to this, four out of tho six subjects in tho 
auditory spatial (AS) condition have relatively high (approx. 1.0)p 
coefficient, ns does one subject in tho visual spatial condition.
Subject 1 in the motor spatial condition (MS) has a high negative 
ooef I'leli'itl suggesting a negative trend In the size of his/her error 
score as the trial mimhor increases.
Inspection of tho intercept coefficients (oC) shows that in 
those conditions whore a significant bins occurred in terms of CE,
-  2 3 3
SOURCE Sums of 
Squares
Df Moan
Squero
F ratio Pr level
A. Spatial Content 17525.40 1 17525.40 13.967 <.001 ***
D. Source of stimuli 3309.53 2 1654.76 1.319 >.05 NS
AXB Interaction 2206.90 2 1103.45 O .879 >.05 NS
Error 37643.80 30 1254.79
Total 60685.63 35
Tablo 9*6 Experiment VI: ANOVA Sumnmry for completion timo on mazo
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EXPERIMENT YL
VS = VISUAL/SPATIAL (MAZE) 
VNS = VISUAL/NQNSPATIAL 
MS = MOIOR/SPATIAL (MAZE) 
MNS = MÜTÜR/NÜNSPATIAL 
AS = AUDITORY/SPATIAL (MAZE) 
ANS ■= AUD1TORY/NONSPATIAL
Interference Stimulus
pin. 9.T MIAN COMPLETION TIME UN MAZE FOR LAG I INTERFERENCE GROUP 
(SPATIAL • MAZE)
SPATIAL INTERFERENCE (MAZE) 1(1,30) - 13.967, l’R.<.001
Subject
Visual
Spatial
Auditory-
Spatial
Motor
Spatial
Visual
non-
Spatial
Auditory
non-
Spatial
Motor
non-
Spatial
1 * 
t>
0.467
-0.112
-26.400
-0.964
2.600
-O.963
3.930
-O.OO6
6.330
0.139
8.733
-O.17O
2 •* 
P
-0.900
0.109
-4.867
O .830
I.60O
-0.400
2.867
O .188
4.933
0.084
4.6OO
-O.036
3 «  
P
-6.930
0.897
0.670
-0.012
-I.93O
-0.176
5.400
O .073
3.670
0.024
5.330
-0.024
4 <
P
-3.500
0.091
3.730
O .667
-O.367
-0.197
11.200
0.273
5.067
0.024
5.470
-0.103
5 •* 
P
0.400
-0.036
-0.933
1.350
-0.333
0.106
5.130
0.139
6.200
-0.091
7.600
-0.200
6 “* 
fi
-3.000
-O.109
1.400
-0.218
0.200
0.360
7.100
-0.136
5.330
-0.079
4.130
0.321
Tnlilo 9.7 Kx|>oriiiiont VI« UojiroHHion Analysis; rooroHsinfl trini 
and error scoro for ondi subject in ondi oxporimontnl 
B ■ slopo coefficient, ■ intorcopt vnluo
numbor
condition.
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EXPERIMENT 3ZT
x= VISUAL INTERFERENCE
q= auditory interference
•= MOTOR INTERFERENCE
Fin. 0.7 MIAN' ERROR I’LK TRIAL M ill NONSI’A'JIAL INTERFERENCE.
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namely VNS, ANS, MNS, each subject has a high, positive, intercept 
value. This reflects the bins caused in memory hy imagining a larger 
(60 cm) movement. The intercept values of the VS, MS and AS groups 
are all either 0, or in some cases negative, reflecting no directionally 
specific biasing. Figures 9.6 and 9.7 show the mean error per trial for 
each stimulus source and each level of spatial content.
9.1.4. Discussion
The predicted suppression effect of spatial interference 
stimuli on imagery was found to occur with all such sources of stimu­
lation. In contrast none of the various interference tasks had a 
suppression effect on imagery in the non-spatial conditions. Assuming 
that interference is caused by competition for a specific resource then 
imagery of a linear movement seems to involve spatial processing. It 
has been argued in previous chapters that interference effects could 
be due to the general capacity loading by the stimulus rather than 
competition for a specific resource. In the present experiment the 
complexity of the stimulus was increased in terms of its spatial 
properties and it seems that it is primarily the spatial nature of 
the stimulus which is interfering with imagery.
The effects of the spatial interference stimuli in terms of 
VE are to increase the variability in all conditions over the non- 
spatial tasks. If, ns previously assumed, VE measures the strength 
of the memory trace, plus any noise within the motor output system, 
then wo can conclude from this high VE that spatial interference tasks 
are affecting memory. It seems that in this experiment, in addition 
to the suppression of imagery, the memory for the original movement is 
also being intorfered with.
namely VNS, ANS, MNS, each subject has a high, positive, intercept 
value. This reflects the bias caused in memory by imagining a larger 
(60 cm) movement. Tho intercept values of the VS, MS and AS groups 
are all either 0, or in some cases negative, reflecting no directionally 
specific biasing. Figures 9.6 and 9.7 show the mean error per trial for 
each stimulus source and each level of spatial content.
9.1.4. Discussion
Tho predicted suppression effect of spatial interference 
stimuli on imagery was found to occur with all such sources of stimu­
lation. In contrast none of the various interference tasks had a 
suppression effect on imagery in the non-spatial conditions. Assuming 
that interference is caused by competition for a specific resource then 
imagery of a linear movement seems to involve spatial processing. It 
has been argued in previous chapters that interference effects could 
be due to the general capacity loading by the stimulus rather than 
competition for a specific resource. In the present experiment the 
complexity of the stimulus was increased in terms of its spatial 
properties and it seems that it is primarily the spatial nature of 
the stimulus which is interfering with imagory.
Tho offects of the spatial interference stimuli in terms of 
VE are to increase the variability in all conditions over the non- 
spatial tasks. If, ns previously assumed, VE measures tho strength 
of tho memory trace, plus any noiso within the motor output system, 
then we can conclude from this high VE that spatial Interference tasks 
are affecting memory. It seems that in this experiment, in addition 
to tho suppression of imagery, the memory for tho original movement is 
also being interfered with.
0 . 2 Sninni.-iry and Conclusions
Tho interference effect on memory and suppression of 
imagery is evident by the increased variability in recall of the 
criterion movement, and the lack of any directionally specific 
biasing. Thus subjects are not being influenced by any images they 
may have produced, but their memory for the correct movement is being 
disrupted by a highly spatial task. This effect is not so surprising 
if one considers how images of linear positioning movements and linear 
movements themselves might bo related. Imagery seems to bo a memory 
process involving tho recall of specific information. In order to 
remember movements along a linear track subjects may bo remembering 
tho position in space of tho movement, (i.o. its start and end points 
and the direction of travel). When asked to imagine another linear 
movement along tho same track they use existing information from 
memory about linear movements but adapt this by storing tho new end 
points (in this experiment tho start point never varied). It may well 
bo that bocatiMO of tho similarity between tho two points within tho 
same frame a bins is caused in memory. A similar argument has boon 
put forward by Fishhurno (19^0) for biasing enusod by actual inter­
polated movements. Interestingly, these biases only occur whon tho 
two movement lengths nro within certain ranges. Onco tho new inovcmont 
is much smaller or much larger than tho old movement no systematic 
biasing occurs. Thus images and movements involving linear spatial 
relatlouslitps are related in memory processing.
It is t>osslti1e that interference stimuli which affect imagery 
will also affect memory for movements themselves. Thoroforo, it seems 
that a task such ns mn/.o learning containing n relatively high propor-
- 2^0 -
tion of spatial information interferes with a spatial memory system 
that is used to remember movements and produce images of movements.
Those subjects who had been presented with information 
relating to the maze had fewer errors and faster completion times, 
when subsequently tested on the maze itself, than those who had 
experienced other forms of interference. This suggests that some use 
was made of the maze information and that it had been stored in memory. 
If one assumes that those experiments are primarily concerned with 
"working memory" rather than long term memory then the most recent 
information being about the maze would bo the best recalled. Mitch 
(1980) describes working memory ns being rather like a blackboard on 
which things arc written and then wiped clean ready for the next entry, 
or in some cases, by the next entry.
Maddcloy and Hitch (197^) developed the concept of working 
memory ns an extension of short-term memory, but as a more genornl 
purpose system. Working memory is best considered ns consisting of 
separable sub-systems. Mitch (1980) identifies four such sub-systems, 
tho input rogistor, the articulatory output system, a control executive 
nnd a visual-spatial store. Tho input rogistor and articulatory output 
systems, nro both used for verbal mnterinl, whilst tho visunl/spntinl 
system is assumed to handlo non-verbal material. Mitch (1980) has 
investigated tho role of working memory for verbal material but has 
little to say about its role in visual-spatial information processing. 
Kncontly, Maddoloy (l90l) has begun to focus upon tho visual-spatial 
store but ns yet only its mere existence has been postulated. It 
seems, howover, that experiments such ns those of Phillips and Christie 
(1977 (a), (b)) Involving visual storage and suppression effocts will
bo most useful in investigating the visual-spatial store.
One suggestion, Baddoley (l98l), is that the visual-spatial 
store is rather like a sketch pad, such as a child's "etch-a-skotch", 
on which pictorial information can be represented, but which can be 
written over by further visual-spatial inputs. It seems that the 
concept of working memory and in particular the sub-system assumed 
to be concerned with visual-spatial information boars a close 
relationship with the visual-spatial properties of images. The 
results of Experiments II to VI all suggest that in imagining linear 
positioning movements subjects generate or transform a representation 
of visual-spatial information in something which may well be called 
"working memory". Particularly the results of Experiment VI suggest 
that this visual/spatial store can be re-written by incoming visual- 
spatial information.
CHAPTER TEN
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN IMAGERY AND MEMORY 
FOR LINEAR POSITIONING MOVEMENTS
It is suggested that images of linear movements and actual 
linear movements are related through a memory representation system.
In the case of linear positioning movements it seems that movements 
and images of movements share a common spatial representation system, 
noth linear movements and images of those movements involve the 
representation of spatial information in memory. In order to be able 
to remember correctly a particular linear movement subjects encode and 
store such spatial information as the start and end points of the 
movement, the direction of the movement, the distance from the start 
to the end point and other information relating the desired end point 
to other frames of reference such as their own body and objects in the 
same visual field. The production of an imago of a linear movemont 
also appears to be based on spatial information. It has boon repeatedly 
shown in past exporimenta that only 2nd order intorforonco tasks which 
involve subjects in processing spatial information suppress imagery 
offocts.
Whilst the experimental ovidonco for spatial processing in 
image generation is quite strong tho link hotwoon images and movements 
in terms of a spatial representation system is only speculative. In 
Experiment VI it seemed that tho 2nd order interference task with a 
spatial component not only intorforod with imagery of a novel 60 cm 
movement, but also interfered with memory for tho correct 45 cm 
movement. Although tho experiment was not dosignod to investigato
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memory for movements directly, it seems that if one is to explain 
how imaocs are generated and how they are capable of producing a 
bias in memory for movements then some comnon source for both images 
and movements must exist.
10.1. Experiment VII
If images of linear movements and actual linear movements are 
both generated from the same representational base in memory, then 
those 2nd order interference tasks which have previously boen shown 
to interfere with image production should also affect subjects' 
recall of a standard linear movement when no imagery is required. Thus 
if movements and images of movements have a common source which is 
based on a spatial representation system, a task involving spatial 
processing interpolated between learning and recall of a standard 45 cm 
linear movement should interfere with the recall of that movement. 
Alternatively, if imagos and movement do not share a common spatial 
representation system then tasks with a spatial component which 
suppressed image production should not interfere with memory for a 
45 cm movoment.
Consequently this experiment aims to investigate how images 
and movomouts are related. It is assumed that tasks which interfere 
with either Imagery, motor memory or both, do so because a particular 
resource normally used for those purposes is being utilised by the
f
interference task
10.1.1. Method
(1) Experimental Design
A two-factor independent groups design was used. Spatial 
content had two levels, high and low, while stimulation source had 
three levels, visual, auditory/vcrbnl and motor/kinnesthetic, giving 
a total of six experimental groups.
(2) Subjects
36 right-handed subjects were randomly selected from a pool 
of 42 volunteers who were all taking a first year undergraduate course 
in psychology at Warwick University. An equal number of male and 
female subjects was assigned to each of the six experimental groups 
(six subjects per group).
(3) Apparatus
As in Experiment VI.
(4) Task/Procoduro
All subjocts wore required to loam a 45 cm movement from right 
to left along tho hidden track. Each movement was determined by a 
start and stop block along tho track and had accompanying warning 
lights signalling where tho two points were, and when each movement 
was to bogin. As in provious experiments subjects performed 15 learning 
trials. This was followed by a 50 sec retention interval during which 
time one of six typos of interpolated tasks was performed. The inter­
polated tnsks wore ns in Experiment VI, visual spatial (VS), auditory/ 
verbal spatial (AS), motorAinaesthetic spatial (MS), visual non- 
spatlnl (VNS), auditory non-spatial (ANS), motor non-spatial (MNS).
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Following the retention interval all subjects had ton trials 
at recalling the original 45 cm movement with the stop and cue lights 
removed. Finally all subjects were tested for speed and accuracy on 
the maze as in Experiment VI.
10.1.2. Results
Data were collected for all subjects' errors in positioning 
movements at recall and their total time and number of false turns on 
the maze.
(1) Positioning Movement Errors
Error to the nearest 0.5 cm from the 45 cm point was recorded 
from which CE and VE scores were calculated as in previous experiments 
(a summary is shown in Appendix I). The mean and standard error of 
these CE and VE scores in each experimental condition is shown in 
Table 10.1.
(2) Constant Error (CE)
Analysis of tho amount of bias in each subject's memory1 for 
the 45 cm movement showod that neither the spatial content nor the 
source of tho stimuli affected the amount of bias (Table 10.2 shows 
the ANOVA summary for CE). The mean constant error for each condition 
shown in Figuro 10.1 does not significantly vary. If, howevor, one 
looks at the standard errors of these means in Table 10.1 one can see 
that the throe conditions in which there was a high spatial interference 
task (namely a maze) these are 6.07, 5»97 and 5»19| compared with 
0.77, 0.60 nnd 1.20 for tho non-spntlal conditions. This shows that 
the effects of a spatial interference task introduced a largo Amount 
of variation between subjects in tho terms of their error, somo of
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vs AS MS VNS ANS MNS
X 2.25 2.30 1.42 -0.68 0.25 0.23
CE
SQ 6.07 5.97 5.19 0.77 0.60 1.2 1
X 2.17 1.68 1.76 0.70 0.77 0.6l
VE
se 0.49 0.40 0.6i 0.17 0.17 0.20
Tallio 10,1 Exporimont Vili Sunrmry of monti (X) and stnndnrd orror («o).
CE and VE for ondi exporimontnl condltion mamntrcd In cms.
SOURCE Sums of 
Squares
Df Mean
Square
F Ratio Pr level
A. Spatial Content 7.362 1 7.362 0.434 ) .05 NS
11. Stimulus source 23.430 2 12.719 0.749 >.05 NS
AXll Interaction 29.475 2 14.738 0.868
in0• NS
Error 509.135 30 16.971
Total 639.410 35
T alilo  10#2 E x p e rim e n t V I I j  ANOVA Summary f o r  s p a t i a l  c o n te n t  and so u rce
o f  s t i m u l i  in  to rm s o f  t h e  c o n s ta n t  e r r o r  (CE) a t  r o c a l l  o f
45 cm movoinont
E X P E R I M E N T  H I
VS = VISUAL/SI’ATIAL (MAZE) 
VNS = VISUAL/NONSPATIAL 
MS = MOTOR/SPAT IAL (MAZE)
MNS = MOTOR/NONSPATIAL 
AS = AUDITORY/SPATIAL (MAZE) 
ANS = AUDITORY/NQNSPATIAL
(SPATIAL ■ M\ZL).
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which wore positive, others negative. Consequently the moan bins is 
not greater than that of the non-spatial interference groups.
(3) Variable Error (VE)
The amount of variation within a subject's series of recall 
trials was analysed by a two way ANOVA. The results showed that the 
level of spatial content of the interference stimulus significantly 
affected VE, F(l,30)= 85.511, pr <.001. The moan VE for subjects in 
the high spatial content (maze) condition was 1.8 7 ems while subjects 
in the low spatial condition had a moan VE of O .69 cms. No other 
effects wore significant. Fig. 10.2 shows the moan VE for each 
experimental condition, while Table 10.3 shows the ANOVA summary.
(A) Mazo Performance
Table 10.A shows the moan and standard error of completion 
time and number of incorrect turns on a final tost of all subjects' 
performance on the mazo.
TIME
A two-way ANOVA of subjects' completion times rosultod in a 
significant main offoot for tho spatial content of the interference 
stimulus, F(1 ,30)b 157»21A pr (.001 (soo Table 10.5). Tho moan comple­
tion time for subjects who had tho maze ns an intorforonco stimulus was 
AA.J6 secs, while subjocts who did not have tho maze ns an intorforonco 
stimulus had a mean completion time of 103.79 secs (soo Fig. 10.3).
No other effects were signifleant.
ERRORS
Analysis of tho number of incorrect turns rosultod in a signi­
ficant offoct for tho spatial contout F(1,30)* 101.292, pr <.0Ol (soo 
Tablo 10.6). Tho moan numbor of incorrect turns for subjocta who had
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SOURCE Sums of 
Squares
Df Moan
Square
F ratio Pr level
A. Spatial Content 12.567 1 12.567 83.511 <.001 ***
D. Stimulus source 0.420 2 0.210 1.427 >.05 NS
AXD Interaction 0.470 2 0.235 1.600 >.05 NS
Error 4.409 30 0.147
Total 17.866 35
T a b le  10 .3 E xp erim en t V I I i  ANOVA Sunmnry f o r  s p a t i a l  c o n te n t  anil Hourco
o f  s t im u lu s  in  tornm  o f  th o  v n r i a b l o  e r r o r  (VE) a t  r o c n l l  o f
45 cm movement
SOURCE Sums of 
Squares
Df Moan
Square
F ratio Pr level
A. Spatial Content 12.567 1 12.567 85.511 <.001 ***
D. Stimulus source 0.420 2 0.210 1.427 >.05 NS
AXH Interaction O.47O 2 0.235 I.600 >.05 NS
Error 4.409 30 0.147
Total 17.866 33
T n lilo  10.3 Ex]»orliiiont V i l i  ANOVA Summary fo r  « p a t in i  c o n te n t  and so u r c e
o f  s t im u lu s  ln  to rm s o f  tlio  v n r i a b lo  o r r o r  (VE) a t  r o c a l l  o f
45 cm movomont
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VS = 
VNS 
MS = 
MNS
Interference Stimulus
VISUAL/SPATIAL (MAZE)
= VISUAL/NQNSPATIAL 
MOTOR/SPATIAL (MAZE)
= MÜTOR/NONSl’ATLAL 
AUDITORY/SPATIAL (MAZE) 
= AUD1TORY/NONSPATIAL
fio.io.2 MEAN VAIUAWÜ I.KHUK (VI.) IVK ALL I Ml HI EKENC1! GROUPS
(SPATIAL • MAZE). SPAT1AI. JNTIKI I.UENGE 1(1,30) - 85.5 l’K< .001
oro _
Mazo as interference Other interference
VS MS AS VNS MNS AS
Incorrect X 
turns
so
Completion X 
Time
. Sees. so
1.67
1.21
36.42
11.60
1.67
1.03
47.83
11.39
2.83
0.75
48.83
8.23
7.00
1.79
103.67
13.09
______
6.83
1.47
100.00
22.03
7.17
2.l4
107.50
14.88
________
Tallin 10.4 lixpnrlmniil VHt Moan (x) ami standard om*r (h o ) of iho 
number of lncorroct turns and completion time« for all 
subjects' porfomianco on tlio maze
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SOURCE Sums of 
Squares
Df Mean
Square
F ratio Pr level
A. Spatial Content 31713.700 1 31713.7 157.214 <.001 ***
13. Stimulus Source 396.375 2 198.188 0.982 >.05 NS
AX13 Interaction 343.406 2 171.703 0.851 >.05 NS
Error 6051.700 30 201.723
Total 33055.181 35
T a b le  10.5 Experiment VTIi ANOVA Summary for completion time on mazo
E X P E R I M E N T  S H
VS *= VISUAL/SPATIAL (MAZE) 
VNS = VISUAL/NONSPAT 1AL 
MS - MDTOR/SPATIAL (MAZE)
MNS = MOTOR/NONSl’AT IAL 
AS = AUPITORY/SPATIAL (MAZE) 
ANS = Al U) ITORY/NONSPAT IAL
Interference Stimulus
l'ifl.10.3 Ml .AN COMPLETION TIM. I OR ALL 1NTLRERRENCL GROUPS UN M\ZE 
(SPATIAL - MAZE).
SPATIAL 1NTRIUT.RLNCE (MAZE) l (J,i^O) ■ 157.J]<1 PR < .001
boon given the maze as ail interference stimulus was 2.06 turns, while 
subjects who had not been given the maze had a mean of 7 incorrect 
turns (see Fig. 10.4). No other significant effects were found.
(5) Regression Analysis
Finally a regression analysis was performed on each subject's 
error scores for the linear positioning task. As in previous experiments 
the recall trial number and the appropriate error for the 45 cm point 
were regressed for all subjects (see Table 10.7 for a summary). It can 
bo seen from Table 10.7 that in the non-spatial interference conditions 
tho intercept value (ec) for all subjects is uniformly low and the slope 
coefficient P is also low, indicating that subjects had a uniform error 
pattern which was low and constant.
Subjects in tho spatial interference conditions have a completely 
different series of intercept values (<) which tend to bo high positive 
or high negative values, whilst their slope coefficients (jj) are low.
This suggests that subjects in tho spatial interference conditions woro 
not uniformly biased in thoir rocall responses but woro, however, 
seriously affected by tho intorforonco task. Docauso some subjects had 
high positive error scores while others had high nogativo tho moan error 
per trial is not a reliable indicator of tho group data, therefore no 
further analysis over trials is possible.
10.1.". Ill m c i i m mIoii
Tho results of this experiment strongly suggost that linear 
positioning movements are produced with roforenco to a spatial represen­
tational system. It has boon shown that tasks with a high spatinl com­
ponent (mazes) interfere with tho subject's memory for a linear position-
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SOIIIICE Sums of 
Square
Df
A. Spatial Component 220.02« 1
B. Stimulus Source 4.056 2
AXB Interaction 1.722 2
Error 65.167 30
Total 290.973 35
Moan
Square
F ratio Pr level
220.02« 101.292 <.001 ***
2.028 0.93'* >.05 NS
O .861 0.396 >.05 NS
2.172
Tnblo 10.6 Experiment VII» ANOVA Summary for numbor of incorroct 
turn« on mn/,o
E X P E R I M E N T  Y U
VS = VISUAL/SPATLAL (MAZE) 
VNS = VISUAL/NONSPATIAL 
MS = MOTOR/SPATIAL (MAZE) 
MNS = MOTOR/NONSPATIAL 
AS = AUD1TORY/SPATIAL (MAZE) 
AN'S = AUDITORY/NCNSPATIAL
Fio»10.4
o
dz
c
2
z
Interference Stimulus
Mb\N NUMBER OI: lNGORREGT IlIRNS ON REGU.E Ul M\ZL 1 OR ALE INTERFERENCE GROUPS
(SPATIAL - MAZE)
SPATIAL 1NTLRPERENQ; l'(i,30) ■ 101.21».! l’R<.OUl
2 5 8
Subject
Visual
Spatial
Visual
Non-
Spatial
Motor
Spatial
Motor
Non-
Spatial
Auditory-
Spatial
Auditory
Non-
Spatial
1 •c -5.07 1.07 0.27 -1.07 4.13 0.53
P -0.30 -0.08 -0.68 -0.20 0.27 0.02
2 •c 5.13 0.87 4.60 2.4l 5.60 -1.00
p 0.19 -0.12 0.38 -0.19 -0.12 0.05
3 oC 6.6o -0.73 -3.00 0.67 7.50 0.53
P 0.00 0.06 -0.38 0.06 -0.30 0.05
4 ex? -3.70 -1.73 -4.53 -0.27 7.33 -0.20
/> -0.10 0.06 -0.03 -0.01 0.08 0.07
5 « 4.87 0.27 4.00 -1.07 -0.13 -I.60
P 0.08 -0.07 -0.09 -o.o4 -0.63 0.27
6 *  i 7.C>7 0.00 -3.60 1.47 -5.4o 0.731_ * -0.23 | 0 .11 -0.33 -0.05 -0.25 -o.o4
Table 10.7 Experiment VTIt Repression analysis, repress!up rocnll
trials number apainst orror Hcoro for oncli subject in oacli 
condition (rc) ■ intercept, (fl) ■ «lope coofficiont
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ing movement. Tasks with a very low spatial information component had 
little or no effects on the subject's recall of a linear movement. 
Therefore it seems that the subject's memory for a linear movement is 
represented in terms of the spatial characteristic mentioned earlier.
It is interesting to note that the effects of the maze inter­
ference tasks on subjects' memory for the linear movements wore not 
biasing, as imagery or production of a linear movement arc. Instead, 
subjects who had boon presented with the maze as an interference 
stimulus, experienced a "forgetting" of whore the 45 cm position was.
The error patterns of those subjects show that somo subjects overshot 
the 45 cm point by as much as 7 cm while others undershot by similar 
or oven greater amounts. Furthermore, individual subjocts varied 
considerably in their own positioning movoinonts over the ton recall 
trials. The variable error (VE) scores for each of the subjocts who 
wore presented with the maze during the retention interval is consi­
derably greater than that of the non-spntial intorforonco groups.
Givon the two component model of VE described earlier it soems 
possible that the grontor amount of variation introduced by the spatial 
intorforonco task is a result of intorforonco to the memory trace for 
tlio 45 cm movomont.
The implications of this experiment when taken with the 
results of the previous experiments on imagery are to suggest that 
linear positioning movements and images of those movements have a common 
baso. More precisely this common basis comprises a spatial representa­
tional system in memory. This suggests that imagos and learned movements 
specifically linoar positioning movements, are generated from n memory
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store which contains representations of spatial information.
One important finding is that linear positioning movements 
appear to bo remembered not in terms of their motoric or temporal 
qualities, nor in terms of their sensory qualities, instead it seems 
as if thoy arc remembered as abstract representations of spatial 
information. As those experiments have only used linear positioning 
movements it is not possible to generalise those conclusions to all 
movements. It docs seem, however, that in movements which are 
primarily concerned witli arriving at a specific point in space, memory 
for those movements is based on spatial information, ns suggested by 
llownrth (1970) •
The analyses of the subsequent performance on the linear maze 
showed that those subjects who had boon given information about the 
maze ns an interference stimulus wore faster and more accurate at 
finding their way through tho maze. This suggests that the memory 
trace for tho 45 cm positioning movement was overshadowed by storage 
of tho corroct path through tho mazo.
10.2. Summary and Conclusions
Tho results of all tho provious experiments in this study seem 
to point towards the importance of spatial information ill tho recall 
and imagery of linear positioning movements. If, as Hitch (l'jHo) and 
Hnddoloy (l9fll) suggost, a general purposo system such ns working 
memory oxists, then it seems that linonr positioning movements nro 
represented in tho visunl-spntini store, or nt least tho visual-spatial 
aspects of thosa movements. At tho samo time as providing a store for
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visual-spatial information, this sub-system also permits further 
processing operations to be carried out on the information contained 
therein. There is a distinction, however, between images generated 
from a permanent store and more transient representations in a short­
term store. The latter would seem to apply to working memory, and 
are concerned with phenomenon as that reported in the experiments of 
Phillips and Christie (1977 (a), (b)).
Following the presentation of a visual-spatial stimulus certain 
properties of the stimulus are found to exist longer than the presentation 
period and longer than would be permitted by an iconic store, Neissor 
(1966). Images generated from long-term memory, however, arc less tied 
to the previous stimulus and consequently may have different processing 
characteristics. It is not clear whether those two typos of visual- 
spatial representations reflect the same system being operated under 
different circumstances or two different systems. There appears to be 
some similarity between tho concept of a visual-spatial storo in working 
memory and Kosslyn's (1900) notion of a visual buffor in his model of 
mental imagery. Kosslyn's model of mental imagory devotes a dual rolo 
to tho "visual buffor" of representing irnngos generated from long-term 
memory and tho short-term storage of visual spatial information.
Experiments VI and VII do not distinguish botwcon short-torm 
storage and images generated from long term memory. It might ho arguod 
that these experiments are primarily concerned with short-term storage, 
except that when subjects aro asked to imagino a linear-positioning 
movement this is in fact a novol movement. However, tho movomont is 
similar to a previously produced movement, except that some form of 
information processing must transform tho momory for n 45 cm linoar
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visual-spatial information, this sub-system also permits further 
processing operations to be carried out on the information contained 
therein. There is a distinction, however, between images generated 
from a permanent store and more transient representations in a short­
term store. The latter would seem to apply to working memory, and 
are concerned with phenomenon as that reported in the experiments of 
Phillips and Christie (1977 (a), (b)).
Following the presentation of a visual-spatial stimulus certain 
properties of the stimulus are found to exist longer than the presentation 
period and longer than would be permitted by an iconic store, Neissor 
(1966). Images goneratod from long-term memory, however, arc loss tied 
to the previous stimulus and consequently may have different processing 
characteristics. It is not clear whother those two typos of visual- 
spatial representations reflect the same system being operated under 
different circumstances or two different systems. Thoro appears to bo 
some similarity botwoon tho concopt of a visual-spatial storo in working 
memory and Kosslyn's (19^0) notion of a visual buffer in his modol of 
mental imagery. Kosslyn's modol of mental imagory dovotos a dual role 
to tho "visual buffer" of representing iinagos gonoratod from long-torm 
memory and tho short-term storage of visual spatial information.
Experiments VI and VII do not distinguish botwoon short-term 
storage and images generated from long term memory. It might bo arguod 
that these experiments are primarily concerned with short-term storage, 
except that when subjects are asked to imagine a linear-positioning 
movement this is in fact a novel movement. However, tho movomont is 
similar to a previously produced movement, oxcept that some form of 
information processing must transform tho momory for a U'i cm linoar
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movement into nn imago of a f>0 cm linear positioning movement. 
Because of these distinctions between images generated from long­
term memory and short-term visual-spatial storage it is not clear 
whether similar interference effects should bo found for images
generated from long term memory, although one might expect little 
difference between the two representations.
CHAPTER ELEVEN
IMAGERY EFFECTS IN A PRESSURE LEARNING TASK
Previous experiments have shown that images of linear 
positioning movements or the rehearsal of those movements consists 
of manipulating the spatial component of a memory representation.
This has been shown consistently throughout this series of experiments. 
Furthermore it appears that this is not purely a function of the visual 
system, but of a more abstract spatial representation. However, all 
past experiments in this series featured a linear-positioning task, 
which is primarily a spatial task, since it is the distance/location 
of a movement that has to be remembered. Therefore, tho predominant 
features of the memory representation for this task aro probably 
spatial.
It could bo tho case that a task which had different features 
to he romomborod would result in a different kind of rehearsal and 
imagery. For instance, ono hypothesis, which has been rojcctod by 
tho past experiments, is that rehoarsal or imagory involves neuro­
muscular activation. It may bo possible that a task which primarily 
concerns motor activity but with a vory low spatial information com­
ponent will bo rohoarsod in such a manner. Learning a prossuro is a 
good example of a task which has vory little spatial information 
(apart from the direction of tho pressure, up, down, etc.), Auuolt
(1939).
Popper and llormnn (1970) hnvo shown that a similar biasing
of memory occurs wlion subjects are required to first loam ono prossuro,
- 264 -
then during a retention interval are required to learn a novel 
pressure. The result is that subsequent recall of the original 
pressure contains an error which is biased towards the intervening 
novel pressure. If imagery of movements is indeed varied according 
to the task in hand, then in imagining a pressure subjects should 
not use spatial information, but some other kind of task relevant 
information.
It is possible that in tasks of this nature, which require 
subjects to learn and remember a specific pressure then "force" may 
bo the most important parameter. Information regarding the force 
applied during a particular motor response can bo fed back via the 
proprioceptive and kinacsthctic receptors in the joint and muscle 
groups, Kelso and Stclmach (1976). However, feedback is not only the 
moans for controlling force. Under an oscillatory mechanism, as 
described by Gallistel (19^0), force parameters can bo specified prior 
to output. In recording forces it is difficult to distinguish between 
force applied at tlio termination of the motor act and the force applied 
during its execution unless continuous recording is used. Gallistcl 
shows that changes in force output during motor acts can bo determined 
in advance by oscillatory units. This suggosts that forco is an 
important parameter for motor control and may bo determined by "higher" 
levels of the motor output systom.
11.1. Kvporimonl VTT1
If subjects can and do use some alternative information to 
gonorate Images then bins in recalling a pressure whon tho intervening
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pressure is imagined should occur. This imagery produced bias should 
be similar to that produced by exerting a novel pressure during the 
retention interval.
Alternatively, if imagery or rehearsal of movements is pri­
marily concerned with rehearsing spatial information, then no equivalent 
bias should occur. If this is the case then the errors produced by 
imagining a novel pressure should bo no different from those produced 
by a control group who simply count backwards in threes.
11.1.1. Method
(l) Experimental Design
A one way independent groups design was used, with typo of 
intervening task as the independent variable and CE and VE as the 
dependent variables. Type of intervening task had three levels, 
producing a novel pressure, imagining a novel pressure, or counting 
backwards.
(2) Subjects
l8 undorgraduato studonts from the Psychology Department of 
Warwick University who had volunteered to take part in the experiment 
wore assigned to one of the experimental conditions. Each group 
contained 6 subjects (3 male, 3 fomalo). Only right-handed voluntoers 
wore used.
(~) Apparatus
As shown in Figure 11.1 a stool handlo was mounted 00 cm from 
the floor in a wooden frame. Tito handle matte contact with a vortical 
stool rod which transferred any pressure on the handle to a spring
Tiß 11.1 Fressure recording àppârdtus 
used in experiment iä ü
loaded weighing scale which recorded the amount of pressure exerted.
The handle also made contact with a micro switch which could bo sot 
at different positions. As the required pressure was reached a buzzer 
sounded. The total amount of movement in the handle was only 1 cm 
(i.o. 0.5 cm either up or down).
() Task/Procoduro
All subjects were first required to learn a 15 kg downward 
pressure by pressing down on the handle until a buzzer sounded. On 
hearing the buzzer subjects wore instructed to maintain that pressure 
for 2 secs until the experimenter instructed them to release the handle. 
Following a further 2 secs pause subjects wore required to again press 
down on the handle. This was repeated 15 times. After learning a 
15 kg pressure in this manner subjects engaged in one of the three 
intervening tasks depending upon which experimental group they were in.
11.1.2» Intervening Tasks
(1) Producing a 30 kg pressure ("OP)
Subjects in this group woro then roquirod to learn a now 
pressure, 30 kg, by exerting twice the original forco on tho handle.
Tills time tho buzzer sounded when a 30 kg prossuro rogistorod on tho 
scale. Subjocts had 10 trials at producing tho now prossuro.
(2) Imagining a 30 kg pressure (301)
This group of subjects was instructed to imagine that they 
woro now pressing down on tho liandlo twico ns hard ns before, to achieve 
a 30 kg pressure. They were providod with buzzer feedback and commands 
to grasp and release tho handle by tho oxporimontor, but no overt
movements were made and the apparatus was not touched by the subject.
As in the 30P group subjects bad 10 trials at imagining this .activity.
(3) Counting backwards (CH)
The control group of subjects wore required to count backwards 
in threes during the retention interval from a 3 figure random number.
All subjects had a 50 sec retention interval. Immediately 
following the retention interval subjects were instructed to reproduce 
the 15 kg pressure 10 times. Each recall trial was started by the 
experimenter, but no feedback from the buzzer was available. Subjects 
wore instructed to say "now" when they thought they had reached the 
correct pressure and then maintain it for 2 secs until the experimenter 
said "release".
1 1 . 1 . 3 .  l i e s u l t s
The error of each recall trials from the 15 kg point was 
noted together with the sign of the error. From this CE and VE scores 
for each subject wore calculated (see Appendix J). The moan CE and VE 
scores for each condition arc shown in Table 11.1.
(1) Constant Error
Analyses of the amount of bins at rocall woro carried out by 
inputting subjects' CE scores to n one-way ANOVA. The results of this 
ANOVA showed that type of intervening task had a significant effect, on 
the amount of bins (CE), F(2,15)- l44.857i pr <.001. (Soo Table 11.2 
for ANOVA summary).
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SOURCE Sums of 
Squares
Df Mean
Square
F ratio Pr level
Intervening task 119.941 2 59.971 144.857 <.001 ***
Error 6.210 15 o.4i4
Total 126.151 17
Tnl.lo 11.2 Experiment VIIIt ANOVA Summaryf one-way imlopoiulont 
groups -  CK
- D71
Decomposition of the significant effect using Tukoy's 
USD (a) tost showed that producing a 30 kg pressure (30P) resulted 
in significantly greater bias than imagining a 30 kg pressure (301).
There was no difference, however, between the amount of bias produced 
by the 301 group and the counting backwards group, (sec Table 11.3 
for differences between means and Fig. 11.2)
(2) Variable Error (VE)
Analysis of the strength of the memory trace, as measured 
by VE, in a one-way independent group ANOVA showed that typo of inter­
vening task had a significant effect, F(2,15)= 7»790, pr (.005. (see 
ANOVA summary in Table 11.4)
Decomposition of the significant offoct for typo of intervening 
task using Tukoy's USD (a) tost showed that counting backwards in threes 
had a lower VE than producing a 30 kg pressure. There was no significant 
difference betweon imagining and producing a 30 kg pressure} (Table
11.5 and Figuro 11.3 show the individual means for each condition), nor 
botwoon imagining a pressure and counting backwards.
Finally, although the lovol of VE is relatively low in all 
conditions Figuro 11.4 suggests that tho higher VE score found in the 
production of a 30 kg pressure is accounted for by a negative trend.
It can bo soon that tho moan pattern of errors for trials in tho 301 
and Cll conditions have a similar function with no trend. Tho 30P 
condition has a completely difforent function, in which the amount of 
error reduces over trials. Because of tho relatively low variability 
(VE) n regression analysis would add very little furthor information.
Tnl)lo 11.3 Exporimont VIIIi l)ifform ico« Itotwoon monti CE for ondi
typo of intorvonino tank. * * < 0.01 pr lovol of «inni ficnnco 
on Tukoy'i» USD (n) tont.
no. 11 *2 Mean Constant Error for each type 
of 1st Order interference
EXPERIMENT ¿ 0 1
30 Kg 30 Kg
Type of Interference (1st Order) 
F,2,15 -  HA-857 Pr<-001
»  2 7 4
SOURCE Sums of 
Squares
Df Moan
Square
F ratio Pr level
Intorvoning task 3.483 2 1.742 7.790 <.005 **
Error 3.353 15 0.223
Total 6.836 17
Tallin ||.4 Kx|H«rlmi’ iit VI I I :  ANOVA Suii«iiaryt one-way iu<lo|>oniloiit 
group* -  VE
X
I 
o
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30P
X=1.65
301
x=l,01
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X=0.58
30P
X=1.65 0,64 1.07 **
301
X=l.0i 0.43
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x =o ,5 8
Tallin 11,5 ICxporimont VIIIi Uifforoiico« botwoon monti« VIC l'or ondi
typo of iiitorvoiiiim tn«k. •* <»01 pr lovol of «ioniflcnnco 
on Tukoy*« USD (n) to«t
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Fi<i. n .5 Mean Variable Error for each type 
of 1st Order interference
EXPERIMENT M I
Type of Interference (1st Order) 
F2,15-7-79, Pr< 005
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4 Mean Effect per trial of Imagining or producing a novel 
force on memory fora 15 Kg downward force
EXPERIMENT Y D I
x ■  Producing a 30 kg force during retention interval.
□  ■ Imagining producing a 30 Kg force during retention interval. 
• - Counting backwards during retention interval.
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11.1.^1. Discussion
Imagery of a pressure has boon shown not to have any 
biasing effect on memory for a learned pressure. The biasing effects, 
previously noted by Popper and Herman (1970) wore found when a novel 
pressure interferes with the learning and recall of a criterion 
pressure rosponso. The equivalence between images and linear 
positioning movements that was found in previous experiments has not 
boon found when the task involved exerting a pressure. The results 
of this experiment suggest that imagery of motor acts involves the 
manipulation of spatial information rather than force or pressure 
information.
In a debriefing session in which subjects were questioned 
about their imagery it was commonly stated by all subjects in the 
imagery condition that thoy had imagined pressing the handle. Thoir 
images consisted of "snapshots” of an arm holding the handle and tho 
handle travelling downwards. For example, subject L.P. was asked 
"what can you toll mo about your imagery?", to which it was replied 
"I imagined I was pushing down on tho handle. I could see my hand 
holding tho whito plastic grip on tho handle - it was my right hand.
The handle moved, downwards, much more than it did when I actually 
pushed it". Similarly subject C.D. in reply to tho same question 
reported "I imagined pushing tho bar downwards. I imagined tho 
distance I had to push tho bar and I was watching tho distance tho 
bar moved. It was a visual imago. I could not fool anything".
These reports suggest that subjoct* had indood fonnod an imago of 
"pressing tho handle twice ns hard" ns instructed. Tho images thoy 
formed, however, wore not motor images but quasi-pictorial imngos 
which primarily featured spatial information, i.o. tho downward movoinont
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of tho handle. It seems that the failure to bias recall of a pressure 
by imagery was primarily duo to the nature of the representation upon 
which an image generation process was activated. Subjects did not 
fail to produce an image but used inappropriate information to 
construct the image. It cannot bo concluded that imagery is confined 
to tho manipulation of spatial representations. It docs, however, 
appear that those subjects1 images contained spatial information, 
rather than, or in a greater proportion to, neuromuscular information.
There are some rather intriguing reports from child dovolop- 
niontalists such as Piagot that in somo cases images do produce biasing 
effects on force and pressure control. Young children, for example, 
arc often tricked by 2 identical amounts of plasticine, if one is 
rolled into a ball and tho other into a sausage shape. Dosidos 
judging tho sausage shape to contain more plasticine tho child, when 
being handed tho sausage shape, overestimates its weight and tho 
child's hand jumps uj>wnrd slightly, Piaget and Inhclder This
can bo explained if one assumes tho child is imagining what tho sausago 
shape should weigh and is producing an appropriate lifting forco. As 
tho woight has boon overestimated tho forco appliod is too great and 
ns a result tho hand rnisos slightly when tho plasticino is taken.
This intriguing phenomenon suggosts that in somo cases images 
can affect a force component of tho motor production systom. One does 
not, however, have to abandon a spatial representation stance to explain 
this offoct. Tho primary foaturo of tho sausage and ball effect is 
that size information is used to build tip expectations of weight.
Hence a size woight illusion is created, in which tho perceived sizes
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mislead the child's expectations about weight. This suggests that 
it is still the spatial component of the stimulus which is being 
used to generate an image. Furthermore this spatial information 
is then capable of affecting other components of the motor production 
system.
Further evidence of the dominance of spatial information 
over pressure or force information comes from an effect first noted 
by Annott (1959). One feature of Annott's experiment was that subjects 
had to learn a pressure with the aid of visual feedback from a pointer. 
Quite by chance on some occasions the pointer stuck and did not move 
ns the subjects increased their pressure. This resulted in subjects 
proclaiming that the lever that they wore pressing had suddenly 
become much stiffer (which in fact was not true). This led Annott in 
a subsequent experiment to remove the visual feedback from the dial in 
some conditions, the result being that subjects' pressures increased* 
This study might well be interpreted in the same way ns the child with 
the plasticine. Subjects were representing the spatial information 
from the dial and using this to gonornto tho appropriate pressures.
When tho pointer fnilod to move, tho spatial feedback (or lack of it) 
determined their oxpoctod motor output.
11.2. Some Conclusions on Imngos and Motor Acts
To conclude, the present experiment con firm» the previous 
findings that imagery of motor acts is primarily a process which 
manipulates spatial representations derived from tho stimulus informa­
tion available in previously experienced situations. Ilowovor, this 
conclusion must still bo limited by tho narrow rango of motor tasks
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on which this hypothesis 1ms been tested. In linear-positioning 
tasks, where the task itself is largely a spatial one, instructions 
for subjects to imagine the task result in significant biasing effects 
on memory. This result has been used to infer that imagery of motor 
acts involves the processing of spatial information. When a motor 
task which is assumed to involve little or no spatial information 
processing is used instructions for subjects to imagine the task 
appear to have no biasing effects on memory. However, subjects1 
reports suggest that images of the task had boon generated but that 
these images were of a visual/spatial nature. While subjective 
reports of images may bo incorrect, for reasons discussed in Chapter 
Throe, when taken with other empirical evidence from previous experi­
ments in this study it seems reasonable to assume that in both linear 
positioning and lover pressing tasks instructions to imagine the task 
affect tho visual-spatial information processing system.
The finding that imagory instructions bias subjects' memory 
in a linear positioning task but not in a lover prossing task might 
suggest differences between how tho two tasks nro remomborod rathor 
than in tho imagery process. Linear positioning tasks boing romombored 
primarily in terms of tho spatial relationships between the start and 
end points of tho movement together with framo of roforonco in which 
tho movement is produced. Lover prossing tasks may woll bo rememborod 
primarily ns an applied force. Ono distinct difference botwoon tho 
two tasks is the amount oT movement involved. Linear positioning tasks 
roquiro arm movement at tho shouldor and elbow joints and wrist movement, 
while levor pressing tasks roquiro little or no overt movement of tho 
limbs. In this particular lover prossing task the total amount of 
movement in tho lover was 1 cm, which transferred through tho joints of
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of the wrist, elbow and shoulder, produces little in the way of 
overt movement.
Tile difference between a force and a movement is normally 
not apparent since the two are rarely separated, either in the 
laboratory or in normal motor behaviour. Motor acts normally involve 
applying a force to a movement, in a particular direction. Indeed, 
one manner in which movement extent might bo controlled is by moni­
toring the force applied. If this is the case, however, then imagery 
of motor acts does not appear to involve the same control structures 
as used in actual motor acts. In the following chapter the implications 
of this study arc considered in connection with theories of motor control 
and other cognitive processes.
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CHAPTER TWELVE
MEMORY, REHEARSAL AND PERCEPTUAL MOTOR SKILL;
CONCLUSIONS, POSITIONS AND DIRECTIONS
The previous chapters review experimental and theoretical 
relations between memory, rehearsal and perceptual motor skill. A 
series of experiments have been fully described and some conclusions 
made. This final chapter has three objectives; first, final con­
clusions from tho present study are presented. Second, an attempt 
is made to position this research within a wider framework of skill 
and cognition. Third, possiblo directions for future research in 
theoretical and applied settings arc suggested.
12.1. Conclusions From Tho Present Study
Mental practice is a cognitive procedure which permits tho 
covert rehearsal of skilled actions. This rohoarsal employs an image 
processing system in conjunction witli memory representations. In 
particular images function to elaborate and refresh existing represen­
tations. From tho analysis of cues available during Ml’ in Chaptor Two 
it seems that relevant visual cues produce groator improvements following 
MP than other or no cues. This suggests that imagery has a visual/spatial 
basis. Olio possibility is that MI’ onables "plans" for actions to bo 
constructed and refined prior to a response being made.
Cognitive psychology has devoted some of its efforts to 
exploring mental imagery. Current theories of imagery are controd around 
tho functlonal/roprosnntational debate. Mistakonly tho functional and
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relations between memory, rehearsal and perceptual motor skill. A 
series of experiments have boon fully described and some conclusions 
made. This final chapter has three objectives} first, final con­
clusions from the present study are presented. Second, an attempt 
is made to position this research within n wider framework of skill 
and cognition. Third, possiblo directions for future rosonrch in 
theoretical and applied settings arc suggested.
12.1. Conclusions From The Present Study
Mental practice is a cognitive procedure which permits the 
covert rohoarsnl of skilled actions. This rehearsal employs an image 
processing system in conjunction with memory representations. In 
particular images function to elaborate and refresh existing represen­
tations. From tho analysis of cues available during MP in Chapter Two 
it seems that rolovant visual cuos produce groator improvements following 
MP than other or no cues. This suggests that imagery has a visual/spatial 
basis. Ono possibility is that MP enables "plans" for actions to bo 
constructed and refined prior to a response being made.
Cognitive psychology has dovotod somo of its efforts to 
exploring mental imagery. Current theories of imagory are centred around 
tho functional/ropresentatlonnl debate. Mistakenly tho functional and
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roprcsontational states of imagery have boon confounded. It is 
conceivable that images do not constitute a distinct or specific 
form of representation but do have a complementary, functionally 
specific, role to play in a cognitive system. It appears that 
imagery of motor acts is a functional part of a cognitive process 
enabling the rehearsal of motor acts. The present investigations 
of mental practice, imagery and perceptual motor skills showed that 
images of motor acts do have functional properties in skill acquisi­
tion as far ns linear positioning tasks are concerned. Those images 
appear to bo closely related to the representation of the motor act 
and arc especially concerned with spatial information.
A serious problem for this research was the lack of an 
adequate experimental methodology with which to investigate images 
and mental practice. Rocont experiments by Finite (1979, 19R0) suggest 
that biasing or after-effects which normally occur in reality can bo 
produced by imagery instructions. This method permits one to investi­
gate thoso cognitive processes involved in imagery in a more formal 
mannor.
Tho first oxporimont in this scries showed that instructions 
to imngino a novel linear positioning movement had a biasing offect on 
n subject's memory for a criterion linoar positioning movement similar 
to that obtained by actual movements. This demonstrates that images 
of linear i M i s l l i n u i i i q  m u v r m e i i t M  do Indeed I'lmclion in skill acquisition.
It might bo inferred from tho lower variability of movement error with 
imagery instructions that images do not involve tho motor production 
system. Two separato systems might bo projKjaod, one for action production 
and one for action recognition. Imagery might bo thought to involve tho
-  2«5 -
recognition system but not the action or motor production system.
One of the ways in which imagery may function in the MP of a previously 
learned movement, is to consolidate the memory trace and in this way 
reduco the amount of variability in successive attempts to reproduce 
the learned movement.
Subsequent experiments employ what I have termed a "second 
order" interference technique to investigate images. "First order" 
inter Terence in the form of interpolated tasks is used to show how 
imagery affects memory. "Second order" interference tasks arc then 
used to interfere with imagery processes and suppress imagery 
produced biasing.
The second experiment (reported in Chapter Five) showed 
that imagery is interfered with hy a visual/spatial task but not by 
a motor task. This provides further support for the earlier assumption 
that imagery does not involve the motor production system. In the 
third experiment (Chapter Six) visual/spatial cues during the movements 
wero reduced by screening the track and subject's arm from view.
Further bias may have boon duo to the differences in tho gonoral pro­
cessing domand of tho second order interference tasks. Consequently, 
the visual/spatial stimuli of tho second order interference woro 
simplified while tho motor interference stimuli wore increased in 
complexity. Tho results again showed that only visual/spntial 
interference stimuli suppressed the imagery produced biasing. Therefore 
any suggestion that tho interference effects were due to general pro­
cessing demands rather than specific resource demands are unsupported. 
All the earlier interference effects suggost that it is tho visual/
spatial nature of the interference task which suppresses image 
processes.
The seventh chapter introduced the possibility of linear 
positioning movements being rehearsed by sub-vocally counting. It 
is possible that temporal or rate of execution information could bo 
either rehearsed or imagined by subjects counting sub-vocally. No 
interference effects wore found when a concurrent verbal shadowing 
task was introduced, and therefore it was concluded that linear 
movements arc not rehearsed by such a counting procedure. Separate 
effects wore also found for the response demand of the interference 
task and its specific resource demands. The response demands wore 
manipulated separately from the source or typo of interference 
stimulus. Increasing the response demand appears to reduce the size 
of "variable error" (VE) while varying the type or source of the 
interference stimulus affects "memory" and results in a biasing of 
memory, reflected by CE and an increase in the amount of variability 
(VE) when memory for the criterion position is affcctod.
Chapters Eight and Nine show that images are interfered with 
by the spatial properties of a stimulus rather than its visual, motor 
or auditory properties. Iinagos of linear positioning movements are 
based on tho abstract representations of spatial information. Those 
spatial representations include location, distance, and direction 
information. Tn Experiment VTI (Chapter Ton) it was shown that linear 
movements themselves are Miihjoct to interference from spatial rather 
than visual, motor or auditory tasks. Therefore images of linonr 
positioning movements and linonr positioning movements themselves
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share a common representation, based on spatial information.
The eighth experiment (Chapter Eleven) assumes that if 
images of other motor acts are primarily spatial in nature then a 
motor task with little or no spatial requirements should not bo 
affected by imagery instructions. Dy using a lover pressing device 
with little spatial information involved in the task it was shown that 
instructions to imagine a novel interpolated pressure had no effects 
on subjects’ memory for a criterion pressure. Images of motor acts 
do not seem to share a full relationship with memories for those acts. 
Imagery of motor acts appears to be a process which is most effective 
when the act is primarily concerned with spatial information. Subjects 
in the lever pressing experiment did report experiencing images but 
these often wore of a "magnified" movement of the lover in the direction 
they wore pressing. While such subjective reports cannot bo taken as 
direct evidence, they do support a spatial processing hypothosis of 
imagery.
12.2. A Position for Imagery in Skill and Cognition
Imagos of movements appoar to function ns a process in 
organising and planning motor skills, especially those primarily 
involving movements through spneo. Through organising and planning, 
images are nhlo to aid rehearsing and remembering of motor acts.
Images are a functional process within a cognitive modol 
of perceptual motor skill, but they do not appear to bo a permanent 
form of representation. Instead of boing thought of as a form of 
representation, imagery might best ho considered ns a cognitive procoss
which utilises other forms of representation. While this research 
suggests that imagery of motor acts commonly involves spatial 
information it could be otherwise. Under certain conditions imagery 
processes could bo shown to operate on temporal or force information. 
Natadze (i960) suggests that contrast illusions between weights can 
bo produced by purely imaginary practice. In a series of experiments 
Natadze found that imaginary lifting of weights could produce similar 
biasing effects as has boon found with images of linear movements. 
However, it is not clear from Natadzc's report what instructions were 
given to subjects, which ho claims are of paramount importance, since 
the effect does not occur if the instructions are varied. More 
specifically, if subjects are instructed to "experience" holding two 
objects then Natadze reports a contrast illusion. However, if subjects 
are instructed to "picture" holding two objects no contrast illusion 
occurs. Tills distinction between "picturing" and "experiencing" is 
not made any clearer by Natadzo's report.
A further point of Natadzo's study is that no data appears 
anywhoro in the report. While ho roports tho occurrence of an illusion 
effect I10 does not report how this offoct was moasurod. It appears 
that subjects wore asked to mako discriminatory judgements betwoon 
objocts and that tho subsequent percentage of subjects who mako a 
false judgement is taken as ovidonco for an imagery offoct. Of course, 
no statistical significances are attached to thoso percentages, although 
most are above the ri(ffu mark.
While these results are intriguing, in that they raise some 
interesting questions to bo addrossed by future, moro rigorous, experi­
mentation, it is not possible to form nny conclusions on tho basis of
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such a loosely reported study. Natadze's experiments appear to have 
been concerned with imagery effects on subsequent perceptual judgements, 
while the present series of experiments is concerned with imagery 
effects on short-term or working memory. Given this difference it may 
be interesting to attempt to replicate Natadzo's experiments both in 
terms of perceptual judgements and memory effects and also to compare 
the effects of instructions to "picture" as opposed to "experience" 
a particular event. Distinctions between those two typos of instructions 
should bo considered together with subjects1 own reports as to the nature 
of their images.
The relationship between imago processes and spatial repre­
sentations within a cognitive model of skills may reflect tho dominance 
of spatial information in motor control. Indeed, Lashloy (1951) 
developed a spaco co-ordinate reference system which llusscll (1976) 
and Ilowarth (1970) suggest forms a basis for movement production. Thus 
motor acts may bo generated on tho basis of stored spatial information 
rather thnn specific neuromuscular information. If motor acts are 
controlled primarily by a spatial reference system thon other parameters 
such ns force niul volocity could bo derivod at a more autonomous stngo 
of motor control. It seems reasonable to assume that in developing 
a particular action tho first piece of information required is tho 
oxisting and dosired limb positionn. In tho process of skill acquisition 
it may well bo that spatial' parameters become less dominant thnn force 
or velocity parameters ns a function of tho amount of nctunl practice. 
This would simply reflect tho dynamic nnturo of skill acquisition and 
tho automatisation process. Consequently tho first stage in nutomatising 
n skill might bo to corroctly represent tho required spatial roforonco 
points for tho various movements.
The planning and organising of a skill may primarily 
reflect tho manipulation of spatial information. In preparing to 
execute a particular motor action subjects may actively rehearse 
and refine tho appropriate spatial information, in which case 
processing capacity is freed during the movement to deal with other 
(temporal, etc.) information.
Turvey and his associates, Turvoy (1977)« Turvcy, Shaw and 
Mace (1978), Turvey and Shaw (1979), Fowler and Turvoy (1978), Kuglcr, 
Kelso and Turvoy (1980), Kelso, Holt, Kugler and Turvoy (1980), Turvoy, 
Shaw, Rood and Mace (1981) and Turvoy and Carollo (1981) have described 
a rather complex model of action which equates perception and action. 
Within a Gibsonian framework Turvey argues that action and perception 
are part of a human system for interaction with tho environment and 
that the three form an ecological system. Action is central to 
understanding perception, they are complementary descriptions of the 
same event. Tho precise motor activities by which a person adjusts 
their actions (such ns walking) to suit the environment are complementary 
to tho optical information that "tunes" that adjustment. Within Turvoy's 
model "co-ordinativo structures" are "tunod" to accommodate environmental 
demands. For example tho two wrists and fingers on each hand of a 
drummer form a co-ordinntivo structure for drumming. (They are not 
directly linked hut they bocomo "tunod" to function as ono unit).
These co-ordlnntivo structures operate in a "coalition" between per­
ception action and the environment (see Figure 11!. l). Tills coalition 
requires that tho organisation and tuning of those collectives constrain 
perception. That is, the way wo pcrcoivo actions and indeed our ontiro 
environment is influenced (if not completely determined by) tho way wo 
act. Kvidonco of this can bo found in Johansson (1973) and Cutting and
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oiiviroiMiiontI toiiotlior titano forni otto unit of 
lioltnvionr. (Takon from Tnrvoy, Slinw and Maco 
197«* p.in)
Koslowki (1977) perception of dots of light experiments. When dots 
of light move about in a random fashion it is difficult for subjects 
to recognise or remember them. However, as soon as the dots of light 
begin to follow an action pattern such as when the lights arc attached 
to the limbs and joints of actors walking, they are instantly recognised 
and remembered. Rut when the same patterns are presented static recog­
nition again fails. There is further evidence, Nowtson (1976) to 
suggest that skilled actors perceive action quite differently from 
their unskilled counterparts.
One feature of Turvoy's "model" is that "plans" and mental 
representations of actions and perceptions are regarded as unnecessary 
since in tm o  Gibsonian fashion the environment presents all the 
information for action and perception. His one concession to mental 
processes is the "fine tuning" of co-ordinativo structures. On this 
point ho is appropriately silent. I would suggest that there is 
evidence that this "fino tuning" occurs during periods of covert 
rehearsal (as well as during actual practice). Tho experiments on 
reminiscence offocts, such as Frith and Lang (1979), already mentioned 
support tho role of mental processes in formulating appropriate actions. 
An imago process would bo nn ideal candidate to accommodate such tuning. 
In tho absence of physical stimulation from tho environment images can 
bo usod to present possible environmental situations for actions to be 
performed in. Thoso imaged, consequences of action might then permit 
appropriate "oo-ordinative h tinctures" (or parts or movement) to ho 
fashioned.
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Images would seem to hnvo a role in tho organising and "tuning"
of actions, which Turvey has yot to explain. While theorists such as
Turvcy, who follow a Gibsonian porspoctivo suggest that action .and 
perception are intimately linked, this does not prevent one from 
postulating the existence of a separate motor production system.
There is some evidence to suggest that perception and production are 
separate systems. For example, in language production young children 
are capable of perceiving and comprehending utterances long before 
they can produce utterances of their own. Of course, it could bo 
argued that when young children are capable of perceiving and 
comprehending utterances they already "know" how to produce thorn 
themselves, but simply lack sufficient control of their vocal apparatus 
to bo able to make the appropriate sequence of sounds. Children do 
indeed appear to spend some time "practising" controlling their vocal 
apparatus while experimenting with the difforont sounds that they can 
produce.
When one looks at the way in which adults acquire a second 
language wo find that the samo pattern of perception proceeding 
production occurs. It is ovidont that people are ablo to porcoivo 
words and often comprchond thorn in a spoken foreign language boforo 
they can correctly produce tlioso words themselves. Those observations 
suggest, quite strongly, that language production follows languago 
perception. Similar arguments npply to action production and perception. 
In skill acquisition the first hurdle to bo ovorcomo by tho loamor is 
to idontify appropriate units of action. The "chunking" of actions 
during a process ol' skill acquisition is a primary factor in improving 
performance. Recent suggestions by Newell and Rosonhloom (l9fl0) put 
forward to explain why improvements with practice follow a log-log 
linear law (Snoddy 1926), Crossmnn (1956)» rely heavily on an assumption 
that "units" of skill are perceived differently during practloe. Furthor
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evidence for the independence of perception nnd production mechanisms 
comes from the various training methods used. Demonstration and verbal 
instruction in training are often most efficient when placed early in 
a training period, prior to any actual practice. One explanation of 
mental practice is that it allows images, based on perceptions of 
actions, to be translated into appropriate units of response. The 
superiority of visual cues in aiding Ml’ also suggests that some 
perceptual processing must occur independently of action production.
Of course it could bo argued that mere recognition is a loss demanding 
task than production in that production requires additional processing, 
but I would maintain that this is not simply further processing but a 
different processing system.
The concept of a motor programme (Pew 1966), Koolo and 
Summers (1976), relates to a stored sot of rules for producing actions. 
In Schmidt's (1975» 1976) "schema" theory of motor control, separate 
production and perception systems were suggested (see Figure 12.2).
The "rocall schoma" is used to produce a particular motor act. Given 
tho desired outcome of the motor act and the initial conditions, the 
recall schema generates a sot of rules which specify a particular 
motor act. This is very much liko the notion of a motor programme but 
thoro Is little dotail ns to what information tho schoinn contains. Tho 
recognition schema is used to prodict tho sensory outcomes of a motor 
act, and can be used to c«x»pnro tho expected sensory outcomes with tho 
subsequent actual outcomes for error. This schema is based on perceptual 
information from past motor acts nnd is very similar to Adams (l97l) 
"perceptual trace". The "perceptual trace" is supposed by Adams to bo 
an image (not necessarily a conscious one) of the proprioceptive visual 
nnd othor sensory consequences of motor acts.
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Consequently there is strong support for tho existence of 
separate production and porcoptual mechanism in motor control and in 
other cognitive acts. Two different systems for modelling cognitive 
mechanisms have been developed, which might reflect the different 
processes of production and perception, (Anderson 19fl0).
"Production systems" are one way in which "procedural know­
ledge" might be represented in artificial intelligence, Nowell and 
Simon (1972), Newell (1973), Uychener and Newell (197b). briefly, 
procedural knowledge refers to that information required by a 
mechanism to enable a particular end-state to bo achieved given a 
particular initial state. This is tho exact specification of Schmidt's 
recall schema. The production system is a sot of specified rules which 
represent tho procedures needed to bo carried out by tho mechanism in 
order that the desired end state might bo achieved. Each production 
rule has a condition and an action (IF, THEN) statement. Moreover 
tho production system uses those rules ns a tost for a particular 
configuration of events which allows the system to be, to some extent, 
adaptive. Furthermore it permits sequences of behaviour to bo "chunked" 
into particular rulo systems. An example of a production system for 
fastening two stool plates togothcr with a nut and bolt might bo ns in 
Table 12.1. Obviously other instructions or rules could be usod to 
arrive at this same solution to this problem, but tho modelling of n 
production system allows these solutions to bo specified in a manner 
which represents the procedural knowledge usod to perform Hut task.
Tho recognition schema, or perceptual processing mechanisms 
nro not adequately modelled by such production systems. Instead,
197 -
IF
THEN
IF
THEN
IF
THEN
Production Explanation
P.l
the goal is to fasten two plates 
and the two plates have aligning 
holes and there is a holt which 
passes through both holes and 
there is a nut to match the holt.
the sub-goal is to fasten the two 
plates with a nut and bolt.
P.2
the sub-goal is to fasten two bolts 
with a nut and bolt and the bolt 
passes through both holes and the 
nut and bolt both rotate
the sub-goal is to hold the bolt 
firm and rotate tho nut in a 
clockwise direction.
P.3
tho sub-goal is to hold tho holt 
firm and tho nut does not rotato 
and tho nut is flush to tho plate 
tho two plates are fastened.
This production provides a 
solution to tho main problem 
of fastening two plates and 
provides a sub-goal of using 
a nut and bolt.
This production puts tho holt 
through tho holes and provides 
a sub-goal to hold tho bolt 
while the nut is fastened.
This production recognises whon 
the nut and holt aro tight and 
the two plates are fastened.
Table 12.1 A sot of productions for fastening two plates together
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according to Anderson (l90o), "schemas", "scripts", or "frames" 
have been used to model perceptual processing, such as pattern 
recognition, nobrow and Winograd (1977)* Minsky (1975) and Schank 
and Abelson (1979) describe script and frame theories, while Rumelhart 
and Ortony (1977) describe schema theory. The throe do have differ­
ences but in general they all present a system for representing 
"declarative" rather than "procedural" knowledge. Declarative 
knowledge refers to what wo know, knowing that a certain object has 
certain features (such as a face having two eyes, two cars, a nose and 
a mouth), knowing that tightening a bolt requires more force to be 
applied towards the final stages, or that bolts are circular in diameter 
while nuts are often hexagonal, those arc all examples of declarative 
knowledge. Schemata, then, are a framework which cnablo inferences to 
bo made about the world and objects in it and how these are influenced 
by different contexts and different goals (or purposes). In the 
production system for fastening two plates with a bolt a schema or 
framo would allow knowledge about fastening plates together, nuts and 
bolts and screwing actions to bo represented by a separate mechanism.
Production systems and schema theories might thon bo taken 
as separate theories of porcoptual, recognition procoss and production, 
procedural processes. It scorns that imagery of linear positioning 
movements involves tho recognition mechanism and not tho production 
mochanism. A strict separation betwoon tho two mechanisms is, howovor, 
untenable, since motor acts involve both recognition and production 
mechanisms. It seems that Turvoy's notion of a "coalition" in which 
action, perception and an environmental niche interact is the correct 
unit of analysis for any ono pioco of bolmviour, but that further
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explanation of the cognitive mechanisms involved is still desirable.
Gallistel (1980) proposes that the last stage of perceptual 
processing and the first stage of motor production processes are one 
and the some. This is one solution to the problem of imitation, since 
it explains how perceiving a movement enables cognitive processes to 
formulate the commands that produce a corresponding movement via an 
oscillatory mechanism. Gallistel suggests that actions are represented 
by a set of six signals, one signal each to specify the period, 
amplitude, phase, while the plane of oscillation is specified by three 
signals relating to up/down, side to side, back and front. An osci­
llator is a neural circuit or neuron, whose electrical activity varies 
rhythmically in the absence or independently of any rhythm in the 
signals impinging on itj a unit of behaviour which is controlled by 
such a neural circuit or neuron is also called an oscillatory action, 
e.g. walking. Gallistel uses a wide range of behavioural, neurological 
and physiological data to arrive at a Fourier model for representing 
any movement. This is indeed a powerful model of action, but while it 
is capable of accounting for the similarities of action perception 
and production it ignores the irregularities. Gallistel's model is 
one possible concrete example of what an action schema might be. In 
this modol a considerable weight is given to the representation of 
spatial parameters. Gnllistol suggests that the "tuning" process 
montionod by Turvoy is concerned with relating "neuromuscular space" 
to "body code space". Tlody code space is that space around the body 
while neuromuscular space rofers to the direction of movement produced 
by a given pattern of neuromuscular activity. For example body code 
space rofers to movement in the ua^ittal plane, the horizontal plane 
and the transverse plane while neuromuscular space refers to the
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movement of, say, the fingers to the palm. Wickens (1939) conditioned 
subjects to withdraw their finger then rotated the hand through l80°.
In the conditioning period subjects moved their finger tips upwards 
and then with the hand rotated would have moved their finger tips 
downwards, if the conditioning had affocted "neuromuscular-space" 
representation. Instead, all but one of the subjects made a transla­
tion through "body-space" and moved the finger-tips upwards. Conse­
quently they had re-channelled muscular-space into body-space and it 
is this rc-channclling or transformation between neuromuscular-space 
and body-space which occurs during the "tuning" of movements.
This is exactly the kind of function which imagery of the 
type discussed in this thesis might accomplish. In imagining a linear 
positioning movement subjects may be using the spatial information in 
the environment to imagino where the movement would start, where it 
might end and in what direction it will bo. They are then able to 
uso this spatial information in the form of an image, as a template 
upon which to map the appropriate "neuromuscular space" commands. In 
Experiment VIII whore subjects woro instructed to imagine a lever 
pressing task it might bo the caso that in such a task the "body-space" 
representation has little informational contont for the neuromuscular- 
space representation, therefore maintaining an image of body-space doos 
not affect nouromuscular-spnco. The spatial naturo of motor control is 
emphasised in the parameters of Gallistel's model, while the experiments 
I have perfoniied emphasise the spatial processing capabilities of mental 
imagery for certain motor nets. It seems reasonable to nssumo that 
images enablo representations of body-space (i.o. the positions of 
ourselves and our limbs relative to objocts in the world), to bo nltgnod 
with representations of neuromuscular space (i.c. tho positions of our
f - *1
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limbs relative to the positions of our musculature)* Spatial 
representations might be topological (Doutsch i960) or Euclidean.
Piaget and Inhelder (195i) have devoted a book to the development 
of spatial representations and suggost that children start with a 
topological representations! system and then develop an ability to 
represent Euclidean space and perform mental operations on that 
representation. Evidence from animal experiments, Tinkclpaugh (1932), 
Meier (1929) and others suggest that Euclidean space is represented. 
Recent work by O'Keefe and Nadol (1978) suggests that the hippocampus 
operates on Euclidean space. The work of Shepherd and his colleagues, 
on mental transformations is an excellent example of imagery being used 
to transform Euclidean spatial representations.
To sum up, I would suggest that there is strong evidence to 
support a notion of actions being dependent upon spatial representation 
for their control. Sucli a control system could, ns Gallistcl has 
suggested, mako use of an oscillator mechanism to achievo motor output. 
The control parameter for the motor production moclmnism can bo captured 
by a Fourier model. This Fourior model specifies the amplitude, 
poriodocity, phase and plane of oscillation. At least throe parameters 
of this model (tlioso governing the piano of oscillation) nro diroctly 
responsible for spatial information. The process of rolnting body-spneo 
to neuromuscular spneo is responsible for tho tuning of motor acts. 
Imagery of motor acts may woll function ns a template for tho equating 
of body-space and neuromuscular-space. Tho experimental evidence I 
have found points to this function of mental imngory in motor control.
Mental practice is able to bring about tho "tuning" of co- 
ordinative structures by using an imago process to relate tho two
representational states of "body-space" and "neuromuscular space". 
Assuming that skilled actions are represented as combinations of 
simple movements oriented with respect to body-space there must be 
a stage of processing which translates this code into the appropriate 
neuromuscular activity. One role of practice seems to bo to develop 
the appropriate tunings of the neural circuitry to accomodato distor­
tion between body-space and neuromuscular-space. If images of motor 
acts can provide a template of the body-space representation in the 
absence of sudi information in the environment, thon MP may make use 
of this representation to assimilate the appropriate neuromuscular 
spatial representation. Thus now acts can bo synthesised out of 
existing motor acts by the tuning of now co-ordinntive structures 
and this tuning can be aided by MP.
12.5» Future Directions
The importance of cognitive processes, such as imagery, in 
skills is becoming increasingly more obvious. Recent trends within 
motor-skills and cognitive scionco suggest that more collaboration is 
inevitable. Nowell and Roscnbloom (19R0) liavo rocontly ro-discoverod 
the log-log linear learning law or power law of practice (see Snoddy, 
192f>; Kitts, 19f>,t) and applied it to a variety of perceptual-motor, 
cognitive and industrial skills. Their interpretation of this effect 
draws heavily upon the role .of planning, organisation and chunking in 
skills.
The part played by imagery in skill acquisition and retention 
is still barely understood. Kurthor investigations nood to 1)0 carriod 
out to establish tho limitations of imagery to function in skills. The
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most immediate course of investigation might be to attempt to 
replicate Natadze's (i960) findings of imagery in weight lifting.
Future research should make use of the procedures established here 
to investigate the possibility of image processes operating on non- 
spatial information. It seems that children and probably adults can 
anticipate weight information and produce motor performances on the 
basis of their anticipations.
The role of different instructions, relating "experience" 
and "picture" could be further investigated. Natadze hypothesises 
that it is the experiential effects of images which influence 
performance rather than the pictorial information contained in the 
image. This is interesting since it suggests that there may be 
circumstancos under which subjects could use MP to rehearse other 
than the spatial aspects of a task.
On a more applied note there are a number of ways in which 
imagery might function in skill acquisition and retention. It has 
already been noted that MP provides an effective means of enhancing 
learning. In view of tho present experiments it seems that imagery 
enhances the momory trace. It would be worthwhile to idontify 
those skills which have a predominant spatial requirement since the 
effectiveness of MP might be increased if subjects were only instructed 
to imagine tho spatial properties of the task. Other practice methods, 
such as actual practico or verbal learning, might then be applied to 
the appropriate non-spatlal task components. It might bo useful to 
include imagery instruction, emphasising the spatial properties of the 
task, at regular intervals to maintain an acceptable performance level. 
There are situations under which it is impossible to practice the complete
-  304
skill, oxcopt in n tost porfonnanco (such as emergency measures).
In these situations some improvements might be gained from imagery 
in organising and planning the required performance.
The varieties of tasks on which subjects have boon tested 
for imagery effects needs extending, not in terms of the different 
types of motor tasks but across all kinds of skilled actions ranging 
from, say, weight lifting to mental arithmetic. The present investi­
gations have merely highlighted the potential for investigating covert 
rehearsal strategies. To this end any claims about the function of MP 
and imagery of motor acts are ns yet restricted to linear positioning 
tests and lover pressing tasks. However, those two tasks do contain 
two basic olemcnts of all motor acts, space and force. Perhaps it is 
the toni]>oral or rhythmic properties of motor nets which should next 
bo systematically investigated for possible MP strategies. A task 
such ns lonrning n particular rhytlim of motor output, say in n tapping 
task in which the spatial components are varied independently of tho 
temporal, aspects of tho task, might provide n suitable moans for 
investigating tho rolntivo importance and efficiency of spatial and 
temporal rehearsal strategies.
A furt.hor dimension along which future investigations might 
proceed is the amount of practice prior to MP. In the review of MP in 
Chapter Two it was suggested that MP was most effective following a 
relatively small amount of actual practice. It may well he tho case 
that the typo of Ml’ changes ns n function of prior training. Pew (1966) 
suggested that skill changes as a function of tho amount of practice 
from visual to kinaesthetic dependence. However, Long (1976) notes 
that in skilled keyboard operations visual feedback plays nn important
-  -
role in maintaining a high standard of performance oven in well 
practised tasks. It would be interesting, therefore, to investigate 
if any changes occur in the type of MP subjects engage in as a function 
of the amount of prior actual practice. One might predict, on the 
basis of Pew’s (1966) hypothesis that while visual/spatial imagery 
might bo used in oarly stages of skill, force or some typo of 
kinncsthotic imagery might be more common in the later stages of skill.
To date, MP has only boon considered during training or skill 
acquisition procedures. It offers groat potential as a method of skill 
retention, or retraining. The effects of MP on the retention of skills 
over long periods, or on the refreshing of old skills has not boon 
considered. A theoretical distinction was made oarlior between images 
generated from long-term-memory and those which facilitate the retention 
of previously presented stimuli, such ns "visualisations" of the Phillips 
and Christie (1977» a,b) sort. It is not clear if iinagos generated from 
long-term memory should bo subjected to the same kind of interference 
effects ns has boon found for the present series of experiments.
In n similar theme one might propose, following from Fuchs’ 
(1962) progression/regression hypothesis of skill, that the snmo sequence 
of rehearsal strategies which had boon effective during skill acquisition 
would bo equally effective during skill retention. It then becomes of 
interest to know if the particular form of MP which was most effective 
prior to a skilled performance is cnpnhlc of preventing skill loss in 
all aspects of the skill or in just a specific component of the skill.
The use of MP as a method of providing refroshor training offers great 
)>otontinl in terms of ease and cost, if it can bo determined what 
particular forms of Ml’ are host suitod to retaining which parts of the
skill
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Continuing in the same vein, of MP as an aid to retraining 
schedules, the spacing of MP during the retention period may well affect 
the outcome of MP on skill retention. If Fuchs' hypothesis is found 
to hold for all or certain skills, then the placing of MP during the 
refresher course will also determine the typo of MP used. More 
generally, in cases whore the loss function for a particular skill is 
unknown it might be possible to mentally rehearse, by imagining 
performing the complete task, at regular intervals. In such circum­
stances MP may prevent or at least slow-down any skill-loss.
One feature of tins rosoarcli has been the transfer (albeit 
negative) effects, from one linear positioning movement to another, by 
moans of imagery instructions. The possibility that imagery of actions 
might facilitate positive or negative transfer between tasks has not 
boon considered other than in Experiment I. It might bo the case that 
imagining performing a novel task may interact with the current reper­
toire of skills and experiences a subject possesses. It is not clear 
whether imagining a task, on which a subject has no previous experience, 
will have the same dependence on past experience ns actual task perfor­
mance has. For oxnmplo nssuming that certain parts of the skill of 
driving a motor-bike with gears on tho loft which follow a "ono down - 
throe up" format (ns is tho case with Japanese motor-bikes) will hnvo 
a negative transfer offoct on driving a Hritish motor-biko which has 
gears on the right anti follows a "one up - three down" format. Now 
there is reason to assume that tho nogntivn transfer offects 
obsorvod in actual practice would bo present in imaginary prnctico.
Tho mapping of positivo and negative transfer effects from actual 
practice to imaginary practice would provide further investigation 
of tho equivalence of imnges and actions, together with a prescription
-  3 0 7  -
for the most suitable practice methods.
In clinical settings patients are sometimes faced with 
having to learn to use damaged or unused limbs or even a pros­
thetic device. It is often reported that patients "disown" the 
limb in question and refuse to oven look at it. If patients wore 
encouraged to imagine moving the limb this may speed up the first 
stages of skill acquisition by including that limb in the planning 
and organising motor acts. In addition it may help them overcome 
any phobias which they might have developed about the use of the 
limb. Of course the reverse phenomenon, of the "phantom limb" in 
which amputated limbs are imagined to exist, might also be related 
to the same process of imagery, although not under conscious control, 
in that the imagery is not voluntary.
Finally a theoretical note about measures of error in 
positioning experiments. Thoro is some debate at present about what 
is the appropriate dependent variable for positive experiments, AE,
CE, VE. It is suggested that CE and VE are tho most useful since 
these separately reflect perceptual and memory parameters of movement, 
Lanbs (1973).
If ono takes a particular VE scoro ono cannot fully appreciate 
what the subject's performance was really like. A high VE could be 
arrived at in many ways, such as a compounding of error in one direction 
over each trial. If one regresses a subject's raw error scoro against 
the recall trial then the resulting regression statistics fully describo 
a subject's performance over trials. Tito intercept («*) valuó can bo 
taken ns a measure of any bins in much the same way that CE is used.
- 3on -
Whilst tlio slope co-officiont reflects how the performance progressed 
over trials. The standard error of the residuals can then bo taken as 
a measure of the variance on each trial from this overall trend 
(reflected by the /* value).
To conclude, this thesis presents a thorough investigation 
of imagery in a linear positioning task and describes a potentially 
powerful means of investigating such processes. While the main body 
of the thesis is largely empirical, the theoretical considerations of 
MP and motor skills are developed in the vein of cognitive psychology. 
The underlying process involved in MP appears to bo imagery which in 
the case of a linear positioning task appears to bo a spatial process. 
The implications of this for theories of motor skills is such that a 
procedure for "tuning" or assimilating "hody-spaco" with "neuromuscular- 
space" can bo suggested which might make use of images of the spatial 
parameters of the movement with respect to other environmental objects. 
This image provides a template from which the neuromuscular-space 
parameters can ho derived. In motor acts with low or little movemont 
involved then tho role of hody-spaco representations and the potential 
of spatial imagery is drastically roducod. Tho importance of spatial 
representations for tho control and organisation of movements is still 
arguable hut this thosis suggests that cognitive processes such ns 
imagery arc confinod to higher aspocts of motor control. Tho possibility 
that images of motor acts hayo a functional role in skill has been 
established in the case of linoar-|)ositioning tasks. Future investi­
gations using tho techniguos established hero may distinguish botwoon 
images from long-term memory and images in "working memory" retained from 
previous stimuli. Further investigations may lead to the identification
of non-spatial forms of imagery for other motor acts, but in ovory-day 
life it seems that the most important feature of motor acts is the 
frame of space in which they are to bo executed and what values should 
be ascribed to the parameters of angle of orientation, amplitude, and 
direction of movement.
- 309 -
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APPENDIX A
Summary of Mental Practice Research
Abbreviations:
MP ■ Mental Practice.
AP 8 Actual Practice.
NP - No Practice.
AMP - Actual Practice followed by Mental Practice.
MAP B Mental Practice followed by Actual Practice.
OB S ■ Observational learning.
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APPENDIX B
CLASSIFICATION OF TASKS : based on Morrlsett (1956)
Score out of a total of 15
TASK Symbolic Perceptual Motor
Basketball e 13* 10
Juggling 6 12 13*
Three Hole tapping 13* 3 8
Pursuit Rotor 3 11* 9
Table tennis 6 12* 11
Ball throwing 5 6 13*
Tennis 11 14* 12
Mirror drawing 7 13* 9
Key tapping 13* 10 7
Ring toss 4 8 10*
Finger dexterity 10 5 13*
Typing 13 6 14*
Pegboard 9 5 13*
Rivetting 5 12* 11
Card sorting 6 15* 7
Symbol/digit substitution 12* 10 4
Sit-ups 3 2 1 5 *
Maze learning 11* 10 6
* indicates into which category this particular task was classified.
Note: Correlation between judges on each catogory, was measured by 
Kendals Coefficient of Concordance (w)
Symbolic i (w) - 0.732 A 2,7 - 29.577, pr < .05
Perceptual:(w) - 0.712 ■ 29.098, pr < .05
Symbolic: (w) - 0.705 "X ,7 ■ "8.916, pr < .05
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APPENDIX C
EXPERIMENT I
Conditions
Subject NIM30 NAM 30 CB30 SIM30 NIM60 NAM 60 CB60 SIM60
1 C.E. 4.50 4.55 -0.30 0.25 -5.80 -3.85 0.90 0.30
V.E 0.71 2.14 2*16 0.49 1.08 1.23 0.62 0.30
2 C.E. 3.20 3.65 -0.70 -0.10 -7.20 -3.45 0.10 0.25
V.E. 1.14 3.00 1.25 0.32 0.40 1.45 1.10 0.20
3 C.E. 7.20 5.00 0.00 -0.40 -4.10 -4.10 1.25 0.30
V.E. 2.49 1.33 1.56 0.39 0.78 3.89 1.75 0.40
4 C.E. 2.40 3.20 3.20 0.05 -3.00 -5.40 1.45 -0.10
V.E. 3. 12 2. fb 1.30 0. 60 1.03 2.06 1.05 0. 30
5 C.E. 3.20 5.90 -2.60 0.15 -3.40 -4.75 -1.75 0.05
V.E. 0.79 2.23 1.07 0.42 1.20 2.25 1.38 0.50
6 C.E. 4.70 6.40 -2.GO -0.10 -5.60 -5.40 -2.38 0.00
V.E. 1.16 2.12 1.06 0.52 1.36 2.01 2.78 0.20
Table C.l. Experiment I. Constant error (C.E.) and
variable error (V.E.) for each subject and each 
condition; error is measured in CMS. Each subject 
appears in only one experimental condition. C.E. 
and V.E. are collapsed over 10 recall trials.
-  332
Conditions
Trials NIM30 NAM 30 CB30 SIM30 NIM60 NAM60 CB60 SIM60
1 X 4.00 6.33 0.50 -0.42 -4.17 -6.50 -0.67 0.08
s.e. 0.63 3.00 3.08 0.66 2.23 1.05 1.99 0.20
2. X 4.80 6.17 0.83 -0.50 4-4.33 -3.67 0.83 0.10
s.e. 1.80 1.50 2.64 0.55 2.16 1.21 1.97 0.22
3 X 4.00 4.33 1.00 0.00 -4.33 -5.00 0.75 -0.08
s.e. 3.40 2.50 2.97 0.45 1.51 2.19 1.70 0.37
4 X 4.30 5.25 -0.67 -0.08 -4.67 -3.58 0.33 0.16
s.e. 2.90 2.60 2.73 0.20 1.97 1.74 1.25 0.25
5. X 4.80 4.92 -0.50 -0.08 -4.17 -3.25 0.58 0.16
s.e. 2.90 1.40 2.26 0.49 2.04 0.88 1.62 0.68
6 X 4.80 3.92 -1.30 0.00 -5.33 -3.75 -1.08 0.08
s.e. 2.90 2.80 2.42 0.32 1.97 2.09 2.59 0.20
7 X 4.00 3.80 -1.25 0.00 -4.67 -4.92 0.41 0.08
s.e. 2.24 3.18 2.32 0.32 1.97 2.25 1.88 0.20
8 X 3.00 3.67 -1.17 0.25 -4.67 -4.33 0.00 0.16
s.e. 0.89 2.80 1.72 0.61 2.25 2.50 1.67 0.25
9 X 4.30 4.17 -0.92 0.33 -5.33 -4.08 -0.33 0.41
s.e. 2.07 2.90 2.20 0.41 1.86 1.83 2.27 0.37
10 X 4.20 4.50 -1.50 0.25 -5.17 -4.67 0.41 0.16
s.e. 1.17 2.70 2.07 0.27 2.04 2.42 2.22 0.25
T a b le  C .2 .  E xp erim en t l i  Mean e r r o r  x and sta n d a rd  e r r o r  (s.e.)
p e r  r e c a l l .  t r i a l  In  each  c o n d it io n s  e r r o r  m easured
in  CMS. (6 s u b je c t s  p e r  c e l l ) .
-  333
APPENDIX D
EXPERIMENT I I
Subjects NAM NIM V M NIMV NIMM CB
1 CE 5.90 2.50 1.70 2.40 -4.45 2.50 -0.80
VE 1.89 0.45 1.01 0.64 1.62 0.85 0.11
2 CE 6.20 5.50 0.95 1.60 -0.20 6.60 1.50
VE 1.56 0.65 0.92 0.14 0.96 1.07 0.65
3 CE 3.30 9.40 -1.58 -1.00 -2.10 6.65 -1.60
VE 2.66 0.44 0.73 0.39 0.96 0.60 0.59
4 CE 6.75 8.30 1.30 -2.10 2.30 4.50 1.65
VE l.ofl 0.61 1.41 2.69 1.46 1.25 1.15
5 CE 7.60 6.40 -1.85 2.05 -2.70 5.60 2.35
VE 2.04 0.46 0.70 1.67 1.21 0.64 0.80
6 CE 5.70 5.10 -1.95 1.55 1.00 4.25 2.00
VE 2.41 0.69 1.12 1.73 0.79 0.56 0.15
Table D.l. Experiment II« Constant error (C.E.) and variable 
error (V.E.), for each subject In each condition« error Is 
measured In cms.. Each subject appears In only one experimental 
condition. C.E. and V.E. are collapsed after 10 recall trials.
CONDITIONS
Trials NAM NIM V M NIMV NIMM CB
1 X 6.70 7.00 0.00 0.67 -1.08 4.83 0.83
s.e. 2.25 2.76 1.40 1.63 2.33 2.48 1.60
2 x 6.90 6.80 -0.70 0.42 -1.83 5.00 0.33
s.e. 2.01 2.32 1.40 1.02 1.94 1.67 1.75
3 x 6.25 6.50 0.10 0.67 -1.33 4.67 1.33
s.e. 2.32 2.66 2.75 1.66 2.34 1.63 1.75
4 x 5.50 6.00 -0.30 0.58 -0.83 4.83 1.25
s.e. 2.07 2.53 1.75 2.20 2.99 1.17 1.33
5 x 5.00 5.80 -0.5 1.42 -1.08 5.00 1.25
s.e. 1.79 1.83 2.28 1.56 3.32 2.00 1.84
6 x 4.80 5.80 -0.30 1.33 -1.58 5.50 1.25
s.e. 2.77 2.48 1.41 2.66 2.06 1.38 1.97
1 Xr- 6.08 6.20 -0.20 1.33 -1.17 5.75 0.50
s.e. 1.86 2.79 2.30 2.71 2.21 1.67 2.07
8 x 6.67 6.30 -0.30 0.17 -1.67 4.83 0.75
S e 6 . 1.94 2.73 2.70 2.29 2.14 1.83 1.67
9 x 5.75 5.80 -0.20 0.75 -l.oo 4.75 0.58
s.e. 1.41 2.64 2.10 2.21 2.97 2.04 1.91
10 x 5.58 5.70 -0.25 0.25 -1.50 5.00 0.58
s.e. 0.92 2.58 1.70 3.66 2.28 2.19 2.27
Table D.2. Experiment II « mean error (x) and etandard error (a.e.)
per recall triali Error Is measured In CMS (6 subjects 
per cell).
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APPENDIX E
EXPERIMENT III
Conditions
Subject NAM 60 NAM 30 NIM60 NIM30 NIMV60 NIMV30 NIMM60 NIMM30
1 CE 4.45 -5.50 4.50 -5.50 2.20 0.00 7.55 -4.00
VE 1.89 1.35 1.18 0.53 1.55 1.15 1.95 0.94
2 CE 5.40 -7.60 6.25 -6.55 -1.30 -3.40 4.60 -4.20
VE 1.51 1.12 1.59 0.50 0.77 0.97 0.97 1.14
3. CE 3.70 -7.40 6.25 -4.80 0.80 1.20 7.10 -4.70
VE 0.82 2.63 1.01 0.42 0.48 1.14 1.10 0.54
4 CE 4.10 -7.20 4.65 -5.00 1.80 1.80 5.25 -5.95
VE 1.29 1.35 0.82 0.67 1.03 1.14 0.89 1.50
5 CE 5.80 0CMTT1 5.65 -5.55 -2.35 1.20 5.20 -5.75
VE 1.48 0.74 0.97 0.69 1.06 0.88 1.11 1.21
6 CE 6.60 -3.80 4.35 -5.50 0.00 -1.70 4.50 -6.05
VE 1.15 0.79 1.08 0.71 1.25 0.57 0.94 1.42
Table E.l.i Experiment III i Constant Error (C.E.) and variable error 
(V.E.) for each subject in each condition, error Is 
measured In CMS. Each subject appears In only one 
experimental condition. C.E. and V.E. are collapsed 
over 10 recall trials.
- 33f> -
Conditions
Trials NAM60 NAM 30 NIM60 NIM30 NIMV60 NIMV30 NIMM60 NIMM30
1. X 4.30 -5.30 5.40 -6.00 0.00 -0.50 5.75 -5.00
s.e. 2.42 1.50 1.30 0.89 1.27 1.05 1.99 2.28
2 X 4.20 -5.30 4.70 -5.50 1.00 -0.20 5.60 -5.20
s.e. 1.33 2.73 0.60 0.84 3.03 0.98 1.80 1.72
3 X 4.70 -6.00 4.50 -5.20 1.00 -0.30 4.80 -4.60
s.e. 0.82 1.55 0.55 0.75 3.03 1.86 1.33 0.80
4 X 6.30 -6.50 4.80 -5.50 0.30 -1.00 6.00 -5.10
s.e. 1.60 2.88 1.21 0.84 1.47 2.53 1.67 0.80
5 X 5.30 -7.00 5.30 -5.30 -0.25 -0.70 6.00 -5.30
s.e. 0.76 3.03 1.89 1.03 1.41 3.08 1.79 1.50
6 X 5.70 -5.70 5.30 -5.50 0.33 0.50 6.00 -5.25
s.e. 0.82 1.63 1.78 0.55 1.99 2.17 1.58 1.60
7 X 5.80 -5.20 5.42 -5.30 0.17 0.50 5.70 -5.50
s.e. 1.78 1.72 1.56 0.82 2.23 2.51 1.40 1.61
8 X 5.20 -6.50 5.40 -5.50 -0.08 -0.50 5.75 -4.40
s.e. 1.94 2.66 1.69 1.05 1.15 3.27 1.89 0.92
9 X 5.30 -6.30 5.80 -5.60 0.00 0.50 5.75 -5.10
s.e. 2.73 1.51 0.99 0.49 2.34 2.59 2.36 1.11
10 X 4.50 -5.70 6.10 -5.40 ■•0.25 0.20 5.70 -5.30
s.e. 1.87 1.51 1.43 0.92 2.14 1.94 1.75 1.21
Table E.2. Experiment III i Mean error (it) and standard 
error (S.E.) per recall trial» error is 
measured in CMS. (6 subjects per cell)
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APPENDIX F
EXPERIMENT IV
Conditions
Subject Verb R Vis R Motor R Verb NR Vis NR Motor NR
1 CE 5.70 0.50 6.25 10.20 0.40 5.40
VE 0.48 0.97 0.86 0.79 1.08 1.43
2 CE 5.80 1.30 4.40 4.80 1.80 4.20
VE 1.03 0.54 0.66 0.63 1.03 0.42
3 CE 5.20 0.95 4.68 5.70 -2.10 4.40
VE 0.79 0.37 0.56 0.48 0.99 1.35
4 CE 5.00 0.20 4.40 5.70 0.10 4.90
VE 0.41 0.79 0.84 0.68 1.00 0.88
5 CE 4.40 0.10 5.20 8.00 -1.20 8.20
VE 0.70 0.57 0.42 1.16 2.30 0.92
6 CE 5.10 -0.70 4.60 6.00 -0.80 7.10
VE 0.88 0.68 0.52 0.67 0.79 1.20
Table P.l. Experiment IV t Constant error (C.E.) and 
variable error (V.E.) for each subject in 
each condition; error is measurod in CMS, and 
each subject appears in only one experimental 
condition. C.E. and V.E. are collapsed over 
10 recall trials.
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Conditions
Trials Verb R Vis R Motor R Verb NR Vis NR Motor NR
1 X 4.90 0.17 4.80 6.50 -1.00 4.50
s.e. 1.28 1.33 0.75 1.97 2.10 1.87
2 x 4.90 0.17 4.30 6.33 -0.30 4.70
s.e. 0.66 1.17 0.52 2.42 1.97 2.50
3 x 4.80 0.17 4.50 6.83 -0.60 5.80
s.e. 0.75 1.17 0.55 2.32 1.84 2.14
4 x 5.00 0.50 4.80 6.67 -0.50 6.17
s.e. 0.89 1.05 0.76 2.25 1.64 1.94
5 x 5.30 0.67 4.90 6.50 0.33 6.00
s.e. 0.52 0.82 1.11 2.07 1.51 1.67
<T\
 
X 1 5.80 0.58 5.10 7.17 -1.17 6.00
s.e. 0.75 0.49 1.20 2.37 2.48 2.00
X 1 5.80 0.42 5.00 7.00 -0.33 6.17
s.e. 0.75 0.92 0.71 2.00 1.97 1.83
1 XCO 5.50 0.33 5.80 6.67 -0.17 6.00
s.e. 1.05 0.82 0.76 2.25 1.47 1.55
9 x 5.00 0.25 5.10 6.67 -0.17 5.67
s.e. 0.63 1.08 1.43 1.97 0.75 1.21
10 x 4.80 0.67 5.00 7.00 0.67 6.00
s.e. 0.75 0.52 0.89 1.67 2.16 1.55
Table F.2. Experiment IV» mean error (x) and standard
error (s.e.) per recall trial in each condition» 
error is measured in CMi?. (('subjects per coll)»
-  3 3 9  -
APPENDIX G
EXPERIMENT V
Conditions
Subjects VS AS MS VNS ANS MNS
1 CE 1.00 2.00 1.20 9.30 0.10 3.90
VE 0.60 1.60 0.90 1.90 1.50 0.70
2 CE 0.00 1.40 1.70 12.00 7.60 6.00
VE 0.80 0.40 0.90 0.90 1.60 1.00
3 CE -0.10 1.60 1.70 1.90 6.60 11.50
VE 0.90 0.90 0.00 0.30 1.00 0.90
4 CE 0.90 1.40 2.30 6.10 6.40 7.10
VE 0.60 0.60 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
5 CE 0.40 1.70 3.60 2.10 6.90 6.70
VE 0.50 0.60 0.90 0.70 1.50 0.60
6 CE 0.40 2.00 3.90 12.30 7.25 0.40
VE 0.70 1.00 1.50 1.50 1.20 0.50
Table G.l. Experiment V : Constant error (C.E.) and variable
error (V.E.) for each subject and each condition, error 
is measured in CMS. Each subject appears in only one 
experimental condition. C.E. and V.E. are collapsed over 10 
recall trials.
-  V'O -
Conditions
Trials VS AS MS VNS ANS MNS
1 X 1.17 3.43 2.33 6.50 6.17 7.83
s.e. 0.75 1.50 1.63 4.04 1.72 2.32
2 X 1.00 1.75 2.17 7.00 6.5 7.33
s.e. 0.63 1.04 1.60 4.60 1.38 2.42
3 X 0.67 1.42 3.33 8.17 7.0 7.50
s.e. 0.52 0.58 1.51 4.88 1.27 3.02
4 X 0.67 1.67 2.33 7.67 8.25 7.67
s.e. 0.98 0.52 1.51 5.72 1.33 3.20
5 X 0.58 1.50 2.17 7.83 7.17 7.17
s.e. 0.66 0.63 1.17 5.19 1.81 2.48
6 X 0.42 1.67 2.00 8.17 7.17 7.83
s.e. 0.66 0.61 1.10 5.19 4.37 3.06
7 X 0.50 1.00 2.58 7.17 6.67 7.25
s.e. 0.55 0.20 2.58 4.80 1.51 2.06
8 X 0.00 1.00 3.50 7.33 7.33 7.08
s.e. 0.89 0.55 1.97 5.54 1.21 2.15
9 X 0.50 1.58 2.58 7.50 6.25 7.16
s.e. 0.49 0.49 1.02 4.85 1.08 2.34
10 X 0.50 1.67 1.83 6.83 6.92 6.92
s.e. 0.55 0.75 1.47 4.40 2.01 2.62
Table G. 2 Experiment Vi mean error (x) and standard error
(s.e.) per recall trial, in each condition, error 
is measured in CMS (6 subjects per coll).
APPENDIX H
EXPERIMENT VI
Subjects VS AS MS VNS ANS MNS
1 CE -0.20 -21.10 -2.70 3.90 7.10 7.80
VE 2.00 3.20 3.50 1.10 1.00 1.10
2 CE -0.30 -0.30 -0.80 3.90 5.40 4.40
VE 2.10 3.70 3.30 0.90 1.20 0.50
3 CE -4.40 0.60 -2.90 5.80 3.90 5.20
VE 0.80 0.80 1.70 1.70 0.30 0.80
4 CE -3.00 7.40 -1.45 12.70 5.30 4.90
VE 2.90 2.10 2.70 1.20 0.50 0.60
5 CE 0.30 6.50 0.30 5.90 5.70 6.50
VE 0.80 4.20 2.60 1.00 0.80 0.80
6 CE -3.60 0.20 2.20 6.40 4.90 5.90
VE 4.10 0.90 1.90 0.50 0.60 1.20
Table H.2. Experiment VI: Constant error (C.E.) and 
variable error (V.E.) for each subject and 
each condition, error is measured in CMS.
Each subject appears in only one experimental 
condition. C.E. and V.E. are collapsed over 
10 recall trials.
Trials Conditions
VS AS MS VNS ANS MNS
1. X -1.67 -3.83 0.33 6.00 5.50 5.67
s. e. 2.94 11.99 1.03 3.16 0.84 1.21
2 X -1.92 - 3.00 -0.33 6.17 5.50 6.17
s.e. 3.23 10.95 2.50 3.19 1.22 1.60
3 X -1.92 - 2.50 0.66 6.50 5.67 6.17
s.e. 3.35 10.56 1.97 3.33 1.03 2.32
4 X -2.92 - 2.00 -0.92 6.58 5.17 5.67
s.e. 3.60 10.06 3.26 3.20 1.17 1.51
5 X -1.08 - 1.67 -1.08 6.50 5.00 5.83
s.e. 2.78 9.73 2.50 3.39 1.67 1.47
6 X -2.00 -1.33 -2.67 5.83 5.17 5.83
s.e. 4.22 10.05 3.39 3.76 1.60 1.47
7 X -0.67 0.17 -0.83 5.83 5.33 5.50'
s.e. 3.08 10.15 5.12 3.37 1.80 1.38
8 X -0.67 0.33 -2.67 6.50 5.33 5.67
s.e. 2.73 10.31 2.80 3.27 1.03 1.21
9 X -0.08 1.00 -0.17 7.17 5.50 5.33
s.e. 2.01 10.77 3.43 3.43 1.05 1.37
10. X -2.00 4.00 -1.33 7.17 5.67 6.00
s.e. 3.74 11.15 3.67 3.92 1.21 1.26
T a b le  H .2 .  Experim ent V I i  mean e r r o r  (x) and s t a n d a r d  e r r o r
( s . o . )  p e r  r e c a l l  t r i a l ,  e r r o r  i s  measured in
CMS. (6 s u b j e c t s  p e r  c e l l ) .
~'t*5 -
APPENDIX I
EXPERIMENT VII
Subjects
Conditions
VS AS MS VNS ANS MNS
1 CE -6.70 5.60 -3.50 0.69 0.68 -1.20
VE 2.06 1.35 2.51 0.59 0.56 0.63
2 CE 6.20 4.95 6.70 0.20 -0.75 1.40
VE 1.93 1.21 1.57 0.82 0.68 0.97
3 CE 6.60 5.85 -4.70 -0.40 0.80 1.00
VE 1.96 1.80 0.82 0.97 0.79 0.47
4 CE -4.30 7.80 -5.10 -1.40 0.20 0.30
VE 3.16 1.62 1.73 0.52 1.03 0.67
5 CE 5.30 -3.60 3.50 -0.10 -0.10 -1.30
VE 2.00 2.37 2.37 0.57 0.88 0.48
6 CE 6.40 -6.80 -5.40 0.60 0.70 1.20
VE 1.90 1.75 1.58 0.70 0.67 0.42
Table 1.1. Experiment VII « constant error (C.E.) and 
variable error (V.E.) for each subject and 
each condition. Each subject appears in 
only one experimental condition. C.E. and 
V.E. are collapsed over 10 recall trials 
(error is measured in CMS).
- 3 Vi
Conditions
Trials VS AS MS VNS ANS MNS
1 X 2.00 3.83 -0.50 0.33 -0.17 0.67
s.e. 5.29 5.08 4.81 1.21 1.17 1.37
2 X 0.00 3.00 -1.17 0.75 -0.25 0.33
s.e. 7.48 4.94 4.71 -0.25 0.88 1.03
3 X 1.67 3.50 -0.67 1.08 -0.08 0.17
s.e. 7.06 6.53 4.46 -0.17 1.02 1.72
4 X 3.00 1.83 -0.67 1.17 0.25 0.00
s.e. 4.94 5.64 5.68 -0.80 1.33 2.10
5 X 2.00 1.50 -1.50 1.26 0.42 0.00
s.e. 6.96 6.12 4.68 0.33 0.92 1.10
6 X 3.33 1.50 -2.17 0.82 0.33 0.17
s.e. 5.16 5.54 5.08 0. 48 0.52 0.98
7 X 2.33 1.16 -1.33 -0.42 0.83 -0.50
s.e. 6.65 6.52 5.54 1.36 0.98 1.38
8 X 1.67 1.42 -1.50 0.17 0.17 0.17
s.e. 7.12 7.76 5.54 0.75 0.98 0.98
9 X 1.83 2.75 -2.50 -0.17 0.33 0.17
s.e. 5.67 5.47 7.09 0.75 0.82 1.47
10 X 1.16 2.50 -2.17 0.00 0.33 0.17
s.e. 7.60 7.31 6.64 0.63 0.82 0.98
T a b l e  1 . 2 .  E xp erim en t V II*  Mean e r r o r  (x) and
s t a n d a r d 1e r r o r  ( S .E .)  p e r  r e c a l l  t r i a l ,
e r r o r  i s  measured in  CMS <6 s u b j o c t a  p e r  c e l l ) .
Conditions
Trials VS AS MS VNS ANS MNS
1 X 2.00 3.83 -0.50 0.33 -0.17 0.67
s.e. 5.29 5.08 4.81 1.21 1.17 1.37
2 X 0.00 3.00 -1.17 0.75 -0.25 0.33
s.e. 7.48 4.94 4.71 -0.25 0.88 1.03
3 X 1.67 3.50 -0.67 1.08 -0.08 0.17
s.e. 7.06 6.53 4.46 -0.17 1.02 1.72
4 X 3.00 1.83 -0.67 1.17 0.25 0.00
s.e. 4.94 5.64 5.68 -0.80 1.33 2.10
5 X 2.00 1.50 -1.50 1.26 0.42 0.00
s.e. 6.96 6.12 4.68 0.33 0.92 1.10
6 X 3.33 1.50 -2.17 0.82 0.33 0.17
s.e. 5.16 5.54 5.08 0. W 0.52 0.98
7 X 2.33 1.16 -1.33 -0.42 0.83 -0.50
s.e. 6.65 6.52 5.54 1.36 0.98 1.38
8 X 1.67 1.42 -1.50 0.17 0.17 0.17
s.e. 7.12 7.76 5.54 0.75 0.98 0.98
9 X 1.83 2.75 -2.50 -0.17 0.33 0.17
s.e. 5.67 5.47 7.09 0.75 0.82 1.47
10 X 1.16 2.50 -2.17 0.00 0.33 0.17
s.e. 7.60 7.31 6.64 0.63 0.82 0.98
T a b l e  1 . 2 .  E x p e rim e n t  V I I i  Mean e r r o r  (x) and
s t a n d a r d 1e r r o r  ( S . E . )  p e r  r e c a l l  t r i a l ,
e r r o r  i s  measured i n  CMS (6 s u b j e c t s  p e r  c e l l ) .
-  3 4 ? -
APPENDIX J
EXPERIMENT VIII
Conditions
Subjects 3oP 301 CD
1 CE 7.3 0.70 0.50
VE 2.87 1.34 0.71
2 CE 5.20 -0.1° 0.40
VE 1.87 1.54 0.52
3 CE 6.00 0.40 -0.70
VE 0.94 1.17 0.48
4 CE 5.90 0.20 0.00
VE 1.73 0.79 0.47
5 CE 5.20 1.60 0.20
VE 1.23 0.52 0.42
6 CE 5.60 0.70 0.90
VE 1.26 0.67 0.88
Table J.l. Experiment VIII : constant error (C.E.)
and variable error (V.E.) for each 
subject in each condition. Each 
subject appears in only one experimental 
condition. C.E. and V.E. are collapsed 
over 10 recall trials (error is measured 
in KflfO.
-  “A G -
Conditions
Trials 30 P 30 I C.B.
1 X 6.83 1.17 0.33
s.e. 2.71 0.98 1.03
2 X 6.17 0.50 -0.17
s.e. 1.17 1.52 0.41
3 X 6.00 0.00 -0.17
s.e. 0.63 1.41 0.41
4 X 6.67 0.33 0.33
s.e. 1.03 1.63 0.82
5 X 6.67 0.40 0.17
s.e. 1.03 1.52 0.98
6 X 6.67 0.33 0.17
s.e. 2.07 1.21 0.98
7 X 6.5 0.67 0.33
s.e. 2.66 0.52 0.82
8 X 4.80 0.33 0.33
s.e. 1.48 1.03 0.52
9 X 4.33 0.83 0.17
s.e. 0.82 0.98 0.75
10 X 4.00 1.17 0.50
s.e. 1.55 0.41 0.84
Table J.2. Experiment VIII i mean error (5c) and 
standard -error (s.e.) per recall trial 
In each condition; error is measured in 
K(js. (6 subjects per call).
